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Article 3

THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN
SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
Terry A. Maroney*
Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both
captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and
practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed
to the U.S. Supreme Court's elimination of the juvenile death penalty in
Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally
normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young
offenders, and advocates increasinglymake such arguments before the courts.
The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation,
and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic
aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental
neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted
to put it into practice.It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinalfactors
hamstringmost claims-for example, that persons with immature brains are
incapable offorming the requisite mens reafor serious crimes. Limitations
intrinsic to the science itself-for example, individual variation-alsohinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental
neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and
illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience
as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and
overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not
materially shape legal decisionmakers' beliefs and values about youthful
offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.
Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice goingforward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science
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as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices
on assumptions aboutjuveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted
and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental
factors-good schools, strongfamilies, economic opportunities, mental health
care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitativeservices-that are both
more important and subject to greater direct control.
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INTRODUCTION

This is the decade of the adolescent brain. Popular maedia
sources claim that contemporary developmental neurosciencel shows
"What Makes Teens Tick" and explains their "exasperating" behavior,
1 Developmental neuroscience, the teen-relevant portion of which also is
referred to herein as "adolescent brain science," is the study of life-course changes in
the brain's structure and function. Yuko Munakata et al., Developmental Cognitive
Neuroscience: Progress and Potential, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 122, 122-23 & box 1
(2004) (using term "developmental cognitive neuroscience" instead). It interacts
importantly with developmental psychology, "the scientific study of changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle." Laurence
Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in Yourm ON
TRIAL 9, 21 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
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including criminal acts. 2 Allstate Insurance released a major national
ad claiming that teens are "missing a part of their brain [s]" and therefore should gain driving privileges only gradually.3 Parents can now
choose among a number of self-help books offering brain-based explanations for why their adolescents are "primal" and "crazy."4
Far from being confined to popular culture, the fascination with
adolescent brain science has begun actively to percolate through legal
theory, advocacy, and lawmaking. Prominent academics argue that an
understanding of the teen brain both supports retention of a separate
juvenile justice system and illuminates the proper perspective on the
adjudication and treatment of young offenders.5 Crimes committed
by still-developing young people, these scholars urge, are less blameworthy than equivalent acts by adults; further, youths' developmental
plasticity makes them more likely to stop offending-if, that is, we
provide them with conditions conducive to rehabilitation. 6 Juveniles'
defense attorneys and policy advocates increasingly cite to such
research, which they say puts "the juvenile back in juvenile justice."7
2 Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick?, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 56; see alsoJay D.
Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 115, 115 (2007) ("Since the 1999 Columbine High School shootings, the
shortcomings of the teen brain have captivated American society as an explanation
for violent and other inappropriate adolescent behavior."); Sharon Begley, Getting
Inside a Teen Brain,NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58 ("It turns out there's a good reason
adolescent brains seem different: they are."); Joline Gutierrez Krueger, Brain Science
Offers Insight on Teen Crime, ALBUQUERQUE TRiB., Dec. 8, 2006, at Al; Leslie Sabbagh,
The Teen Brain, Hard at Work, No, Really, SCI. AM. MIND, Aug./Sept. 2006, at 20, 21-23
(presenting research suggesting that relative brain immaturity "may explain why adolescents exhibit impulsive or thoughtless behavior"); Paul Thompson, Editorial, Brain
Research Shows a Child Is Not an Adult, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, May 25, 2001, at
31A (arguing that new evidence regarding teenage brain development compels different treatment of adolescents in the justice system).
3 Allstate Insurance Co. Advertisement (2007), available at http://www.allstate.
com/content/refresh-attachments/Brain-Ad.pdf ("[When] bright, mature teenagers
sometimes do things that are 'stupid' . . . it's not really their fault. It's because their
brain hasn't finished developing.").

4

See MICHAELJ.

BRADLEY, YES, YOUR TEEN IS CRAZY! (2002); LOUANN BRIZENDINE,
31-56 (2006) (containing chapter titled "The Teen Girl Brain");
BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN (2003); DAVID WALSH, WHY Do THEY Acr THAT
WAY? A SURVIVAL GUIDE TO THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN FOR YOU AND YOUR TEEN (2004).
5 See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCorr & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 28-60 (2008).
6 See id. at 13-16.
7 Puttingthe Juvenile Back in JuvenilejusticeJuv.JusT.ISSUE BRIEF (Action for ChilTHE FEMALE BRAIN

dren N.C., Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ncchild.org/

action/images/stories/JuvenilejusticeRaisingThe Age-Brief final.pdf [hereinafter Putting the Juvenile Back in juvenile justice]; see also Wis. COUNCIL ON CHILDREN &
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Prosecutors, too, recognize the potential relevance of neuroscience,
though they are less sanguine about whether its necessary policy implications tend in the direction of greater solicitude.8 More, courts and
legislatures have begun to take note. United States Supreme Court
Justice Stevens in 2002 signaled his interest in "[n]euroscientific evidence" which "has revealed that adolescent brains are not fully developed."9 Senator Edward Kennedy in 2007 convened a hearing on the
0
juvenile-justice implications of brain development.' Many scholars,
attorneys, commentators, and courts believe that such science played
a critical role in Roper v. Simmons,"I in which the Supreme Court abolRETHINKING THE JUVENILE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2006) [hereinafter
RETHINKING THE JUVENILE]; Wendy Paget Henderson, Life after Roper: UsingAdolescent
Brain Science in Court, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chicago, IL), Fall/Winter
2009, at 1 ("[A]ttorneys [are] . . . moving adolescent brain development front and
center into the juvenile and criminal court.").
This Article uses the terms "juvenile advocates" and "advocates" to signify both
defense attorneys and employees and affiliates of institutes that advocate forjuveniles'
FAMILIES,

interests.

8 See, e.g.,

Am. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., A PROSECUTOR'S GUIDE TO PSYCHO-

LOGICAL EVALUATIONS AND COMPETENCY CHALLENGES IN JUVENILE COURT

1, 18, 42-45

(2006) (presenting data with goal of disputing "sham mental defenses" and countering "disturbing" trend of using "expert testimony to excuse the dangerous and
harmful behavior of youth"); Two TrainingOpportunities,IN RE EXPREss (Nat'l Juvenile

Justice Prosecution Ctr., Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 2004 (listing "Adolescent Brain" training program in Columbus, Ohio in May 2004); Course Schedule, National District
Attorneys Association Education Division (Oct. 2007-Mar. 2008), availableat http://
www.ndaa.org/pdf/naccourse-scheduleoct_07_mar_08.pdf (stating, in listing for
course on "The Adolescent Brain," that "participants will have a better understanding
of adolescent brain development" enabling cross-examination of defense experts); see
also Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public
Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 5-9), available at
http://www.temple.edu/psychology/lds/documents/adolescentbrainscienceandpublicpolicy.pdf (describing how in the case of Omar Khadr, a fifteen-year-old held at
GuantAnamo Bay, military prosecutor questioned defense expert about brain development in effort to show Khadr was fully responsible for alleged actions).
9 In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 971 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
10 Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development and Juvenilejustice Before the Subcomm. on
Healthy Familiesand Communities of the S. Comm. on Educationand Laborand the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Oth Cong.
(2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development].
11 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also, e.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2006-CA001247-MR, 2006-CA-002074-MR, 2008 WL 1991612, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. May 9, 2008)
(stating that Roper Court discussed adolescent brain development); Ken Strutin,
Neurolaw: New InterdisciplinaryResearch Enters Legal System, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13, 2009, at 5
("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court .. . concluded that juveniles did not merit the death
penalty because, among other reasons, their brains were not as developed as adults.").
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ished the juvenile death penalty. 12 Many now assert that brain science
might, and should, play an even larger role going forward.
This Article argues that, contrary to the high expectations many
have placed on developmental neuroscience, it will-and shouldhave fairly modest effects on juvenile justice. Not only is this correct
as a matter of theory, it is being borne out in practice. To show how
this is so, this Article offers the first attempt systematically to identify
and analyze cases in which advocates have attempted to put developmental neuroscience into practice. The case analysis demonstrates
that most such efforts fail, for two primary reasons: a disconnect
between scientific findings and the questions asked by legal doctrine,
and limitations posed by the science itself. Though the analysis
reveals instances in which courts cite approvingly to brain-science
arguments, in no such case does that science appear to have been
outcome-determinative.
The relative inefficacy of brain science in influencing court outcomes illuminates significant theoretical and practical barriers to such
influence. Those barriers counsel that that the trend toward urging
reliance on such science be significantly moderated.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the ascendance of
the teen brain within juvenile justice as a product of three streams'
confluence: juvenile justice's close historical relationship with developmental psychology, a science that began a significant expansion in
the 1980s; the radical growth of neuroscience, including developmental neuroscience, in the 1990s; and an emerging post-2000 dialogue
between legal scholars and neuroscientists. Importantly, this confluence coincided with a widespread, sharp move away from traditional
juvenile justice values,' 3 as virtually every state in the 1990s began to
treat far more juveniles as adults and to shrink the benefits-such as
confidentiality-youth previously had enjoyed. Scholars and advocates began to see brain research as a tool to close an apparent disjuncture between science, which increasingly showed that juveniles
12 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
13 This Article uses the term "traditional juvenile justice values" to capture the
primary features of the juvenile justice system in the period between In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), and the mid-1990s. That period was characterized by the introduction
of largely adult-like procedural safeguards (such as the right to counsel) and retention of core historical features such as confidentiality, record sealing, attention to
individual characteristics and family circumstances, time-limited sanctions, and a
focus on treatment and rehabilitation. See Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection
Between Developmental Science andjuvenilejustice, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 493, 499-506 (2009)
(reviewing Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 5) (offering similar definition of an
"evolved" traditional model).
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and adults are different, and law, which increasingly treated juveniles
and adults as if they were the same. Efforts to abolish the juvenile
death penalty reflected this new tactic. That the Supreme Court
appeared to take cognizance of the science-and did, in fact, eliminate the death penalty-provided significant encouragement to that
project.
Part II demonstrates that, despite projections, adolescent brain
science has had, is likely to have, and should have only moderate
impact in the courts. First, courts tend to regard even scientifically
sound claims as legally irrelevant. For example, contemporary analysis of intentional mens rea asks only whether a defendant desired or
knew that a result would obtain, while neuroscientific arguments
invite a focus on substantive irrationality notwithstanding specific
intent. Second, scientific limitations often hinder such claims. For
example, because developmental neuroscience supports only probabilistic generalizations about youth as a class, it is unhelpful in making
highly individualized determinations such as formation of intent.
Direct reliance on neuroscience also has implications for equality and
autonomy commitments, of which scholars and advocates have taken
insufficient notice. Further, the pressures of advocacy incentivize
defenders and advocates to downplay the legal-scientific mismatch or
to overplay scientific findings (and incentivizes prosecutors and skeptics to do the opposite). Such distortions, not unique to the juvenile
justice context but present in it, create a danger of poorly justified
decisions.
Part III, however, argues that neuroscience nonetheless has a
role-albeit a small one-to play in shaping juvenile justice policy.
Neuroscience has more natural traction within juvenile justice than in
adult criminal law. Rather than raising deep and likely unsolvable
questions about human agency, it simply reinforces the (once) noncontroversial idea that, as a group, young people differ from adults in
systematic ways directly relevant to their relative culpability, deterrability, and potential for rehabilitation. This message is well worth
articulating; the cautionary point is that the theoretical and advocacy
uses of adolescent brain science should mirror only the level of generality that the science can support. At this moment, that level of generality is fairly high. Similar lessons from the broader contemporary
debate over the use of neuroscience in criminal law have not yet penetrated the dialogue within juvenile justice; this Article shows that they
should. More, while neuroscientific evidence may be thought
uniquely persuasive, this Article instead suggests that developmental
neuroscience is legally persuasive only insofar as it aligns with decisionmakers' values, beliefs, and commitments.
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The Article concludes that legal decisionmakers acting in a policymaking role-usually legislatures but sometimes the courts-therefore ought to consider developmental neuroscience one source
among many upon which to draw when making legally relevant
assumptions about adolescents as a group. To go further is unwarranted and unwise.
I.

ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE:

AN OVERVIEW

Adolescent brain science came to occupy its current prominence
within juvenile justice because of the confluence of three distinct phenomena. Developmental psychology, always important within juvenile
justice, became far more sophisticated; neuroscientific technology
improved dramatically, facilitating ever more finely grained insights,
including about youth; and scholars began a dialogue over the legal
implications of neuroscience. By the early part of this century the
confluence created the conditions for a close examination of the legal
relevance of juvenile brain development. This Part traces this trajectory, describes the relevant findings of developmental neuroscience,
shows how that science was invoked in Roper, and details the range of
legal issues to which scholars now argue it to be relevant.
A.

Developmental Psychology and Neuroscience

Theories of adolescence as a developmental stage importantly distinct from both childhood and adulthood always have been central to
juvenile justice, underlying not only the core idea-that of having a
separate system at all-but also the attributes of that system.14 However, for most of the twentieth century developmental psychology was
in a fairly primitive state and focused primarily on young children.15
See Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22J.
L. 445, 447-48 (1983-84) (discussing how juvenile courts are tasked with devising a developmentally appropriate approach to offending).
15 See Nicholas Hobbs & Sally Robinson, Adolescent Development and PublicPolicy, 37
Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 212, 213-16 (1982) (explaining how researchers believed that "by
the adolescent years, it is too late to make any difference" in the cognitive development of young people). Several theorists did venture into adolescent development
even during this early era. See id. at 217-18; ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY YOUTH AND
CRISIS 128-35 (1968); BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL
THINKING 344-50 (Anne Parsons & Stanley Milgram trans., 1958); Lawrence Kohlberg
& Elliot Turiel, Moral Development and Moral Education, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE (G. Lesser ed., 1971). These early theories occasionally were
reflected in law. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) (citingJEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1948)).
But see Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
14
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In the empirical void about teen development, courts, policymakers,
and the public relied primarily on "common sense," or what they
believed to be true based on experience and observation. 1 6 Common
sense failed to provide a stable basis for delinquency policy: it is sufficiently elastic as to be consistent with competing theories, and the
view it provides is myopic. 1 7 Beliefs about the causes of and cures for
delinquent behavior therefore have vacillated wildly, carrying policy
with them.' 8
It wasn't until the 1980s that a sustained program of relevant
empiricism took hold.19 Scientists began to study teens' risk-taking
behaviors; 20 "sensation-seeking"; 21 ability to adopt a future-time perspective; 22 perceptions of personal vulnerability;2 3 attitudes toward
VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1627 & n.72, 1632-33 (1992) (explaining that Piaget's theory of
cognitive development is now largely discredited).
16 See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as ConstitutionalLaw, 62 VAND. L.
REv. 851, 859-68 (2009) (defining "common sense"); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of
Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & Pot'v REv. 143, 146 (2003) (describing the
historical reliance on common sense in juvenile justice).
17 Experiences with youthful offending (and one's resulting common sense about
it) vary across a population and over time. Further, a commonsense theory might be
accurate as to some juveniles, in some circumstances, some of the time, but fail as a
generalizable account. Cf Maroney, supranote 16, at 877-902 (illustrating that decisions based on common sense are not always subject to categorization as empirically
correct or incorrect, but often are best understood as indicators of a person's underlying worldview); Scott, supra note 15, at 1669 (explaining that the goal of research is to
"replace intuition with insight"); Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 22 (maintaining that "[c]ommon sense and casual observation" tell us that children and adults are
different but cannot reliably indicate whether particular differences are "substantial
and consistent enough to potentially shape either public policy or legal practice").
18 Like the delinquent in "Gee, Officer Krupke," juveniles have been shoved
between competing theories. See ARTHUR LAURENTS ET AL., WEST SIDE STORY 114-18
(1958) (music by Leonard Bernstein and lyrics by Stephen Sondheim); see also TaylorThompson, supra note 16, at 172 (asserting that adolescents have sometimes been
regarded as "wholly vulnerable and incompetent children in need of paternalistic
strategies designed to guide their conduct," and sometimes as "fully calculating and
sometimes sociopathic mini-adults deserving society's harshest punishment").
19 See Hobbs & Robinson, supra note 15, at 219-20; Melton, supranote 14, at 458.
20 See ADoLEscNT RISK TAKINc (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 339 (1992); Ruth Beyth-Marom et al., Perceived Consequences of Risky Behaviors:
Adults and Adolescents, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 549 (1993).
21 SeeJeffrey Arnett, Sensation Seeking: A New Conceptualizationand a New Scale, 16
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCEs

289 (1994).

22 See A.L. Greene, Future-TimePerspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things Future
Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99 (1986); Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents
See Their Future?A Review of the Development of FutureOrientationand Planning,11 DEvELOPMENTAL REv. 1 (1991).
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authority;24 self-concept;2 5 peer orientation; 26 and decisionmaking. 27
Research generally showed that teenagers are indeed distinct from
both children and adults. For example, normal teens show a marked
increase in risk-taking behavior, though they often display adult-level
cognitive understanding of risk; they also display far higher levels of
peer orientation and sensation-seeking. 2 8 Of particular importance
for juvenile justice, research demonstrated that some level of delinquent behavior is normal, particularly for boys, and that the vast
majority of teens "age out" of such offending.2 9 Psychologists and
legal scholars began in the 1980s a collaborative effort to define and
measure teens' law-relevant psychological attributes, such as competence to waive Miranda rights or choose abortion.3 0 Nevertheless, in
the early 1990s juvenile justice policy was still largely being "devised in
a context of empirical uncertainty,"3 1 and scholars undertook a conSee Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 Am. PSYCHOL102 (1993).
24 See K. Rigby & E.E. Rump, Attitudes Toward Parents and InstitutionalAuthorities
DuringAdolescence, 109 J. PSYCHOL. 109 (1981).
25 See Susan Harter et al., The Development of Multiple Role-Related Selves DuringAdolescence, 9 DEVELOPMENTAL PSCYHOPATHOLOGY 835 (1997).
26 See B. Bradford Brown et al., ParentingPracticesand Peer Group Affiliation in Adolescence, 64 CHILD DEv. 467 (1993); Delbert S. Elliott & Scott Menard, Delinquent
Friends and Delinquent Behavior: Temporal and Developmental Patterns, in DELINQUENCY
AND CRIME 28 (J. David Hawkins ed., 1996).
27 See Catherine Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades
Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEv. 538 (1981); Leon Mann et al.,
Adolescent Decision-Making: The Development of Competence, 12 J. ADOLESCENCE 265
(1989); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity offudgment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 249 (1996).
28 See SCOrr & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 38-44; B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent
Brain, 1124 ANNALs N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111, 112, 122 (2008) (describing how impulse
control shows linear improvement with age, but risk-taking behavior increases then
23

GIST

decreases over adolescence).

29 See FRANKUN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 63, 91-103 (2005) ("The
central notion of . . . 'adolescence-limited' offending is that the cure for youth crime
is growing up."); Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-PersistentAntisocial
Behavior A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675-79 (1993); Edward P.
Mulvey & Mark Aber, Growing out of Delinquency: Development and Desistance, in THE
ABANDONMENT OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 99, 100-01 (Richard L. Jenkins & Wain K.
Brown eds., 1988).
30 See, e.g., Melton, supranote 14, at 448, 463 & n.87 (discussing how "the overriding contemporary issue in the law affecting children is the limits of their compe-

tence," which has seen "the most rapid growth in recent research"); Elizabeth S. Scott
et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221,
221-23 (1995); Scott, supra note 15, at 1623, 1627-28 & nn.60, 67 ("Much of the
analysis of adolescent competence has focused on medical decisionmaking.").
31 Scott, supra note 15, at 1663.
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certed effort to close that gap.3 2 By the late 1990s a respectable body
of research was in place, more research was underway, and advocates
increasingly cited to such research. 3 3
At precisely this same time, a veritable revolution was taking place
in neuroscience. Technological breakthroughs allowed for increasingly sophisticated observation of human brains in vivo, including
those of young people, 34 a development that quickly drew widespread
attention.3 5
Widely publicized structural imaging studies demonstrated in
1999 that the brains of normal adolescents are still developing.3 6
Such findings, later replicated, challenged an ingrained scientific
belief that such maturation was largely complete in early childhood.3 7
Adolescent structural maturation, these studies showed, appeared to
revolve around two processes: myelination, or insulation of neural
axons with a fatty substance referred to as "white matter," and changes
32 See Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz, Introductionto YOUTH ON TIAL, supra
note 1, at 1, 3-5 (explaining how the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice was founded in 1995 to respond to
"society's need for a scientific initiative that would address the implications of adolescent development for the construction of rational juvenile justice policy and law").
33 See generally YOUTH ON TIUAL, supra note 1, at 67-265 (presenting a series of
articles showing the relevance of developmental research to juvenile justice); Donald
L. Beschle, The juvenilejustice Counterrevolution:Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the
Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 95-100 (1999)
(joining developmental and legal research in juvenilejustice context); Richard E.
Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social
Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 723-33 (same, in context of trying juveniles as
adults).
34 See L.P. Spear, Adolescent Brain Development and Animal Models, 1021 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 23, 23-24 & fig. 1 (2004). For a review of such studies, see generally
Casey et al., supra note 28, at 113.
35 See, e.g., Tim Jarvis, The Brain Age, 0 OPRAH MAC., Nov. 2008, at 169, 170, 174;
Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49, 50-53.
36 See Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adole.F-ence: A
Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861-62 (1999); Tomis Paus et
al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and Adolescents: In Vivo Study,
283 SCIENCE 1908, 1908 (1999); Elizabeth Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859,
860-61 (1999). Explanations of the technology behind structural and functional
brain imaging are legion. See, e.g., B.J. Casey et al., Imaging the Developing Brain: What
Have We Learned About Cognitive Development?, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 104, 104-105 &
box 1 (2005); Teneille R. Brown & Emily R. Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly-Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 15-31, on file with author).
37 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 119 ("For most of the 20th century, experts
believed that the most important period for human brain development was the first 3
years of a person's life.").
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in the volume and density of "gray matter," or neuron cell bodies and
synapses. 3 8 Healthy brains showed linear increases in white matter
from childhood until adulthood, indicating a progressive increase in
potential for fast, efficient communication among brain systems. 39
Scientists also identified "a preadolescent increase followed by a postadolescent decrease" in gray matter, 40 showing that the early adolescent brain experiences an overproduction of neurons similar to one
previously observed in very early childhood. Following this second
wave of "exuberance," neural connections are over the course of adolescence sharply "pruned back"-likely because of relative use, dependent on life experiences, and reflecting a "fine tuning" of ability.41
Further, both pruning and myelination were shown to affect different
regions of the brain at different times; the brain's evolutionarily new
frontal cortices are the last fully to achieve structural maturity. 42 This
finding was particularly meaningful, as the frontal cortices are responsible for higher-order reasoning and "executive control"-fluid coordination of cognition and emotion, goal-directed planning and
forethought, and impulse control.4 3 A small number of functional
imaging studies additionally suggested that adolescents might tend to
38 See Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 861-62; Sowell et al., supranote 36, at 860; see
also Charles A. Nelson III et al., Neural Bases of Cognitive Development, in CHILD & ADoLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 19, 24-25 (William Damon & Richard M. Lerner eds., 2008)
(describing the processes of synaptic pruning and myelination).
39 See Giedd et al., supranote 36, at 861; Paus et al., supra note 36, at 1908-09; see
also Abigail A. Baird, The Developmental Neuroscience of CriminalBehavior, in THE IMPACT
OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAw 81, 99 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009) ("It
[is] well established that myelination has a direct impact on the speed and efficiency
of neural processing."). The developmental tradeoff is that the brain "is probably
losing some of its raw potential for learning and its ability to recover from trauma."
Wallis, supra note 2, at 59.
40 See Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 861; see also Sowell et al., supranote 36, at 860
(summarizing experimental observations of reductions in grey matter between adolescence and adulthood).
41 See B.J. Casey et al., Structuraland FunctionalBrain Development and Its Relation to
Cognitive Development, 54 BIoL. PSYCHOL. 241, 243 (2000); see also STRAUCH, supra note
4, at 9, 15 (defining "exuberance"); Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 863 ("[S]econd
wave of overproduction of synapses . . . may herald a critical stage of development
when the environment or activities of the teenager may guide selective synapse elimination during adolescence."); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 439 (2000)
(explaining how the brain is "sculpted on the basis of experience to effectively accommodate environmental needs").
42 See Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 861-62; see also Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic
Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101
PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 8174, 8174 (2004) (finding back-to-front pattern).
43 MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 75 (2d ed. 2002).
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employ different brain processes than adults when carrying out identi-

cal tasks.44
Thus, by the early 2000s neuroscience supported the notion that
teen brains are structurally and functionally different from those of
both children and adults. A developmentally normal combination of
pruning and myelination results eventually in a brain that is better
equipped quickly and efficiently to respond appropriately to life's
challenges and perform the types of tasks for which the person has
trained. While the average normal adolescent's physical capacity for
such maturity far exceeds that of a child, it falls short of that of the
average normal adult. As developmental psychology by that time
strongly indicated that "many of the [I] aptitudes" known to be associated with the implicated brain areas "continue to develop between
adolescence and young adulthood,"45 a behavioral link appeared logical. It therefore was possible to link the two streams of research and
to hypothesize that to "the extent that transformations occurring in
adolescent brain contribute to the characteristic behavioral predispositions of adolescence, adolescent behavior is in part biologically
determined." 46
This narrative, joining together the complimentary implications
of behavioral studies and direct brain observation, emerged against
the backdrop of a larger dialogue then taking shape over the implications of neuroscience for law. 4 7 Scholars predicted that emerging
brain science would be particularly relevant to criminal law, given the
44 See, e.g., Abigail A. Baird et al., FunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial
Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSVCHIATRY 195, 198-99 (1999).
45 Sowell et al., supranote 36, at 860 (stating that teens lack structural maturity in
brain areas "essential for such functions as response inhibition, emotional regulation,
planning and organization").
46 Spear, supra note 41, at 447.
47 A survey of the rapidly expanding literature on law and neuroscience is beyond
the scope of this Article. See generally LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006) (collecting works on neuroscience's influence in law); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (projecting developments to which
neuroscience might lead and examining how the law might affect, and be affected by,
them); Baird, supra note 39, at 89-100 (asserting that brain maturation supports the
coordination of emotional and cognitive capacities, facilitating behavioral conformance to socially mandated standards); Scott T. Grafton et al., Brain Scans Go Legal, Sci.
Am. MIND, Dec.2006/Jan. 2007, at 30 (discussing the impact of neuroimaging on
assessments of criminal responsibility); Symposium, Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM.
J. L. & MED. 163 (2007) (presenting nine articles on neurotechnology and law); Law
and Neuroscience Project, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2009) (describing the MacArthur Foundation funded national research
project).
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centrality of mental states to criminal responsibility.4 8 The most
aggressive claim was that neuroscience would upend entrenched concepts of free will and responsibility underlying all criminal law. 49 A
more modest prediction was that neuroscience might improve identification and understanding of the types of irrationality already relevant to criminal law.50 For instance, better understanding of the
effects of brain damage might help demonstrate that a defendant is
adjudicatively incompetent.5 1 Particularly because juvenile justicefar more than the adult criminal system-explicitly invites insights
from the mind sciences, this particular brain-law connection appeared
especially promising to both scholars and advocates.
It also appeared to be much needed. Completely separately from
the development taking place in psychology and neuroscience, the
law of juvenile justice began in the 1990s to undergo a convulsive
change of its own. Prompted by what appeared to be a spike in gunrelated youth homicides, commentators and policymakers warned of a
new breed of juvenile "superpredators" who would be responsible for
a "coming bloodbath" of youth crime.5 2 States responded with an
impressive amount of juvenile justice legislation in an extremely short
48 See Semir Zeki & Oliver R. Goodenough, Introduction to LAW AND THE BRAIN,
supra note 47, at xi, xiii-xiv.
49 SeeJoshua Greene &Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, in LAW AND THE BRAIN, supra note 47, at 207, 224 (detailing and
debunking most such claims but arguing nonetheless that neuroscience will dispel
"illusion" of free will and cause retributive theories to "give way to consequentialist
ones, thus radically transforming our approach to criminal justice"). Scholarship
seeking to moderate the strongest claims, see, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the
Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in CriminalLaw, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009),
far outnumbers scholarship actually making those claims.
50 Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE
LAw, supra note 47, at 157, 181, 186-87 ("[N]euroscience will surely discover much
more about the types of conditions that can compromise rationality [under current
legal standards and] may help adjudicate excusing and mitigating claims more
accurately.").
51 See generally Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "RationalUnderstanding,"
and the CriminalDefendant, 43 AM. Cium. L. REV. 1375, 1381-82 (2006) (discussing the
concept of adjudicative competence and exploring the impact of brain damage); cf
Anemona Hartocollis, In Support of Sex Attacker's Insanity Plea, a Look at His Brain, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2007, at B3 (describing how Peter Braunstein introduced neuroscientific evidence of brain damage in a rape and kidnapping trial in an unsuccessful effort
to demonstrate that mental illness prevented formation of mens rea).
52 See Hearingson the Juvenilejustice and DelinquencyPrevention Act: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. On Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the S. Comm. on Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong., 90 (1996) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm.) ("Brace yourself for the coming generation of 'superpredators.'"); Peter Annin, 'Superpredators' Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of
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period of time-indeed, during the 1990s nearly every state amended
its juvenile code.53 States made it far easier to transfer ever-younger
children to adult court for an ever-growing list of offenses, eroded
confidentiality protections, and de-emphasized rehabilitation.54
Hindsight shows that the "coming bloodbath" never materialized; the
youth homicide spike fell off quickly, and juvenile crime has been at
historic lows for some time.5 5 The deep systemic changes enacted in
response to those fears, though, remain largely in place. In important
respects, the juvenile system became indistinguishable from the adult
one, and the benefits it retained became available to fewer young
persons.56
Vicious Kids?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57; John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the
Super-Predators,WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23.
53 See Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, State Legislative Responses to ViolentJuvenile Crime: 1996-1997 Update, Juv. JusT. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1998, at 1
(summarizing state legislative action reforming juvenile law in the areas of "jurisdictional authority," 'judicial disposition," "sentencing authority," "corrections programming," "confidentiality," and "juvenile crime victims"), available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf; see also, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102 (2008) (created by
1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1595, as amended by 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 68) (establishing "a
system of juvenile justice" to "protect, restore, and improve public safety" and that
"will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law"); Juvenile Corrections Act,
1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 65 (codified as amended in scattered sections of IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 20-501 (2006)) (establishing ajuvenile corrections system based on community protection and juvenile accountability); ZIMRING, supra note 29, at 105-06 (noting this trend).
54 See Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development andjuvenile justice, supra note 10, at
4-5 (testimony of Michael A. Corriero) (characterizing states' legislative changes as "a
collective regression that resulted in discarding or ignoring ancient assumptions, conventional wisdom, and conscientious research").
55 See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND Vicrims, at iii (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
ojstatbb/nr2006 ("[T]he rate of juvenile violent crime arrests has consistently
decreased since 1994, falling to a level not seen since at least the 1970s."); ZIMRING,
supra note 29, at 120-22 (noting that youth crime rates already were dropping at the
time the predictions were being made).
56 See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (extending jury right to juvenile
court because it has become so similar to adult court). Children as young as eleven
now have been tried as adults, see People v. Abraham, 662 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003), and thousands who committed serious crimes as minors are serving
sentences of life without parole, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, THE
REST OF THEIR LIVEs 25-31 (2005) (reporting that, as of 2004, 2225 youth offenders
were serving life without parole and noting a sharp rise in such cases since the 1980s).
Some scholars attribute this trend in part to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), on the
theory that importation of adult procedures into juvenile court paved the way for
treatingjuveniles like adults more generally. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish theJuvenile
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Scholars and advocates in the late 1990s therefore correctly perceived that science and law were moving in precisely opposite directions: the former was solidifying around the view that adolescents are
different from adults in ways directly relevant to their culpability and
capacity for change, while the latter was solidifying around the view
that adolescents, particularly older ones or those accused of very serious crimes, ought to be treated like adults. 5 7
B.

The Brain-Based Challenge to the juvenile Death Penalty5 8

Scholars and juvenile advocates soon saw an opportunity to use
brain science to break the tension and move law in their preferred
direction: a challenge to the juvenile death penalty. This challenge
provided a critical testing ground.59
Though the Supreme Court had in Stanford v. Kentuckyso upheld
the constitutionality of the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds, 6 1 states remained free to eliminate it. In 2000 a coalition of
advocates began a state-by-state effort to convince them to do so, and
made a strategic decision to rely heavily on recent findings in developmental psychology and neuroscience. 62 Researchers increasingly
incorporated testimony about the teen brain into legislative testiCourt: Youthfulness, CriminalResponsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-

68, 69-70, 72-74 (1997).
57 See, e.g., RETHINKING THEJUVENILE, supra note 7, at 4 (contrasting presumptions
underlying legislative changes of the 1990s with implications of "new information
about adolescent brain development").
58 This Article does not seek to replicate others' extensive accounts of Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 2, at 123-37; Deborah W.
Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379
(2006); Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age
Discrimination,2005 Sup. CT. REV. 51 (2006); Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons:The Role
of the Science Brief 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 369 (2006).
59 Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 408 (2006) ("Roper has been the most important
case to propose use of the new neuroscience to affect responsibility questions
generally.").
60 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
61 Id. at 378 (permitting states to execute those 16 and older at the time of their
crimes). But see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-37 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for those 15 and under at time of
crime).
62 See Patrick Boyle, Behind the Death Penalty Ban, YouTH TODAY, Apr. 2005, at 1
(noting that the advocates sought to get "the scientific/medical community talking
with the child advocacy community" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
NOLOGY
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mony, even bringing along plastic brain models to illustrate their
points.63
A series of unexpected events quickly upped the ante. In June
2002 the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia" reversed course on the
constitutionality of executing mentally retarded persons. 65 In so
doing it overturned a case 66 decided the same day as Stanford; further,
the Atkins Court discussed relevant characteristics of the mentally
retarded-for example, their relative deficiencies in controlling
impulses-in a manner strongly paralleling arguments then being
crafted as to adolescents. More, while Atkins was pending, Kevin Stanford-of Stanford-filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, relying
in part on developmental neuroscience.67 The Court denied the petition but four Justices dissented.6 8 Importantly, Justice Stevens explicitly endorsed Stanford's scientific arguments:
63 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 128 (stating that legislators were sometimes convinced to see the issue as "'not just a matter of law and morality, but [one] of adolescent development'" (quoting Mark Moran, Adolescent BrainDevelopment Argues Against
Teen Executions, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 16, 2003, at 8 (2003)); Mary Beckman, Crime,
Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCIENCE 596, 596 (2004) ("The latest states [to
ban the juvenile death penalty], Wyoming and South Dakota, considered brain development research in their decisions."); Boyle, supra note 62 (stating that such
presentations, being given as early as the 1980s, gained momentum after 2000).
64 536 U.S. 304, 314-16 (2002).
65 Id. at 314-16.
66 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of
executing mentally retarded persons).
67 See Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Stanford, No. 01-10009
(U.S. Oct. 21, 2002); Supplemental Brief in Support of Original Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Stanford, No. 01-10009 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2002).
68 See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for writ of habeas corpus). The Governor of Kentucky in December 2003
commuted Stanford's sentence to life without parole. Stanford v. Commonwealth,
248 S.W.3d 579, 580 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (denying new sentencing hearing after commutation of sentence); VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENAL'TY TODAY 6
(2005), available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty-staff/faculty-profiles/coursematerials/streib/juvdeath.pdf.
Napoleon Beazley and Toronto Patterson, also on death row for crimes committed asjuveniles, filed similar petitions in this same time period. Unlike Stanford, they
faced imminent execution. Neither appears to have brought brain science to the
Court's attention, though Patterson had done so before the state courts. See Declaration of Dr. Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (No. 026010) [hereinafter Gur, Patterson Declaration], available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/juvjus/Gur%20affidavit.pdf. Three Justices dissented from denial of his
petition, saying the time had come to reconsider Stanford. Patterson, 536 U.S. at 984
(Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution); see also Beazley v. Texas, 535
U.S. 1091 (2002) (denying Beazley's petition for writ of certiorari); In re Beazley, 535
U.S. 1094 (2002) (denying Beazley's request for a stay of execution). Beazley and
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Neuroscientific evidence of the last few years has revealed that adolescent brains are not fully developed, which often leads to erratic

behaviors and thought processes in that age group. Scientific
advances such as the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging-MRI scans-have provided valuable data that serve to make
the case even stronger that adolescents "are more vulnerable, more
impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults."6 9
The post-Atkins moment fed a groundswell of attention to the
teen brain from advocates, commentators, and the media.7 0 Indeed,
in late 2003 defense counsel for Lee Malvo-the teenager convicted
of participating in the Washington, D.C. area "sniper slayings" while
under the influence of an adult he regarded as his father-invoked

Patterson were executed. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the
U.S. 1608-2002, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ESPYyear.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2009) (listing execution dates of May 28, 2002 for Beazley, and Aug. 28, 2002, for
Patterson). Scott Allen Hain relied in part on developmental neuroscience in a similar petition; it was denied and he too was executed. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18-22, Hain v. Mullin, 537 U.S. 1173 (2003) (No. 02-6438); see also Hain, 537
U.S. at 1173 (2003) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Execution Database, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions (search in field "Search by Name" for "Scott Allen Hain") (last visited Oct.
30, 2009) (listing execution date of Apr. 3, 2003 for Hain). Finally, Ron Chris Foster
made a similar application. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19-25, Foster v. Epps,
537 U.S. 1054 (2003) (No. 02-6655); see also Foster,537 U.S. at 1054 (denying petition
for writ of certiorari). As he was still alive when Roper was decided (because of a
pending Atkins claim) he was resentenced to life without parole. See Foster v. State,
961 So. 2d 670, 672 (Miss. 2007).
69 Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ
of habeas corpus) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
70 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales
for the CategoricalExemption Forjuveniles from CapitalPunishment, 33 N.M. L. REv. 207,
207-10 (2003); Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of
Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463 (2003); Morse,
supra note 59, at 408 ("Editorial pages encouraged the High Court to consider the
neuroscientific evidence . . . ."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming

Youth, 81 TEx. L. REv. 799, 811-29 (2003); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott,
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1009-10 (2003); Adam Ortiz,
Adolescence, Brain Development, and Legal Culpability,Juv. JUST. CENTER (Am. Bar Ass'n,
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2004, at 1, 3 (arguing that brain research demonstrates "adolescents are less morally culpable for their actions than competent adults and are
more capable of change and rehabilitation"); Sarah Spinks, Adolescent Brains Are Works
in Progress, PBS, Jan. 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/work/adolescent.html.
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incomplete brain development as a reason jurors should spare
Malvo's life. 7 '
In August of 2003 the Missouri Supreme Court defied Stanford
and ruled the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional.7 2 Certiorari
was granted in Roper v. Simmons in January 2004.73
Christopher Simmons's lawyers chose prominently to highlight
adolescent brain science in their briefs, arguing that "the parts of the
brain that enable impulse control and reasoned judgment," as well as
"competent decision-making, control of emotions, and moral judgment," are "not yet fully developed in 16- and 17-year-olds," deficits
rendering them less culpable, less deterrable, and less than the "'fully
71 See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Malvo Closing Argument, CRIm. JusT. MAG., Spring
2004, at 73, 74 (providing a partial transcript of defense counsel's closing argument).
The defense called as a mitigation expert Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic psychologist
involved in Atkins, see CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL
219-22 (2006), to testify about teen brain research. The defense's closing argument,
which some jurors later credited with their decision to spare Malvo the death penalty,
included the following:
Intelligence does not equate to judgment. Intelligence does not equate to
maturity.... You may have seen it on the front cover of Newsweek a year or
so ago. It had a picture of the juvenile brain. It's called brain imaging. It's
hard science. That shows that the juvenile brain is different. . . . [T]he
frontal lobe of the juvenile brain is not developed. It's the CEO of the brain
.... It is the portion of the brain that gives us our judgment, and it doesn't
fully develop until we're into our early 20s .

. .

. [A]nd that's why we, as a

society, have chosen not to grant full responsibilities . . . to teenagers.
Shepherd, supra, at 74.
72 State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003). Simmons had
presented developmental neuroscience evidence before the Missouri Supreme Court.
See Petitioner's Statement, Brief, and Argument at 50-54, Simmons, 112 S.W.3d 397
(No. 84454), 2003 WL 24219767. The court did not consider this evidence. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 412 ("While the parties have cited this Court to numerous current
studies and scientific articles about the structure of the human mind, the continuing
growth of those portions of the mind that control maturity and decision-making during adolescence and young adulthood, and the lesser ability of teenagers to reason,
this Court need not look so far afield.").
73 Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004). While Roper was pending New
Hampshire held hearings on a bill to abolish the juvenile death penalty. Two
researchers testified about developmental neuroscience. See, e.g., Hearing on SB 513
Relative to the Death Penalty Before S. Comm. Onjudiciary, 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) [hereinafter Hearing on SB 513] (testimony of David Fassler, M.D.).
Once certiorari was granted in Roper, a Delaware juvenile moved to preclude the
state from seeking the death penalty. See State v. Jones, No. 9911016309, 2004 WL
2190097 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2004), reh'g denied, No. 9911016309, 2005 WL
950122 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2005). The court offered to stay proceedings; the
defense asked to proceed. Jones was sentenced to death, a sentence set aside after
Roper. See infra note 230.
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rational, choosing agent[s]' presupposed by the death penalty."7 4
Simmons's counsel similarly emphasized neuroscience in oral argument, devoting to it more time than any other issue.7 5 This focus was
complemented by a number of amicus parties, notably the American
Medical Association, whose brief urged that "[a]dolescents' behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains."76
The Roper Court, in a decision closely tracking many of Simmons's arguments about maturity, agreed that the behavioral attributes of older adolescents were importantly parallel to evidence found
dispositive in Atkins.7 7 In the most frequently cited portion of the
opinion, it noted "[t]hree general differences between juveniles
under 18 and adults": greater propensity to "immaturity and irresponsibility," resulting in overrepresentation in "virtually every category of
reckless behavior"; increased vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences, including "peer pressure"; and "more transitory, less
fixed" personalities, reflective of less "well formed" character.78 These
attributes of youth, the Court held, "render suspect" both the notion
that the death penalty effectively deters teens and "any conclusion
74 See Brief for Respondent at 10, 23, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1947812 [hereinafter Simmons Merits Brief] (quoting Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1989) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotes and
citations omitted); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2-5, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 2046818 (responding to these arguments); see aLso Aronson, supranote 2, at
115 ("A key element of Simmons's defense was new brain imaging evidence suggesting that the adolescent brain is not as well developed as an adult's brain.").
75 See Oral Argument at 28-29, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
2387647 [hereinafter Roper Oral Argument] (statement of Seth Waxman) ("[Y]ou
have a scientific community that in Stanford was absent . . . the major medical and
scientific associations, were not able in 1989, based on the evidence, to come to this
Court and say there is scientific, empirical validation for requiring that the line be set
at 18."); see also id. at 38 ("[W]e know ... from common sense and it's been validated
by science . . . that it is impossible to know whether the crime that was committed by a
16- or 17-year-old is a reflection of his true, enduring character .... ); see also Haider,
supra note 58, at 375 (discussing role of neuroscience in oral argument, including a
request by Justice Kennedy to comment on it).
76 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 10, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549 [hereinafter
AMA Roper Brief]; see also id. at 2 ("The adolescent's mind works differently from
ours. Parents know it. This Court has said it. Legislatures have presumed it for
decades or more. And now, new scientific evidence sheds light on the differences.");
Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, and the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9-12, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004
WL 1636447 (making neuroscience arguments).
77 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
78 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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that ajuvenile falls among the worst offenders."7 9 For these and other
reasons it struck down the juvenile death penalty.8 0 However, the
influence of neuroscience was unclear. The Court drew most of its
language from prior decisions, none of which had relied on brain science,8 and remarked that "any parent knows" that teenagers are
immature. 2 It buttressed this experiential observation by noting that
"the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite
tend to confirm" it,83 but nowhere specified which amicus briefs it
found relevant and persuasive.8 4 These ambiguous signals, though,
were seen in light of the 2002 Stanford dissent, the prominence of
neuroscience in briefing and argument, and the broader societal context-one fascinated with the teen brain-within which the case was
decided.
Developmental neuroscience thus came to be regarded-accurately or not-as a major influence on the highest-profile juvenile case
in decades.8 5

79 Id. at 570.
80 Id. at 575.
81 See id. at 569-70; see alsoJohnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1993) (agreeing that youth is relevant to appropriateness of death penalty); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982) (reasoning thatjuveniles are more vulnerable and impulsive and less self-disciplined and future-oriented than adults).
82 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Roper Oral Argument, supra note 75, at 39-40 (statement of Breyer, J.) ("[W]hat I thought the scientific evidence was getting at, that it
simply confirms what common sense suggests ... [and] simply corroborated something that every parent already knows .... ).
83 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. The reference to "scientific" sources may, but does not
necessarily, indicate brain science, as it encompasses all references to psychology and
all social-science findings not categorized as "sociology." Five amicus briefs, including
the AMA and APA briefs, referenced scientific sources. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae
of the American Bar Ass'n in Support of the Respondent at 9-10, Roper, 543 U.S. 551
(No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399.
84 Morse, supra note 59, at 410 ("Perhaps the neuroscience evidence actually
played a role in the decision . . . but there is no evidence in the opinion to support
this speculation.").
85 See Putting the Juvenile Back injuvenilejustice, supranote 7, at 6 ("In light of this
new evidence about adolescent development, the U.S. Supreme Court ... outlawed
the death penalty for youth."); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating
Juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 395-400, 413 (2008)
(noting that the Roper Court emphasized scientific evidence); Jeffrey Fagan, Adolescents, Maturity, and the Law: Why Science and Development Matter in Juvenile justice, Am.
PROSPECT, Sept. 2005, at A7 (evidence about teen brains "was an important part" of
Court's decision); Krueger, supra note 2, (Roper "took into consideration the incomplete brain development in juveniles").
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C. Adolescent Brain Science Beyond Roper
Since Roper many scholars and advocates have urged that such
science holds enormous potential to transform juvenile justice well
beyond the death penalty.8 6 Such post-Roper claims run the gamut
from the broad to the specific. The vast majority are based on a combination of developmental psychology and neuroscience, with the
findings of the latter being invoked generally to buttress the reliability
of the former.8 7 Scholars regard that buttressing as critically important, on the theory that it lends a "hard science" edge to behavioral
findings that might otherwise be dismissed as inordinately "soft."8 8 To
86 See, e.g., RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 7, 10 (arguing that "the
brain development-juvenile justice link is a work in progress, but it is the key to" an
improved juvenile justice system, including "determining which children to treat in
the juvenile system and what sort of treatments will be most effective"); Donna M.
Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental
Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 125, 172-73
(2007); see also Aronson, supra note 2, at 117 ("U] uvenile justice advocates are currently seeking to expand the scope of the Roper decision and to use neuroscientific
evidence for a variety of non-death penalty related issues."); Naomi Cahn, Poor Children: Child "Witches" and Child Soldiers in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 413,
430 (2006) (characterizing legal implications of developmental neuroscience as "staggering"); Ill. Office of the State Appellate Defender, Registration Form for 4th
Annual Midwest Juvenile Defender Summit, July 17, 2008, available at http://www.
state.il.us/DEFENDER/acrobatdocs/juvdefreg2008.pdf (proposing that brain-science
insights could be used to challenge statements of victims, witnesses, and clients, and
could inform interviews of adolescent clients); MacArthur Found. Research Network
on Adolescent Dev. & Juvenile Justice, Presentation on Adolescent Development and
Criminal Blameworthiness, at slide 29 (2006), http://www.adjj.org/downloads
(describing "The Immaturity Gap" between adolescents and adults).
87 See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, andjuvenile Transfer
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1555, 1571-72 (2004)
(noting "emerging evidence that the neurological correlates" of "cognitive, social,
and emotional capacities are undergoing crucial development throughout adolescence"); Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young "Sex Offenders":
How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79
TEMP. L. REV. 499, 507 (2006) (stating that studies of "adolescent brain development
[have] lent powerful support to the work of developmental psychologists").
88 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 133 (proposing that psychological testimony is
"perceived as soft" while brain images are perceived as "hard"); Tamar R. Birckhead,
North Carolina,Juvenile CourtJurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1443, 1463-64 (2008) ("In a society evermore dependent upon science and technology, advocates' increasing emphasis on hard science has earned them some support."); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role
in juvenilejustice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CiuM. L. 321, 331-32 (2006) (contrasting attitudes
between behaviors caused by "differences in brain structure or function" with those
attributable to "environmental or social factors"); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Defense, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Winter 2005, at 51, 51
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the extent that the psychological and neurological strands are separable, this Section briefly articulates those aspects of the claims that rely
on assertions about the teen brain. The next Part demonstrates how
such claims have fared (and are likely to fare) when put to the test in
the courts.
The most generalized claim is that evidence of population-typical
brain immaturity during the teenage years both reinforces the original impulse to create a separate system of adjudication and treatment
for juveniles and counsels recommitment to that system.8 9 Perhaps
the most prominent contemporary scholars of developmental science
and juvenile justice, Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, articulate this notion in Rethinkingjuvenile Justice,90 a 2008 book described
by one scholar as representing the "gold standard in legal-developmental collaboration."9 1 Their central brain-based claims may be synopsized as follows. First, structural immaturity in a normal teenager's
frontal lobes may explain her relative deficiency in imagining the
future, including the long-term consequences of her actions.9 2 Second, puberty-linked changes in the brain's reward circuitry and in its
hormone production predispose that teen to seek novelty and to value
the rewards of risky behavior more than its risks.9 3 Third, the relative
weakness of neural connections between frontal cortices and those
brain areas associated with primary social and emotional processing
contributes to her poor impulse control and emotional regulation. 94
Fourth, because brain regions associated with executive function fully
mature only in late adolescence and early adulthood, while those associated with primary emotional arousal and social information mature
shortly after puberty, that teenager will for some years experience a
"maturity gap" during which she is attracted to risky or irresponsible
behaviors that she lacks full capacity to appreciate or control.9 5 Thus,
("hard science" supports what policymakers know from behavioral studies and "what
they have intuitively known from their personal experiences"); see also Brown & Murphy, supra note 36 (manuscript at 69) (asking whether advocates are using brain
images "specificallyfor their prejudicial effect," as they might thus persuade factfinders
to "accept psychological constructs that would otherwise be suspect as 'soft' science").
89 See, e.g., RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 4.
90 Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 28, 44-50 (arguing that "scientific knowledge," including "neurobiological" knowledge, about adolescent development
"should be the foundation of the legal regulation of juvenile crime").
91 Buss, supra note 13, at 493.
92 Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 40.
93 Id. at 42-43, 48.
94 Id. at 44-45.
95 Id. at 48-49. See also Hearingon Adolescent Brain Development andjuvenile justice,
supra note 10, at 2 (testimony of Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D.) ("[M]iddle adolescence
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the normal attributes of the teen brain add up to "a prescription for
bad choices," generally reflective more of normative developmental
process than of bad character.9 6 These aspects of adolescent brain
development, as manifested in behavior, should mitigate the law's
response to juvenile offending. A teenager is not (like a child) so
compromised as to be fully excused, but neither is she fully responsible, a status she will attain only once she has finished this critical stage
of maturation. A sound juvenile justice system ought to reflect, in all
its particulars, such a theory of mitigation.9 7
Scott and Steinberg's basic theory, which may be called the
"diminished culpability" model, has been endorsed to some degreeand often completely-by virtually every scholar, advocate, and
defender now seeking to expand the influence of neuroscience within
juvenile justice.9 8 Specific claims fall at every possible point along the
life course of a juvenile proceeding. What follows is a brief sketch of
the range of such claims.
Waiver of rights. Adolescents' impulsivity and relatively deficient
decisionmaking processes, particularly when under stress, render
them less able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consent to
searches, participate in identification procedures, waive Miranda
rights, confess, waive counsel, or enter a guilty plea.9 9 Juveniles may
... is a period of heightened vulnerability to risky and reckless behavior, including
crime and delinquency. The engines are running at full throttle, but there is not yet a
skilled driver behind the wheel.").
96 SCOrr & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 49.
97 Id. at 121-26.
98 See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 86, at 447 (positing that neuroscience shows why
children in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing nations are easily turned into
soldiers, and should be rehabilitated rather than punished); Nina W. Chernoff & Marsha L. Levick, Beyond the Death Penalty:Implications of Adolescent Development Researchfor
the Prosecution, Defense, and Sanctioning of Youthful Offenders, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
209, 210-11 (2005); CRIMINALJUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 10-15 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/
juvenilesentencing.pdf; Shepherd, supranote 71, at 75 ("Children-adolescents-are
responsible for their acts, but they are not as responsible as mature adults."); Shepherd, supra note 88, at 52 (stating that juvenile's behavioral traits are "built in-literally hard-wired into the adolescent brain-and are not aberrant symptoms of moral
weakness").

One partial exception is Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, juvenile
justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author).
While offering a similar account of the brain science, Slogobin and Fondacaro argue
in favor of a model focused not on juveniles' relative culpability but their lesser deterrability. Id. (manuscript at 43-57).
99 See Chernoff & Levick, supranote 98, at 215; Bishop & Farber, supra note 86, at
172 ("Some of the most defining characteristics of adolescence-impetuosity, suscep-

tibility, and immaturity, which Roper explains make children less culpable than
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assert or waive such rights, but because of their brain immaturity they
should not be allowed to do so absent meaningful adult guidance and
as non-coercive a context as possible.1 0 0
Competence. Neuroscience buttresses research showing that
younger juveniles are less likely than adults to demonstrate adjudicative competence' 0 1-that is, the ability to understand proceedings,
consult with and assist counsel, and make critical decisions in a minimally rational and self-protective manner. 102 Normal developmental
immaturity therefore ought to provide a basis for finding a juvenile
incompetent, particularly in adult court, even if she cannot demonstrate a psychiatric disorder, developmental disability, or neurological
abnormality relative to other teens.' 0 3
Transfer to adult court. To transfer a minor to adult court for prosecution is to engage in a legal fiction out of step with developmental
reality.104 juveniles may commit crimes that cause as much harm as
an adult's crime, but those equivalencies do not obviate brain-develadults-are significant impediments to a juvenile's ability to appreciate and exercise
his right to counsel and his right not to incriminate himself."); Fagan, supra note 85,
at A7 (stating that brain immaturity helps explain why "adolescents are overrepresented among defendants who give false confessions"); Shepherd, supranote 88,
at 52 (emphasizing greater need for caution with evidence obtained from juvenile
confessions and consent searches).
100 See Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 215-16; Birckhead, supra note 85, at
429-32 ("[Y]outh may be incapable of adult reasoning during questioning because of
the long maturation process of the adolescent brain."); id. at 446-47 (encouraging
use of expert testimony on teen brain development to determine youth's perceptions
of whether they are in custody and their responses to interrogation).
101 See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 ("[T]he developmental deficits of immaturity that make [teens] less culpable may also make them less competent defendants
. . ."); Shepherd, supra note 88, at 52.

102 Maroney, supra note 51, at 1376, 1391.
103 Steinberg and Scott, in a pragmatic move not entirely consistent with their
theoretical model, contend that while such developmental immaturity should provide
a basis for an incompetence finding in adult court, it ought to provide no such basis
in a juvenile court. Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 168-74.
104 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 117 (describing advocate's claim that scientific
evidence "could be used to slow or stop the automatic transfer of juveniles to adult
criminal courts"); Lisa McNaughton, Extending Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota'sJuvenile justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1063, 1071-72 (2006) (citing briin
research in support of argument that automatic transfer scheme is unconstitutional);
Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children As Adults: The Transfer ofJuveniles to Adult Courts and
the PotentialImpact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 176 (2007) (asserting that teens' "social, physiological, and psychological underdevelopment . . .
demand[ ) a reexamination of current transfer policies"); Fagan, supra note 85, at A5
(arguing that the "push to treat more kids as adults" is "contradicted by new behavioral and biological research about maturity and criminal culpability").
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opment differences relevant to both culpability and amenability to
reform.10 5 Transfer should be abolished or, if allowed, triggered only
by specific findings by ajuvenile courtjudge focused on the attributes
of the individual juvenile. 0 6
Mens rea and mental-state defenses. Because of brain immaturity,
juveniles are less able or likely to form "specific intent" to carry out a
particular action or to cause a particular result.10 7 Instead, their
choices tend to be impulsive, and they are unlikely fully to contemplate consequences.10 8 Even when a juvenile can and does form the
requisite mental state, that mens rea is a relatively poor proxy for culpability and future dangerousness.1 0 9 Further, assessment of both
105

See, e.g., Hearingon Adolescent Brain Development and Juvenile justice, supra note

10, at 1-4 (testimony ofJennifer L. Woolard, Ph. D) (offering synopsis of relationship
between brain and behavioral aspects of developmental science and asserting that
together they "support a fundamental tenet of the juvenile justice system," that
juveniles are not "'miniature adults' simply because they are capable of committing
certain offenses"); RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 16 (describing "incongruous" scenario in which "a 10-year-old who biologically cannot understand the longterm consequences of a murder is treated as an adult for commission of that crime").
106 MAcARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. &JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 3: LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE 4 (2006) [hereinafter
LEsS GuILTY By REASON OF ADOLESCENCE],
available at http://www.adjj.org/
downloads/6093issue brief 3.pdf (arguing that because of difficulty in making individual assessments of maturity, including by reference to "brain images," all individuals under 18 presumptively should be treated asjuveniles, with limited exceptions for
the few youth who "have exhausted the resources and patience of the juvenile justice
system" and are very dangerous); Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 (stating that "neuropsychological research" counsels against "laws that funnel adolescents wholesale into
the adult courts" and the "remedy is to rely on case-by-case assessments by judges").
107 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 117-18 (describing advocate's claim that scientific evidence will alter mens rea concepts because teens are in a "natural state of
diminished capacity"); Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 214 ("[F]act finders
should be required to consider the intent element of an offense in light of the
research on adolescent incapacities.").
108 See Hearingon SB 513, supranote 73, at 17 (Testimony of Daniel Jackson, M.D.)
(drawing distinction between "impulsive" and "predatory" aggression and asserting
that most juvenile crimes reflect the former); LESS GUILTY By REASON OF ADoLESCENCE, supranote 106, at 2 (proposing that teens' impulsivity, "lack of foresight," and
tendency to focus on "immediate gratification" may lead to "bad decisions" in committing crime); RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supranote 7, at 22 ("We now know that the
areas of the brain not yet developed by adolescence are those that inhibit commission
of crimes.").
109

See Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 214 (arguing that evidence that would

indicate an adult formed specific intent may not indicate that "more precise and elevated form of intent" in ajuvenile); cf Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557-58, 578
(2005) (prohibiting death penalty for juveniles despite proof that individual defendant possessed most culpable mens rea).

114

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:1

criminal intent and defenses based on a "reasonable person" standard
should adopt the perspective of someone with an age-typical brain.11 0
Structural and functional brain immaturity also undermines the application to juveniles of the felony murder doctrine 1 I and accomplice
liability.1 12 Doctrine in each of these areas reflects baseline assumptions about rationality and forethought that are inapposite for the typical juvenile.
Imposition of adult punishment. "Adult" punishments-sentences
that appear on the juvenile's public, permanent record, include state
control for longer periods of time than permitted in the juvenile system, and/or are at least partially served in adult institutions-never
should be imposed, whether as a result of transfer or a "blended sentencing" scheme."13 Such sentences are disproportionate to juvenile
110 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 118 (describing one advocate's claim that scientific evidence produces new idea of the "reasonable adolescent" (internal quotation
marks omitted)). This idea was proposed pre-Roper and relied on developmental psychology. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 16, at 145 (arguing that defense of "developmental negligence" should be available to youth charged in adult court with
specific intent crimes or accomplice liability); see alsoJ.R. v. Alaska, 62 P.3d 114, 119
(Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (adopting reasonable adolescent standard).
111 The felony murder rule affects a large number of juveniles and frequently
exposes them to mandatory transfer and lengthy sentences. See Steven A. Drizin &
Allison McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Felony-MurderRule When the Defendant
Is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV. 507, 537-41 (2004). An estimated one-fourth to onehalf of juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences were imposed after felony
murder convictions. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 56, at
27-28.
112 Accomplice liability is particularly important because much youth crime is
committed in groups. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 56, at
1-2 (finding that more than one-fourth of JLWOP sentences for felony murder are
imposed on accomplices); OFFICE OFJUSTICE PROGRAMS, NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CO-OFFENDING AND PATTERNS OFJUVENILE CRIME 6 ex. 3 (Dec. 2005),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/210360.pdf (reporting that the majority of youth crime is committed in groups). The claim is that minors' vulnerability to
peer pressure may indicate that actions taken to further the criminal activity of
another frequently are motivated by unreflective loyalty, not underlain by the
required dual intents to assist and that the crime be committed. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.06 (1985) (defining mens rea for accomplice liability); Chernoff & Levick,
supra note 98, at 214; see also Taylor-Thompson, supra note 16, at 167-68 (examining
a possible extension of developmental defenses).
113 Chernoff& Levick, supra note 98, at 211; see alsoJUVENILEJUSTICE COMM., AM.
BAR Ass'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN SENTENCING
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/
OFFENDERS 1,
11 (2008),
YOUTHFUL
juvenilesentencing.pdf (noting that Roper's conclusions apply "with equal force to all
sentences for juvenile offenders" and to parole determinations). A "blended sentencing" scheme is one in which a court imposes a juvenile disposition and an adult sanction, the latter often being stayed pending successful completion of the former. See,
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offenders' diminished culpability and ignore the developmental reality that most will desist criminal behavior naturally as their brains
mature.1 1 4 Such sentences also are unlikely to deter other minors,
who inadequately consider consequences.' 15 Finally, incarceration
(particularly with adults) can distort juveniles' growth at a critical
11 6
juncture in brain development.

These claims are not radically different in kind from those regularly made by scholars and advocates on the basis of developmental
psychology and "common sense." They are different only insofar as
they purport to rest on a different empirical basis-that of neuroscience-and to result in more unshakeable conclusions, as a biological basis for immaturity ostensibly shows immaturity to be more deeply
rooted and involuntary than does a psychological basis.1 17 They are
also different to the extent they suggest that adolescent maturation
takes longer than once was thought.1 18 Those differences, though,
e.g., Chauncy E. Brummer, Extended juvenile jurisdiction: The Best of Both Worlds?, 54
ARv. L. REV. 777, 778-96 (2002).
114 See RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 12 (proposing that "once an
adolescent matures into adulthood" and the prefrontal cortex is fully developed, "the
natural tendencies toward risk taking are mitigated by increased forethought and
crime rates drop precipitously"); Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form Of Death: Implications of
Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 26-40 (2008) [hereinafter Feld, A Slower Form of Death]; Barry
C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences,
10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 43-70 (2007); Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The
EighthAmendment andjuvenile Life without ParoleafterRoper, 47 B.C. L. REv. 1083, 1084,
1091-98 (2006); Brianne Ogilvie, Note, Is Life Unfair? What's Next for Juveniles after
Roper v. Simmons, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 293, 307, 313-14 (2008).
115 See Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 17) (noting that the ability to anticipate future consequences develops with age).
116 See, e.g., RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 14 (suggesting adverse
brain impact on teens subjected to "sensory deprivation" while incarcerated); Putting
the Juvenile Back injuvenilejustice, supranote 7, at 6 (proposing that the "malleability of
the adolescent brain" contributes to "vulnerab[ility] to sexual exploitation and physical assault" in adult prisons).
117 See Hearing on Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 10, at 1 (testimony of
Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D.) (arguing that "[s]cientific discoveries about brain development have helped us understand why" juveniles are different, "but they haven't
changed the basic story line" that those differences are real and justify differential
treatment).
118 Steinberg, supranote 8 (manuscript at 15) (describing "overarching consensus
. . . that teenagers are not as neurobiologically mature as we once thought they
were").
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have not proved as consequential in legal practice as some have
predicted.
II.

THE LIMITED IMPACT OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE
IN THE COURTS

As the previous Part showed, before Roper scholars and advocates
had begun to envision a powerful role for developmental neuroscience within juvenile justice. Buoyed by apparent success in that
case, since Roper such theories have proliferated. Defenders and advocates have begun actively to test those theories in cases. To measure
the extent to which reality is conforming to predictions, I conducted a
study of such cases.' 19 As this Part demonstrates, the range of neuros119 The methodology was, briefly, as follows. I used Westlaw to identify post-Roper
cases raising legal issues to which defenders were likely to regard brain science as
relevant, and reviewed those cases to detect mention of such science, for example
with a search for "JUVENILE /P (LIFE /3 PAROLE) & DA(AFTER 2004) & ROPER"
in Westlaw's ALLCASES database. I also searched directly for mention of such science, for example with the search, "(BRAIN /S DEVELOPMENT) & (ADOL!JUVE!)"
in the ALLCASES database. In many cases I examined briefing and oral argument.
As many criminal and juvenile cases are not reported, I also used broader internet
searches, reviewed the secondary literature for clues to relevant cases, and located
amicus briefs by advocacy organizations. When I became aware through contacts in
the defender community that neuroscience evidence had been argued in unreported
cases, I sought public records of the proceedings. At the low-relevance end of the
responsiveness continuum were cases in which parties or courts made a quick mention of brain science or the "scientific studies" language of Roper. At the high-relevance end were cases in which parties presented testimony of brain-science experts.
The last search was conducted on August 13, 2009.
The searches yielded a total of fifty-seven cases, falling at all points along that
continuum, five of which are pending. In eleven cases (including one case that is
counted here as two because it referenced an unpublished, pending case not otherwise accounted for), developmental neuroscience appears to have been regarded at
least somewhat favorably by a court in granting some form of relief to a defendant,
almost always in the context of sentencing. In four of those eleven, the defendant
given a sentencing concession was a young adult rather than a juvenile. In an additional three cases, developmental neuroscience was referenced by a judge in dissent
or concurrence. As discussed below, inclusion in the "possible influence" category
was generous; in none of these fourteen cases does developmental neuroscience fairly
appear to have been outcome determinative, and in most it was not demonstrably
influential.
The project does not claim to be quantitatively authoritative. First, I did not
gather primary data on confidential proceedings in juvenile courts. This necessary
constraint confines the data set to (a) cases in which the state proceeded against a
minor in adult court or (b) juvenile-court cases that are reported, whether because
they are not confidential under state law or because the court protected the youth's
identity (for example, by use of pseudonym). These criteria capture a great many
juvenile cases, but analysis of nonpublic juvenile-court cases might have enriched the
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cientific arguments before the courts-state and federal, juvenile and
criminal-is both wide and deep. Their impact, however, has been
shallow.
This shallow impact, likely surprising to many, cannot be
explained fully on the grounds that the science is new or the effort
early. Rather, the courts' response to adolescent brain science reflects
a frequent disconnect between the questions asked by law and those
answered by science. Though courts sometimes cite the science
approvingly, they do so only to buttress conclusions otherwise fully
explained. The shallow impact also reflects scientific limitations that
are genuine and likely to persist. These factors explain how courts
generally have responded to developmental neuroscience arguments,
analysis. Second, I am not likely to have captured the entire universe of relevant,
public, but nonreported cases, particularly those resulting in acquittal, or to have
detected all cases in which neuroscientific arguments somehow influenced diversion
or plea bargaining, the largely invisible methods by which most juvenile cases are
determined. Third, in some cases brain science may have influenced prosecutorial
discretion, exercise of which is largely invisible. For example, Ruben Gur-a frequent
expert-in 2005 asserted that his pre-Roper affidavit on brain development on behalf
of Hector Huertas had been influential. Ruben C. Gur, Brain Maturation and the Execution ofjuveniles: Some Reflections on Science and the Law, PA. GAZETrE, Jan./Feb. 2005,
at 14 (2005) ("[I]t apparently worked. The Commonwealth decided not to pursue the
death penalty in light of scientific findings that the brain does not mature until early
adulthood."). Huertas's attorneys did argue that brain science provided one reason
why Pennsylvania should be precluded from seeking the death penalty. Motion to
Preclude the Commonwealth from Seeking the Death Penalty against a Juvenile and
Consolidated Memorandum of Law at 35, 38, 57, Commonwealth v. Huertas, CP 00090941 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 2002), available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.
org/pdfs/huertasfinaljuvenilechallengemotion.pdf. It is not, however, possible to discern whether the state relied on that evidence in declining ultimately to seek the
death penalty. See Aronson, supra note 2, at 129.
Finally, this Article analyzes only claims based on developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain, not cases in which juveniles claimed abnormality relative to
other teens-for example, because of organic brain injury or psychiatric disorder.
See, e.g., In re Hegney, 158 P.3d 1193, 1205-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing a
neuropsychological evaluation claiming to show deficits consistent with head injury).
Such claims should be considered as they would if raised by adults, a topic that is the
subject of a separate and growing literature. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany & James E.
Coleman, Jr., Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 39, at 183; Brown & Murphy,
supra note 36 (manuscript at 32-74); Maroney, supra note 51, at 1417-25; 0. Carter
Snead, Neuroimagingand the "Complexity" of CapitalPunishment,82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265,
1292-99 (2007).
The Appendix, available at Notre Dame Law Review, Archive: Vol. 85, No. 1,
http://www.ndlawreview.org/archive/issue.phpvol=85&num=1
(also on file with
author), contains a listing and description of all cases considered relevant under the
above-described methodology.
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but also show why that response has some basis. Two additional factors demonstrate why courts should not unduly privilege such claims.
First, juvenile justice cannot directly track neuroscience without implicating equality and autonomy concerns, and no adequate limiting
principle has yet been articulated. Second, the pressures of legal
advocacy incentivize overstatement and often result in inaccuracy;
while this tendency can be controlled, it cannot be eliminated.
As this Part will show, then, adolescent brain science has not been
(and is unlikely to be) a transformative force in juvenile justice, at
least in the courts. Part III argues that the science nonetheless may
play some role going forward, and makes clear that the criticisms
herein raised do not detract from the normative desirability of many
of the policy changes in support of which the science has been
invoked.
A.

Doctrinal Obstacles

The most frequent shoal upon which post-Roper adolescent brain
science claims founder is that of existing legal doctrine, which tends
to render them either irrelevant or unpersuasive. In some instances,
courts perceive that the issue has been foreclosed by legislatures; in
others, doctrine directs a relatively narrow inquiry and scientific
insights fall largely outside its boundaries. 120 Such disconnects are
most clearly seen in cases involving imposition of adult punishment.
The language of Roper has been widely interpreted so as to undermine
its applicability to non-death sentences, review of which is limited. A
similarly narrow focus applies to determinations of a juvenile's mens
rea or other mental capacity.
Doctrine is not a full independent measure of a claim's intrinsic
merit. For example, if a procedural default is held to bar pursuit of an
actual innocence claim, that holding says far more about the doctrinal
valuation of procedural bars than it does about innocence as an exculpatory factor. Further, doctrine potentially is mutable. The point of
this Section therefore is not to endorse the status quo but, rather, to
120 The same doctrinal constraints apply to developmental science generally,
though full discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Both sorts of
claims tend to be invoked simultaneously, and courts that reject the doctrinal relevance of behavioral work also reject that of neuroscience. However, courts that
accept as doctrinally relevant some insights from behavioral work do not always credit
neuroscientific evidence. Indeed, this is a plausible description of the Roper decision.
This disparity may be partially explained by the newcomer status of neuroscience relative to behavioral science. It is largely justified, even setting newcomer status aside, as
not all of the relevant limitations of neuroscience pertain to behavioral studies. See
infta note 129.
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demonstrate how it currently is operating to diffuse neuroscientific
claims. Questions of merit are taken up in the following Section and
in Part III.
1. Adult Punishment
Contemporary Eighth Amendment doctrine, under which nondeath sentences will be invalidated only if so "extreme" as to be
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime,' 2 1 frequently is fatal to
juveniles' neuroscientific claims that particular punishments are
unconstitutional. Similarly, courts have tended to uphold adult-sentencing schemes against brain-science challenges, hewing to doctrine
directing deference to facially reasonable legislative and judicial
choices as to which youths, or categories of youths, may or must be
tried and punished as adults.122 The only punishment context in
which neuroscience has had discernable, if marginal, impact is in a
small number of individual sentencing proceedings, a context in
which-unless mandatory sentences apply-judges have considerable
latitude.' 2 3 This Section addresses each issue in turn.
Juvenile life without parole. Because Roper eliminated the most

extreme possible sentence for youth, scholars and advocates quickly
have sought to extend its reasoning to the most extreme remaining
sentence-juvenile life without parole (JLWOP).124 As they have
121 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24
(2003) (plurality opinion) (adopting Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence). Several justices believe that the Eighth Amendment imposes no proportionality constraint on
noncapital sentences. See id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). See generally Richard S. Frase, Excessive
Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality"Relative to
What ? 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005) (tracing the history of proportionality review).
122 See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
123 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(b), at 744, 746 (3d ed.
2007) ("[1]t could be argued that there is no aspect of a defendant's life that may not
be weighed in assessing the appropriate sentence under a discretionary sentencing
scheme."); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (stating that in
sentencing a judge should possess "the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life").
124 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (noting that if execution is the
ultimate penalty life without parole is the "penultimate" one). As this Article is going
to press, JLWOP is permitted in the majority ofjurisdictions. See Adam Liptak, Locked
Away ForeverAfter Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at Al (reporting that
forty-two states and the federal government allow JLWOP and many states allow its
imposition on young children). JLWOP affects far more youth than the death penalty
did. Compare STREIB, supra note 68, at 3 (reporting that 226 juveniles were sentenced
to death in the three decades before Roper), with Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leigh-
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argued, developmental science would appear to bear as directly on
the underlying purposes of JLWOP-retribution, incapacitation, and
deterrence-as on the death penalty.12 5 Indeed, the Court has agreed
to hear in its October 2009 term two cases challenging the constitutionality ofJLWOP as applied to a thirteen-year-old and a sixteen-yearold convicted of nonhomicidal offenses.126 Both petitioners have
made brain-science arguments strongly paralleling those in Roper,1 27
and largely the same lineup of amicus parties has done the same. 128
The Court's treatment of developmental neuroscience may provide
valuable insight, largely absent in Roper, to its attitude toward its relevance. Even if no such insight is forthcoming, its decisions clearly will
alter the landscape within which JLWOP claims are decided.
Under the existing framework, though, such claims have been
nearly uniformly unsuccessful,1 29 and adolescent brain science has
ton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice,42 U.S.F. L. REV.
983, 985 (2007) (reporting that just under 2500 are serving JLWOP).
125 Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 114, at 10.
126 See Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (No. 08-7621) (mem.) (granting
certiorari to consider the constitutionality of imposing JLWOP on thirteen-year-old
convicted of rape); Graham v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (No. 08-7412) (mem.)
(granting certiorari to consider the constitutionality of imposing JLWOP on sixteenyear-old convicted of probation violation for robbery and burglary). Because of petitioners' ages and crimes, even if the Court invalidates their sentences, it might leave
open the possibility ofJLWOP for older teens or those convicted of homicide.
127 See Brief for Petitioner at 15-18, Sullivan, No. 08-7621 (U.S. filed July 16,
2009); Brief for Petitioner at 39-43, Graham, No. 08-7412 (U.S. filed July 16, 2009).
128 See, e.g., Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Graham, No. 08-7412 (U.S. filedJuly 23, 2009), 2009 WL 2247127; Brief
for the American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Graham, No. 08-7412 (U.S. filed July 23, 2009), 2009 WL 2236778 [hereinafter APA
Sullivan & Graham Brief]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber et al. in
Support of Petitioners, at 1 Graham,No. 08-7412 (U.S. filed July 23, 2009), 2009 WL
2236775 [hereinafter Aber Brief] (explaining interest of "an interdisciplinary group
of psychologists, social scientists, and neuroscientists who have devoted their careers
to the study of adolescent development and behavior").
129 Courts have rejected a significant number of post-Roper Eighth Amendment
JLWOP challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Pete, 277 Fed. App'x 730, 734 (9th Cir.
2008) (mem.); Connell v. State, 7 So. 3d 1068, 1076-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); People v. Zhuk, No. C047365, 2008 WL 2781112*32-33 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2008);
State v. Wilson, 938 So. 2d 1111, 1146-47 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Foster v. State, 961 So.
2d 670, 671-72 (Miss. 2007). Several JLWOP challenges were in a habeas posture,
limiting the scope of the inquiry. See, e.g., Sharikas v. Kelly, No. 01:07cv537, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29153 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2008) (mem.); Douma v. Workman, No. 06-cv0462, 2007 WL 2331883, at *4-5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 13, 2007) (dismissing equal protection challenge toJLWOP on merits). A number of cases reflect imposition ofJLWOP
as to which the defendant raised no cruel-and-unusual punishment claim. See, e.g.,
Daniel v. Parker, No. 05-2273, 2008 WL 3834043 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2008);
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had no discernable impact. The most commonly articulated justification for rejection of such claims is Roper itself, in which the Court
appeared in dicta to endorse the Missouri Supreme Court's resentencing of Simmons to "life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor."o3 0 Many
courts have relied on this dictum.s13 The second majorjustification is
the oft-repeated "mantra" that "death is different" 32 : many courts
McGilberry v. Epps, No. 1:03CV301LS, 2006 WL 3955828 (S.D. Miss. June 15, 2006).
A few post-Roper courts have found JLWOP sentences unauthorized by statute. See,
e.g., Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 320-21 (Ky. 2008); People v. Her,
No. C051473, 2007 WL 4217445, at *12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2007). One court
declared JLWOP cruel and unusual where imposed on a fourteen-year-old whose
nonhomicide crime caused no injury. In re Nuiez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 247 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (noting "freakish[ness]" of sentence and that under California law
JLWOP would be prohibited had Nufiez committed homicide). The Nudez court relied
in part on the general developmental principles articulated in Roper, but did not reference neuroscience. See id. at 256-58.
130 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (quoting State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper,
112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2005)); cf id. at 572 (stating that "[t]o the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the
punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe
sanction, in particular for a young person," and noting further that the Governor of
Kentucky had so commuted Stanford's sentence). Justice Scalia regards this to be a
vulnerable dictum. At oral argument, counsel for Missouri predicted that "if the
Court says [juveniles] are immune from .

.

. capital punishment .

.

. someone will

come and say they also must be immune from . .. life without parole"; Scalia agreed,
stating, "I'm sure that would follow. I-I don't see where there's a logical line." Roper
Oral Argument, supranote 75, at 5; see also Roper543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia,J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court's reliance on international authority would also dismantle
JLWOP sentences).
131 See, e.g., Calderon v. Schribner, No. 2:06-cv-00770-TMB, 2009 WL 89279, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) ("[Roper] not only does not assist [the defendant], it in fact
eviscerates his Eighth Amendment argument."); People v. Galvez, No. B194868, 2007
WL 2377339, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007) ("Roper implicitly recognizes the
distinction between the death penalty and LWOP [by approvingly noting Simmons's
sentence.]"); Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630, 641 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) ("[T]he
United States Supreme Court . .. would not have recognized a sentence of life without parole as an acceptable alternative to death . . . [if it] would violate the Eighth
Amendment."); cf United States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir. 2007)
(noting in dicta that Roper "permitted imposing a sentence of life imprisonment" on
minors).
132 Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1147-49 (2009)
(advocating abandonment of death-is-different rationale for limiting noncapital sentencing review, as it is "wrong as a matter of doctrine, and . . . unwise as a matter of
policy"); see also id. at 1161 (noting that the Roper Court's solicitude toward youth has
not extended to noncapital sentencing review).
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have stated that Roper applies only in the death penalty context,13 3 and
have instead judged JLWOP under the grossly disproportionate standard that, long before Roper, underlay the failure of most Eighth
Amendment challenges. 1 3 4 These long odds have not changed with
invocation of brain science.
Courts that have directly addressed neuroscientific claims in the
JLWOP context generally have treated the issue as either doctrinally
irrelevant or as surplusage. For example, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals upheld a JLWOP sentence imposed on a fourteen-year-old
convicted of intentional murder.1 3 5 The court took no issue with the
defendant's developmental psychology claims, drawn directly from
Roper, but held that those factors were properly considered and
rejected by the sentencing judge in determining the youth's culpability and dangerousness.1 3 6 Similarly, it took no serious issue with his
brain-science claims-including that such research "demonstrates biological reasons for adolescents' inability to control impulses, avoid
133 See, e.g., Culpepper v. McDonough, No. 8:07-cv-672-T-17, 2007 WL 2050970, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2007) ("[T]he Roper decision is to be narrowly construed [and]
does not particularlyaddress mandatory life sentences pertaining to minors"); Connell,
7 So. 3d at 1077 ("Roper applies only in limited circumstances, and we are not in a
position to expand that decision as the appellant would have us do.").
134 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 958 A.2d 1214, 1234-35 (Conn. 2008) (stating that "'in
the past twenty years, courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims
made by juvenile murderers attacking their life sentences'" and citing dozens of preRoper cases (quoting Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630, 640 (Del. 2007))); Wayne A.
Logan, Proportionality and Punishment:Imposing Life Without Paroleon juveniles, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 681, 707-08 (1998) (detailing history). Relief from noncapital
sentences-even if mandatory and lifelong-is exceedingly rare, even for adults. See,
e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279, 281 (1983) (overturning sentence of life without parole for a "seventh nonviolent felony"-attempting to pass a bad $100 check);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) (noting in dicta that making "overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment" would be grossly
disproportionate).
State courts pre-Roper did sometimes rely on state law to invalidate JLWOP. See,
e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983) (finding cruel and unusual punishment for seventeen-year-old convicted of felony murder); Naovarath v. State, 779
P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989) (overturning LWOP imposed on a thirteen-year-old as a
"denial of hope"). Most courts refused such relief, often despite the more generous
scope of state law. See, e.g., Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that under California law "[y]outh has no obvious bearing" on proportionality analysis of mandatory JLWOP for fifteen-year-old); Feld, A Slower Form of Death,
supra note 114, at 26-40; Logan, supra, at 705-06 & nn.119-20.
135 State v. Ninham, 767 N.W.2d 326, 329-31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
136 Id. at 329 (holding that developmental attributes "are factors the sentencing
court should weigh when determining parole eligibility," though "Ninham's crime
was unusual for its senseless and extreme brutality").
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risky behaviors, and make good decisions"-but held that it did not
"constitute a new factor. The trial court was aware of the differences
between juveniles and adults. Continued medical and scientific
research that provides a physiological explanation for the differences
is not highly relevant to the sentence."'13 7 Similar (if more oblique)
claims have met a similar fate in other courts, which appear to agree
that the science either sheds little light on the individual defendant's
crime or personal attributes or adds little to developmental arguments
already given adequate due.13 8
Lengthy or harsh adult sentences. Juveniles also have used brain science to challenge other lengthy or harsh sentences.13 9 Such challenges stand on even less secure doctrinal footing, as the possibility of
parole (even if remote) weighs in favor of constitutionality. 140
137 Id. at 330-31 (noting defendant's argument that "[r]ecent research also shows
adolescents' amygdalas are more active than adults.' The amygdala is closely related
to emotionally laden responses. In addition, Ninham argues that mounting research
suggests alcohol causes more damage to developing brains of teenagers than previously thought").
138 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 944 So. 2d 660, 661-64 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (failing to
address defendant's claim thatJLWOP was unconstitutional because of "[t]he principles underlying the decision in Roper v. Simmons, bolstered by continuing scientific
research," and upholding sentence because of brutality of the offense (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)); see also id. at 664 (explaining that Craig
did not demonstrate that he was "'exceptional'" and "'a victim of the legislature's
failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the
offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case'" (quoting
State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d 672, 676 (La. 1998))). Similarly, in Connell, 7 So. 3d at
1076-77, both the trial court and an appellate court dismissed defendant's JLWOP
claim despite amicus briefing that had drawn on the developmental portion of Roper,
including Rope's nod to scientific studies. See Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 17-19, Connell, 7 So. 3d 1068 (No. CR 060668); see also Allen, 958 A.2d at 1233, 1236 (denying defendant's JLWOP challenge,
which had cited to the "sociological and physiological evidence on which Roper
relied").
139 Some juvenile "virtual lifers" are serving terms exceeding their life expectancies. Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 114, at 51-52; see, e.g., In re Welfare of
A.J.F., No. A06-303, 2007 WL 92843, at *4-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (sentencing a youth to life plus 408 months); State v. Goins, No. 06-MA-131, 2008 WL 697370,
at *5-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2008) (sentencing a youth to eighty-four years); State
v. Bunch, No. 06-MA-106, 2007 WL 4696832, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2007)
(upholding sentence of eighty-nine years despite developmental principles of Roper).
140 The possibility of parole in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980)
(upholding life sentences with parole eligibility for third nonviolent felony offense),
was seen as an important factor distinguishing it, later, from Solem. See also Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (plurality opinion) (approving sentence of
twenty-five years to life for nonviolent felony theft under California's Three-Strikes
Law).
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Accordingly, few have prevailed. As in the JLWOP context, courts
have tended to take a narrow view of substantive sentencing oversight.14 1 They also have tended to dismiss arguments based in developmental neuroscience, often under the rationale that it fails to offer
anything meaningfully new but also because it fits poorly with record
evidence as to mens rea or aggravating factors.
A cluster of Kentucky cases demonstrates the first rationale. Prior
to Roper, a number of juveniles pleaded guilty to capital offenses in
order to avoid potential execution; each agreed to a sentence of life in
prison with the possibility of parole after 25 years.1 4 2 After Roper many
moved for resentencing on the ground that they should not be held
to a sentence agreed to under the shadow of an impermissible penalty.' 43 Most argued that the court should take notice of adolescent
brain science, which emerged after their pleas were entered. Blake
Walker, for example, argued that Roper "provides a new framework for
our understanding of the appropriate penalties for juveniles in light
of adolescent brain development."1 44 Similarly, Samuel McMillen
argued that Roper "explained the constitutional importance of adolescent brain development in sentencing juvenile criminal defendants"
and that teens' "lack of full brain development is an even greater mitigating factor now than anyone understood at the time of' his original
sentencing. 14 5 Both the Walker and McMillen courts, though, refused
to order resentencing, unpersuaded either that Roper applied or that
141 See, e.g., People v. Browner, No. B198836, 2008 WL 4323723, at *2-4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 23, 2008) (finding fifty-to-life sentence for fifteen-year-old not cruel and
unusual); People v. Demirdjian, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 186-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(same).
142 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009) (authorizing such
sentence for juvenile treated as "youthful offender").
143 See, e.g., Kirkland v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-000100, 2008 WL 2940709
(Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2008); Cheng v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002619, 2008 WL
1093886 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2008); Devers v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002049,
2008 WL 612246 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008); Gussler v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d
22 (Ky. Ct. App. July 20, 2007); Denton v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-000587 (Ky.
Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2007). The defendant in Devers had been convicted at trial but
reached a sentencing agreement in order to avoid a possible death penalty. Devers,
2008 WL 612246, at *1.
144 Walker v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2006-CA-001247, 2006-CA-002074, 2008 WL
1991612, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. May 9, 2008).
145 McMillen v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-001806, 2007 WL 3406851, at *2
(Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (discussing defendant's argument that the "Roper Court established that juvenile criminal
defendants possess diminished culpability when compared to adults due to their adolescent brain development" and "when the [trial court] made its sentencing decision,
it was unable to give full and sufficient consideration to the constitutional importance
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neuroscience materially changed the factual premises.146 These and

similar cases, to be sure, presented unique difficulties because the
petitioners were required to overcome a presumption of the finality of
plea bargaining. 1 4 7 The McMillen court, though, signaled a more general lack of receptivity to neuroscientific arguments, declaring that
despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court discussed
adolescent brain development in very broad and general terms ....
Roper does not contain any language mandating that a trial court
must give an offender .

.

. a new sentencing hearing in order to

retroactively apply the RoperCourt's reasoning regarding adolescent
brain development. . . . [T]he Roper Court's discussion regarding
adolescent brain development. . . . is not retroactive as a constitu-

tional matter. 14s
Neuroscience arguments raised in several other Kentucky cases were
dismissed without discussion.1 4 9
The second rationale is illustrated by People v. Pratcher1 5 0 in which
a fifteen-year-old challenged his sentence of fifty years to life for intentional murder. A neuropsychologist testified about adolescent brain
development generally, and Pratcher's brain specifically, in support of
his arguments that such a sentence was unconstitutionally disproporof adolescence as a mitigator with respect to the specific level of brain development of
juveniles").
146 Walker, 2008 WL 1991612, at *2 ("[A] valid plea by a juvenile to any sentence
other than the death penalty will NOT be re-opened based upon Roper'); McMillen,
2007 WL 3406851, at *3 (holding that "because McMillen was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, not death ... Roper does
not apply").
147 See, e.g., McStoots v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 790, 791-92 (Ky. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that passage of new law does not render plea agreement involuntary);
see also Schane v. Cain, No. 07-1068, 2007 WL 4967081, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 24, 2007)
(upholding JLWOP on basis of plea bargaining principles).
148 McMillen, 2007 WL 3406851, at *3-4.
149 See Devers v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002049, 2008 WL 612246, at *1 (Ky.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008) (rejecting claim that "circuit court 'was unaware of the full
effect of adolescent brain development as it relates to culpability' at the time he was
sentenced" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Denton v. Commonwealth, No.
2006-CA-00587, slip op. at 2-3 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2007) (rejecting claims that court
failed "to give full and sufficient consideration to the characteristics of adolescent
brain development relating to culpability ... [and] was not fully aware of the relationship between adolescent brain development and culpability, and was thus unable during sentencing to give full and sufficient consideration to the constitutional import of
adolescent brain development"). Similar arguments were made obliquely in one
other case. See McStoots, 245 S.W.3d at 791 (noting defendant's arguments based on
the Roper Court's statements about developmental maturity).
150 No. A117122, 2009 WL 2332183 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2009).

126

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:1

tionate. 15 1 The sentencing court, however, found those arguments
ultimately unpersuasive in light of the deliberate nature of the crime
(including, for example, loading and cocking a rifle for four successive shots), and the appellate court agreed. 152 Other state courts similarly have relied on assessment of high individual culpability to refuse
brain-based challenges to multi-decade sentences imposed on defendants as young as twelve.15 3
151 Id. at *10-11 (describing testimony of Dr. Myla Young). In addition to describing normal adolescent brain development, Dr. Young performed a SPECT scan on
Pratcher's brain, concluding that he was particularly "dysfunctional," but she acknowledged that "[i]t's unclear whether we're talking about frontal lobe damage or immaturity." Id. at *11 n.7.
152 Id. at *44-50 (discussing, inter alia, the RoperJLWOP dictum, state-court precedent, and the factual findings of the sentencing court, though noting that Pratcher
"presented evidence at trial both that adolescents' brains are immature and that
appellant was immature even for a 15-year-old").
153 See State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 163 (S.C. 2007) (upholding concurrent
thirty-year terms for twelve-year-old); see also People v. Diaz, No. F052637, 2008 WL
5273910, at *5-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008) (affirming seventy-five-to-life sentence
for seventeen-year-old convicted of attempted murders, despite amicus briefing that
included a neurodevelopmental argument); People v. Ostio, No. G037826, 2008 WL
2461807, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 19, 2008) ("Citing a recent article on adolescent
brains . .. Ostio contends his youth operates to diminish his personal culpability. We
acknowledge recent precedent prohibiting the use of the death penalty for youthful
offenders. However, in light of the seriousness of Ostio's crime .. . the sentence of 25
years to life does not [constitute] cruel and unusual punishment." (citations omitted)); People v. Nguyen, No. G035181, 2006 WL 1493699, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 31,
2006) (upholding an indeterminate term of life plus twenty-five years to life for fifteen-year-old and stating "[r]egardless of whether the nature of the adolescent brain
produces behavior that is more impulsive than an adult's, as defendant asserts, his
conduct in this case reveals a high degree of individual culpability"); State v. Chavarria, 208 P.3d 896, 898-99 (N.M. 2009) (upholding life sentence with possibility of
parole following seventeen-year-old's guilty plea to murder despite expert testimony
by psychiatrist and psychologist about teen brain development; sentencing court said
that while it had "heard .. . about the adolescent mind" it was convinced that defendant "knows exactly what he's doing" and the "consequences of his behavior" and the
plea agreement); State v. Groenke, No. 2006AP1712, 2007 WL 1064088, at *4 (Wis.
Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007) (rejecting as "conclusory and undeveloped" defendant's claim
that sentencing court had taken inadequate account of his age and brain immaturity).
Gabriel Mendoza Gonzales, convicted pre-Roper for a crime committed at age
fifteen and sentenced to forty years, brought neuroscientific evidence before an
appellate court in a habeas petition filed concurrently with his post-Roper appeal. See
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 27-29, People v. Gonzales, Nos. E036344,
E037793 Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2005) (arguing that sentence was unconstitutional in
light of brain science); id. at 36-37 exs. A, B (citing NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS (2001) [hereinafter NIMH, TEENAGE BRAIN],
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teenbrain.cfm; Mark Moran, Adolescent Brain Development Argues Against Teen Executions, PSYCmATRIC NEWS, May 16, 2003,
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Though most adult-punishment challenges referencing brain science have failed, it is worth noting a small countertrend. In two cases,
state courts relied on developmental principles-possibly including
neuroscience-to limit extraordinarily long sentences, once by
allowing the eventual possibility of discretionary parole' 5 4 and once by
imposing a term of years well below the maximum.1 55 These were
individual, not categorical, determinations; the same courts refused to
limit juvenile sentences generally or to invalidate mandatory minimum sentences for youth. 15 6 Two additional state courts also appear
to have relied in small part on brain science to invalidate juvenile sexoffender registration, once by removing a juvenile from the list and
once by invalidating the entire registration scheme.1 5 7 This group of
at 8, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/38/10/8). The
court was not receptive. People v. Gonzales, Nos. E036344, E037793, 2005 WL
1799520, at *1 n.3, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2005) (rejecting as irrelevant an argument from Gonzales's petition based on "'emerging consensus among psychiatrists
and other mental health professionals .. . that the teenage brain does not function
and process information the same way as an adult brain'").
154 Citing, inter alia, the "scientific and sociological studies" language from Roper
and "the literature regarding juveniles that supported that position," the sentencing
court determined that "in spite of [the juvenile's] horrific crimes, there was some
possibility that [he] would change by the time he was eligible for parole at approximately age fifty" and imposed a sentence of ninety-nine years with parole eligibility
after thirty-three. Cotting v. State, No. A-9909, 2008 WL 4059580, at *3 (Alaska Ct.
App. Sept. 3, 2008). That sentence was upheld as "not clearly mistaken" by the appellate court. Id.; see also Ling v. State, No. A-9228, 2008 WL 2152028, at *2 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 21, 2008) (approving identical decision by different trial court to allow a
juvenile's eventual eligibility for parole, nowhere mentioning "scientific studies" but
referring instead to "the factors that the Supreme Court considered in Rope'and the
fact "that it was not uncommon for teenagers to make poor decisions").
155 See State v. Carrasquillo, 962 A.2d 772, 775-76 (Conn. 2009) (discussing the
testimony of Carrasquillo's expert, a psychiatrist, about "development of the adolescent brain generally and the defendant's cognitive development in particular," focusing on "significant differences between the adolescent brain and the adult brain").
The sentencing court accepted that Carrasquillo's "judgment" and "thinking" were
"in development," but stated that such mitigation "only goes so far"; the court sentenced him to thirty-five years, more than the mandatory twenty-five but less than the
authorized life term. Id. at 776-78 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the sentence. Id.
156 See Cotting, 2008 WL 4059580, at *2 (rejecting defense request to limit sentence to sixty years); Ling, 2008 WL 2152028, at *2 (same); Carrasquillo,962 A.2d at
777-78 (noting that propriety of a mandatory twenty-five-year sentence was not
affected by Roper and stating that "[t]he delineation between juveniles and adults for
purposes of prosecution and punishment is a public policy determination reserved to
the legislative branch").
157 See Fletcher v. State, No. 0404010688, 2008 WL 2912048, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct.
June 16, 2008) (expunging record and removing juvenile from registry based on evi-
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cases indicates that developmental neuroscience sometimes may work
to solidify a holding-whether individual or categorical-where a
court regards developmental principles as both persuasive and relevant to punishment and sees brain science as informing, in some way,
those principles.
As most punishment cases indicate, though, courts tend to view
the findings of developmental neuroscience as either irrelevant to the
specific determination before them or as insufficiently persuasive as to
invalidate schemes for imposition of non-death sentences.15 8
dence of rehabilitation). The Delaware judge did not directly consider developmental neuroscience but, as a small part of a lengthy decision, approvingly quoted an
unpublished opinion by a Nevada family court judge invalidating application of that
state's registration scheme to juveniles. Id. at *17-18 (discussing without citation an
April 2008 decision of family court judge William 0. Voy in Clark County, Nevada).
The Nevada court listed five reasons why the scheme jeopardized the rehabilitative
mission ofjuvenile justice; the fact that "the brain of an adolescent is still undergoing
physical development" was one of them. Id.; see also In re Louis A., No. 51676, 2008
WL 6043828, at *2 (Nev. Sep 5, 2008) (refusing on jurisdictional grounds to hear
state's appeal of family court judge's invalidation of state juvenile sex-offender
scheme).
Adolescent brain science has come up in two additional sex-offense cases, both
civil commitment proceedings in which the state sought to confine young adults as
sexually violent predators. In one case the appellate court noted an expert's opinion
that defendant's abuse of an eight-year-old when he was fourteen was insufficient evidence of "paraphilia" because "there is 'plasticity' in the sexuality of a juvenile
offender as behavior evolves and the brain develops." See In re Benton, No. 57779-4-1,
2008 WL 2487927, at *4-5 (Wash. Ct. App. June 23, 2008) (citing testimony as one
example of why jury may have been confused about definition of "paraphilia").
Though the court required a new hearing, its decision hinged on the prosecutor's
improper suggestion to the jury that it need not find the defendant had paraphilia.
Id. Another appellate court rejected an eighteen-year-old's complaint that the commitment court should have taken "judicial notice" of brain development. See In re
Shell, No. A08-1043, 2009 WL 1182152, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 2009) ("Scholarly articles discussing the ongoing scientific research on the adolescent brain and
how it differs from the adult brain are not 'sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned,' and the court properly declined to take judicial notice of them."
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 201)).
158 See, e.g., State v. Carissa M., No. YR-2006-0004 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 26, 2007).
Carissa McGee, sixteen, non-fatally stabbed her mother and sister and was convicted
in adult court. Her attorneys relied on adolescent brain science and her diagnosed
psychiatric illness to argue that she be sentenced as a "Youthful Offender," which
would have permitted treatment in the juvenile system. See Child-Defendant Carissa
McGee's Memorandum in Aid of Disposition at 4-5, Carissa M., No. YR-2006-0004
(N.M. Dist. Ct. July 26, 2007); see also id. at app. (summarizing the findings and potential significance of neuroscience for McGee's case). McGee was nonetheless sentenced to twenty-one years in adult prison, with nine years deferred. See Docket Entry
for July 26, 2007, Carissa M., No. YR-2006-0004 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 26, 2007).
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Transfer to Adult Court

Brain-based challenges to the transfer of minors to adult court
also have been relatively ineffective. This area of law is closely related
to adult punishment, as such punishment-for example, incarceration beyond the twenty-first birthday-generally may be imposed only
following transfer. Historically, transfer decisions were left to juvenile
court judges, who had authority to find that a particular youth warranted adult treatment.15 9 Legislatures provided broad parameters
within which that discretion was exercised-for example, by setting an
age below which transfer was unauthorized-bounded on the outside
by due process principles.1 6 0 Increasingly, though, states allow prosecutors to determine the court in which to proceed, or provide for legislative transfer, in which adult jurisdiction follows automatically from
the state's selection of a particular charge against a person of a prescribed age. 16 1
Nonindividualized transfer. Well before the advent of developmental neuroscience, young people had argued that these newer schemes
unconstitutionally exposed them to adult punishment without the
benefit of an individualized hearing on their maturity, culpability, and
potential for rehabilitation. Virtually all such challenges failed.162
Courts overwhelmingly deferred to legislatures' choices as to what
Another case raising a cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge to a term of
years is pending. See Petitioner Charles Andrew Williams's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Stay the Federal Habeas Petition to Permit Petitioner to Return to State Court to Attempt to Exhaust All Unexhausted Claims
at 11, Williams v. Ryan, No. 3:05-cv-00737-WQH-WMC (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2007) (arguing that "advancing medical technologies that provide insight into the brain development ofjuveniles ... directly relate[ ] to Petitioner's assertion that his sentence of two
consecutive 25 years to life terms" is cruel and unusual); see also infra note 180 (discussing Williams in greater detail).
159 See, e.g., 1907 Ill. Laws 75 (allowing a court "in its discretion" to permit a "delinquent child" to "be proceeded against" under adult law).
160 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). Some states have sharply
curtailed judges' discretion. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 2008 &
Supp. 2009) (requiring judicial transfer if any of the listed factors are established by
the record).
161 See ZIMRING, supra note 29, at 139-57 (explaining transfer schemes and the
increasing use of prosecutorial and legislative transfer). Transfer schemes are byzantine, and many states combine all three approaches. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
arts. 305, 857, 863 (2007). Transfer is often also referred to as "certification" or
"waiver." This Article uses the term "transfer" to avoid confusion with waiver of constitutional rights.
162 See, e.g., State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566-69 (Minn. 1997). But see State v.
Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995-1004 (Utah 1995) (invalidating a prosecutorial transfer
scheme as violative of the Utah Constitution).
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combinations of age and charged offense categorically warrant adult
treatment; they also affirmed prosecutors' power to make that determination, either by choosing the charge or by choosing the court.163
Brain science has not altered these tendencies.
A number of youth have urged post-Roper that developmental
neuroscience shows the irrationality of nonindividualized transfer and
counsels reversal of this doctrinal trend. David Garcia, for example,
offered expert testimony on adolescent brain development to support
his claim that New Mexico's transfer law was "a rejection of biology," 164 a claim echoed by that of a California teenager.16 5 An Illinois
youth similarly argued that the transfer should be disallowed as the
"same science .

.

. that led the Supreme Court to conclude that the

incomplete brain development and resulting character attributes ...
renders the death penalty an inappropriate punishment for juveniles
necessitates the conclusion that other harsh adult penalties are also
inappropriate for juveniles."1 66 Each of these appeals, like their preRoper predecessors, appears to have failed because of deference to the
163 See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1333-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(rejecting challenges based on equal protection, separation of powers, and due process); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1364-68 (Fla. 1980) (rejecting the same under
state and federal law).
164 Child Defendant's Closing Remarks at 2, 5, State v. Garcia, No. CR 2005-422
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter GarciaClosing]; Reply to State's Response
to Motion to Dismiss First Degree Murder and Felony Murder Charges as Unconstitutional at 5-9, Garcia, No. CR2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Garcia Reply] (arguing that "recent scientific understanding of adolescent brain
development and how that impacts behavior" creates Eighth Amendment issues and
shows that statute not rationally related to purposes of punishment). The Garciacase
is discussed further infra notes 187-92.
165 Petition for Review Following Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at
5-6, People v. Gonzales, Nos. E036344, E037793, 2005 WL 1799520 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 1, 2005) (asking "whether in view of the growing consensus of the medical community and mental health professionals that the teenage brain has much less control
over impulsive behavior coupled with the impulsive nature of petitioner's first crime,"
automatic transfer and mandatory adult sentencing is cruel and unusual). Gonzales
urged that the science post-dates, and calls into question, the California voters' decision to institute legislative transfer.
166 Motion to Declare Defendant's Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional at
7-8, 10, People v. Jones, (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Apr. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Casey
Jones Motion], availableat http://www.njdc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow
link on left for "Advocacy in Adult Court" and scroll down to link for "Motion to
Declare Defendant's Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional") ("If we can no
longer put juveniles to death because of their diminished culpability, we can no
longer treat them as adults when punishing them for crimes in any context."); id. at
16 (noting that in twelve years since Illinois Supreme Court upheld transfer scheme
"significant developments have been made in understanding adolescent brain devel-
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legislative scheme.1 6 7 Only in the Gonzales case did the state even
respond substantively to the neuroscientific argument,168 and though
several days were consumed by expert testimony, the Garciatrial court
declined even to mention science in its ruling; it simply found that the
constitutionality of legislative transfer was answered by pre-Roper
precedent.169

Judicial transfer. There is no evidence that juveniles have on the
basis of neuroscience either persuaded individual judges to retain
juvenile-court jurisdiction; nor have they managed to overturn transfer decisions on appeal. The case of Christopher Pittman, a twelveyear-old convicted of killing his grandparents, is exemplary. Pittman
argued that a juvenile court judge lacked authority to transfer him
because "recent scientific data" shows that twelve-year-olds lack "capacity" to be tried as adults.1 70 The South Carolina Supreme Court
instead held that the "rules of statutory construction do not allow the
Court to determine legislative intent based on scientific data" and
noted that the statute contained no minimum age for judicial transopment and behavior"); see also id. at 21-22 (urging courts to reevaluate the constitutionality of transfer in light of new scientific evidence).
Adolescent brain science also was presented by amicus parties in a case successfully challenging Nevada's transfer scheme on the ground that it violated juveniles'
right against self-incrimination. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Juvenile
Defender Center in Support of Appellants at 13-15 & n.14, In re William M., 196 P.3d
456 (Nev. 2008) (No. 48649); Affidavit of Marty Beyer, Ph.D, William M., 196 P.3d 456
(Nev. 2008) (No. 48649). However, the court did not cite to the developmental
research in overturning the scheme. See William M., 196 P.3d at 460-65.
167 See Gonzales, 2005 WL 1799520, at *9 (rejecting challenge). It is not possible to
ascertain with certainty the fate of the Jones case. "Casey Jones" is a pseudonym
assigned by amicus counsel. However, a legal database search reveals no reported
Illinois case matching the described facts; a lower court ruling that the transfer
scheme is unconstitutional certainly would have been appealed by the state, as it
would have overruled state supreme court precedent, and almost certainly would have
been reported. The logical inference is that the challenge was denied.
168 Gonzales, 2005 WL 1799520, at *7 ("Regardless of whether the nature of the
adolescent brain produces behavior that is more impulsive than an adult's, as defendant asserts, his conduct in this case reveals a high degree of individual culpability.");
see also Reply to State's Response to Motion to Declare Defendant's Transfer to Adult
Court Unconstitutional at 1, 11-12, Jones, (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, June 23, 2006),
available at http://www.njdc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow link on left for
"Advocacy in Adult Court" and scroll down to link for "Reply to State's Response to
Motion to Declare Defendant's Transfer to Adult Court Unconstitutional") (reflecting that State did not respond to brain-science arguments).

169 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss First Degree Murder and Felony Murder
Charges as Unconstitutional at 4, Garcia,CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter GarciaDenial Order] (citing State v. Muniz, 74 P.3d 86 (N.M. 2003)).
170 State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (S.C. 2007).
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fer.171 In the same vein, a Minnesota appellate court rejected a defendant's claim that a judge should have considered neuroscience when
making the transfer decision, as the legislature had determined the
relevant factors and had not included neuroscience among them. 172
Thus, developmental neuroscience has to date proved no match
for the strong doctrinal pull toward deference to transfer schemes
and has failed materially to influence individual transfer determinations.17 3
3.

Mental States

Defenders' efforts to use developmental neuroscience in the context of mental-state assessment-whether going to mens rea, mentalstate defenses, or to the ability competently, knowingly, and intelligently to assert or waive constitutional rights-also have largely fallen
short, primarily because of the generally "adult-like" tests of mental
state by which juveniles are judged. Substantive criminal law generally
is adopted wholesale by the juvenile justice system; the special attrib171 Id. at 162.
172 In re Welfare of A.J.F., No. A06-303, 2007 WL 92843 at *2, 4 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 16, 2007) (indicating that fifteen-year-old charged with first-degree murder asked
that the judge be required to consider Rope's "discussion of how adolescent brain
development impacts culpability," but the court held that science could not alter the
legislature's choices "regarding how culpability is to be viewed" for transfer purposes);
see also Petitioner's Petition for Review from Denial of Petition for Writ of Mandate at
5-7, Gregory H. v. Superior Court, No. S158098 (Cal. Nov. 13, 2007) (describing
expert testimony at transfer hearing that argued because "the last stage of brain
maturity engages higher reasoning, abstract abilities, judgment, foresight and the
ability to delay gratification, a 14-year-old boy is far from achieving neurological development" but noting that the juvenile was nonetheless transferred); Docket Entry of
Jan. 16. 2008, Gregory H., No. S158098 (Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) (denying petition for
review).
In a Vermont case, defense counsel raised developmental neuroscience in an
appeal from denial of "reverse waiver," a process by which juveniles initially charged
as adults sometimes can be transferred to juvenile court. The appellate court
remanded for a new hearing on other grounds and did not discuss the brain-based
argument. See State v. Dixon, 967 A.2d 1114, 118-19 (Vt. 2008) (summarizing results
of a psychological evaluation of the defendant); Brief of the Appellant at 33, Dixon,
967 A.2d 1114 (No. 07-457).
173 As in the punishment cases, there is evidence of a small countertrend. A Ninth
Circuit judge dissented from a decision upholding deportation of ajuvenile following
his mandatory transfer to, and conviction in, adult court. The judge relied in small
part on developmental science, possibly including brain science, to assert that all
youth should be afforded individual judicial transfer hearings. Mendez-Alcaraz v.
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 849-51 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("Both the
law and the scientific literature agree that when it comes to crime, juveniles are
different.").
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utes of that system cluster around adjudication procedures and dispositional consequences, not standards for determining guilt.17 4 Thus,
the same mental-state concepts are used in juvenile and adult court.17 5
More, while age clearly matters to assertion of Fourth Amendment
rights and to competence determinations, courts have yet to reach any
consensus over how this is so, and tend to use adult-like tests despite
brief nods to the impact of youth.17 6 Reliance on adult-like standards
has made courts reticent to consider brain-based arguments that
minors are unable (or less able) to form "specific intent," do not consider future consequences in the manner contemplated by the felonymurder doctrine, and should be measured by a different concept of
"reasonableness." Such challenges often are perceived as going to the
legitimacy of the rules themselves rather than their application.
Intent. In a number of homicide cases defenders have claimed
that the young person, because of brain immaturity, did not consciously desire, or realize to a substantial certainty, that someone
would die as a result of his actions.17 7 They sometimes also argue that
the young person did not consciously deliberate over whether to act,
defeating any element of premeditation.17 3 Such assertions were first
raised pre-Roper, not in the courts but in the media. In a 2001 editorial following a school shooting in which fifteen-year-old Andy Williams killed two and injured thirteen, a researcher with the National
Institutes of Health wrote:
I doubt that most school shooters intend to kill, in the adult sense
of permanently ending a life and paying the price for the rest of
174 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2003 & Supp. 2009) (defining delinquent
child as person under eighteen who commits an act designated as a crime by the
penal code); Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV.
659, 672 (1970).
175 This is so unless the legislature has chosen to extend to minors tried injuvenile
court either an infancy defense or a presumption of inability to form intent. See, e.g.,
In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 133-34 (Cal. 1970); In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 668
(Conn. 1989).
176 See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666-67 (2004); Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979); see also Lourdes M. Rosado, Note, Minors and the
FourthAmendment: How Juvenile Status Should Invoke Different Standardsfor Searches and
Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (1996) (explaining how courts have applied
the Fourth Amendment to minors and arguing for a juvenile consent standard to
account for adolescent's cognitive differences).
177 A first-degree murder charge typically requires such proof. WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAw § 14.2 (4th ed. 2003); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a), (b)
(1985) (defining "purpose" and "knowledge," which together comprise what is called
specific intent).
178 Premeditation usually is defined as advance contemplation or a turning over in
the mind. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 501 A.2d 791, 792-93 (D.C. 1985).
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their own lives. Such intention would require a fully developed
prefrontal cortex, which could anticipate the future and rationally
appreciate cause and effect. The young school shooter probably
does not think about the specifics of shooting at all. The often
reported lack of apparent remorse illustrates how unreal the reality
is to these teenagers.
This brief lesson in brain development is not meant to absolve
criminal behavior or make the horrors any less unconscionable.
But the shooter at Santana High, like other adolescents, needed
people or institutions to prevent him from being in a potentially
deadly situation where his immature brain was left to its own
devices. No matter what the town or the school, if a gun is put in
the control of the prefrontal cortex of a hurt and vengeful 15-yearold, and it is pointed at a human target, it will very likely go off.' 7 9
The editorial may have influenced Williams's defense, as shortly
after the shootings he had an MRI taken of his brain.18 0 Before it was
examined, though, Williams pleaded guilty. He now claims that "trial
counsel erred because that MRI could have been analyzed to determine whether his brain development showed a lack of maturity and
impulse control," factors that purportedly would have been relevant to
the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated" mens rea required on all
counts."" As he asked in a 2007 pro se motion,
179 Daniel R. Weinberger, A Brain Too Young for GoodJudgment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2001, at A13; see also STRAUCH, supra note 4, at 114-15 (discussing Williams case).

180 Williams v. Ryan, No. 05-cv-0737, 2007 WL 925834, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2007) (holding that the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
on unexamined MRI was exhausted for habeas purposes). Though Williams's many
post-conviction filings all refer to the MRI, they nowhere explain why it was taken and
why it was not examined. See, e.g., Petitioner Charles Andrew Williams' Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Stay the Federal Habeas Petition
to Permit Petitioner to Return to State Court to Attempt to Exhaust All Unexhausted
Claims at 9, Williams, No. 05-cv-0737 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Williams
Memorandum]. Nor is such information found on a website maintained by his supporters. See Andy Speaks, http://www.andyspeaks.com/main.html (last visited Sept.
11, 2009).
Several years prior, fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel, who pleaded guilty to killing his
parents and two schoolmates and injuring many more at his school, introduced brainscan evidence as mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. That testimony was
intended to support psychiatric testimony that Kinkel was mentally ill and in need of
treatment, not to show that he had a developmentally normal brain. The prosecution
did not cross-examine the brain expert and the judge did not discuss that evidence at
sentencing. See Frontline, The Killer at Thurston High: 111 Years Without Parole, PBS,
May 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial. It is possible that Williams's counsel initially sought the MRI because of the Kinkel case.
181 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Williams, No. 05-cv-0737 (S.D. Cal. filed July 10, 2008) (internal quotation marks omit-
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The Superior Court of the United States has recently ruled teenage
criminal defendants cannot be sentenced to death because their
brains are not fully developed, and yet there is an unread MRI of
this teenage criminal defendant's brain, taken just after shooting 15
fellow students and school personal, but no lawyer appointed had it
examined, considered, or used in defense. When? Where? What
Court takes this claim seriously?' 8 2
This claim is pending and, given the complicated habeas posture,
likely will not be resolved for some time.18 3 However, similar efforts to
defeat evidence of specific intent to kill, or of premeditation, by
recourse to brain science all have failed.
Pittman, for example, argued that "the portion of the brain that
gives one the cognitive capacity to satisfactorily perform acts such as
forming malice . . . is underdeveloped in a twelve-year-old." 84

The

court found the argument "unconvincing given the nature of the
criminal acts," pointing to evidence that the child acquired a gun,
waited until his grandparents were asleep, "executed an escape plan,
and concocted a false story" to mislead police.18 5 As such actions by
an adult would be sufficient to infer either a conscious plan to cause
death or an awareness that death would (and did) result, it was considered a fortiori to allow the same inference for a child. Similarly, a
Tennessee court rejected expert testimony about adolescent brain
development in determining that a fifteen-year-old premeditated the
killing of her grandparents.18 6
ted); id. at 5 (referring to "available MRI" and complaining that trial counsel failed to
investigate "his maturity and ability to exercise judgment and control his impulses
which may have led to defenses based on insanity, diminished capacity and/or lack of
intent").
182 Williams, 2007 WL 925834, at *8 (quoting motion for coram vobis). These
arguments have now been echoed by Williams's habeas counsel. See Williams Apr.
2007 Filing, supra note 180, at 11-13 (asserting that MRI and other evidence as to
adolescent brains show unconstitutionality of Williams's waiver of rights, guilty plea,
and sentence).
183 Williams's claim is unlikely ever to provide significant guidance on the relevance of brain science to mental-state defenses, as it will be filtered through the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), test for ineffectiveness of counselmeaning that a court easily could find that the relevance of such evidence was sufficiently unclear in 2001 as to preclude a claim that counsel was neglectful in failing to
pursue it.

184 State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 163 (S.C. 2007).
185 Id. ("Appellant's story was so detailed that it led law enforcement on an extensive ruse for most of the morning following his discovery.").
186 State v. Daniel, No. M2005-01211-CCA-R3, 2006 WL 3071329, at *10-11 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Oct. 30, 2006) (indicating that psychiatrist testified "generally about the
physical development of the parts of the brain which control judgment; but, he did
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In like fashion, Garcia invoked brain science to assert that fifteen-, sixteen-, and seventeen-year-olds are so generally incapable of
forming a "willful, deliberate and premeditated" mens rea as to invalidate their wholesale transfer to adult court when charged with firstdegree murder, and was granted a hearing at which to present expert
testimony.18 7 That hearing, though, revealed that Garcia was not so
much arguing that teens cannot (or do not) satisfy the legal test for
specific intent as he was arguing for a different conception of the
mental state morally justifying conviction of a teen for intentional
murder. His own experts agreed that adolescents are capable of forming specific intent.1 8 8 Their main point about brain immaturity was a
not testify regarding the development of the Appellant's brain or that she, specifically,
was incapable of exercising judgment" but nonetheless finding that "[r]egardless of
her young age, the circumstances surrounding the shootings, both before and after,
demonstrate premeditation").
187 See Motion to Dismiss First Degree Murder and Felony Murder Charges as
Unconstitutional at 9, 13, State v. Garcia, No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14,
2007) [hereinafter Garcia Motion to Dismiss]; see also id. at 17 (asking to present
expert testimony that brain immaturity "precludes juveniles from considering the
consequences of their actions"). Three mental-state questions were at issue: juveniles'
capacity to form specific intent, Garcia's capacity to do so, and whether he actually
did so. See, e.g., Reporter's Transcript of Apr. 26-27, 2007 at 13, Garcia, No. CR 2005422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Garcia Transcript I] (stating the
court's understanding that the issue "was the science behind the question of the maturation of the human brain, not David's brain, per se," that "[a]ll brains mature,
basically, the same way," and that "as a class ... the brains ofjuveniles are not as fully
developed as an adult"). Garcia's brain-science arguments were issues of first impression. GarciaReply, supra note 164, at 12 ("[T]he Defense has not found a New Mexico state case in which a reviewing court has directly considered the impact of Roper
and brain development research . . . .").

188 Garcia's experts-Ruben Gur, of the University of Pennsylvania, and Marty
Beyer, a developmental psychologist-testify frequently. See GarciaTranscript I, supra
note 187, at 62-63, 110-11 (noting that Gur has testified in twenty to twenty-five criminal cases, and in several about adolescent brain science); id. at 128-30 (stating that
Beyer has testified in approximately thirty-five cases); cf Klein v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., No. 04-955, 2008 WL 879968, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008) (including Gur's
testimony on the juvenile brain offered by civil plaintiffs suing Amtrak for injuries
suffered by teenage boys who climbed atop a parked train car).
Both submitted written reports and testified about anatomical brain immaturity.
GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 136 (testimony of Marty Beyer) ("[Tihe behavioral immaturity that we all know about in teenagers really mirrors the anatomical
immaturity.. . ."); Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D. at 15, Garcia, No. CR 2005-422
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) (urging "presumption . . . that someone under 20
should be considered to have an underdeveloped brain," with impact on formation of
mens rea); Developmental Assessment of David Garcia, Marty Beyer, Ph.D. at 5, 136,
Garcia,No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) ("[E]ven intelligent adolescents are not capable of adult decision-making in part because their brains continue
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much deeper one: that though a typical teenager literally is capable of
intending his actions and their consequences, his technically sufficient mental state is substantively irrational.18 9 For example, an adolescent might intend the victim to die, but he lacks a meaningful
conception of what it means for a person to be dead.19 0 Even if true,
that point is also irrelevant unless a court were willing to adopt a substantively deep concept of the applicable mens rea. The experts' secondary point was about odds: that the planning and forethought
contemplated by New Mexico law is far less common in adolescents is

to develop beyond age 18."). At the hearing Gur gave a PowerPoint presentation
about adolescent brain development, concluding that a typical juvenile will, because
of incomplete myelination and pruning, be less able to "make the appropriate executive decision at the time of upheaval or excitement," control aggressive impulses, and
anticipate and plan for the future. GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 46-48 (testimony of Gur).
Both experts conceded the ability to form specific intent. Id. at 64 (testimony of
Gur) ("I'm not saying that juveniles are unable to form an intent."); id. at 3 (testimony of Beyer) (testifying that Garcia was capable of forming specific intent). A third
expert testified that Garcia did not actually form such intent. See id. at 59 (testimony
of Thomas Calvin Thompson) ("[T]he indications in the neuropsychological testing,
the prolonged history of stress and depression, and the extreme high level of vulnerability of his system to emotional overload would have prevented him from the criteria
for specific intent.").
189 See GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 74 (testimony of Cur) (explaining
that while children can and do plan, the real "question is the quality of their consideration," that is, "the extent to which they're able to premeditate in a rational fashion");
id. at 89, 131-32 (expressing the view that children can plan, but their quick decisions
are bad ones); id. at 185 (testimony of Beyer) ("[T]eenagers can form intent, but ...
the way they think it through is often not rational . . . ."); id. at 227 (noting that

Garcia's actions in obtaining gun showed ability to form intent while "not being able
to think rationally"); id. at 258 (stating that individual assessment should focus not
just on teen's intent "but also their ability to think rationally").
The State's experts agreed that adolescents are capable of forming specific
intent, but applied straightforward definitions of planning and forethought. See, e.g.,
Reporter's Transcript of May 10, 2007, at 212, Garcia,No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter GarciaTranscript II] (testimony of Adrian Raine) (concluding that in order to convince him that teens can't "form intent and make an
informed decision," intent would have to be defined other than by its ordinary meaning); cf Morse, supra note 59, at 407 (asserting that advocates' mens rea claims necessarily must concede a "prima facie case for guilt" but urge that youth "are nonetheless
less criminally responsible because they have insufficiently developed rationality").
190 See GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 140-42 (testimony of Gur) (asserting
that, in part due to "lack of development of the brain," "teenagers don't really have a
concept of what it means to kill or die"); cf id. at 223 (testimony of Beyer) (testifying
that Garcia understood that "guns kill people" but did not anticipate death of victim).
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acting impulsively, particularly in emotionally intense situations.1 9 '
That point, even if true, also is irrelevant unless a court were willing to
find that specific intent is so rare in teenagers who kill as to upset the
legislative transfer scheme on its face, rather than leaving that determination in the individual instance to prosecutors (in selecting the
charges) and factfinders (in determining whether adequate planning
has been proven). The Garcia court apparently was uninterested in
taking either step, as it summarily rejected both arguments.19 2 As in
Pittman, the court hewed closely to traditional mens rea definitions
and deferred to legislative choices.19 3
Reasonableness. If brain-based challenges to specific intent have
been unsuccessful because of the relatively undemanding prevailing
conception of that mens rea, challenges going to reasonableness
might fare better. Failure to foresee consequences is culpable only
where such failure constitutes a gross deviation from what a reasonable person in the actor's situation would have foreseen, and the developmental attributes of one's age are part of one's "situation."19 4 Thus,
191 See, e.g., id. at 73-74, 89 (testimony of Gur) (arguing that conscious planning
and consideration of consequences are unlikely when teen experiencing "emotional
upheaval").
192 See Garcia Denial Order, supra note 169, at 2-4.
193 A similar result obtained in a case in which a ten-year-old unsuccessfully
argued that he was unable to form specific intent to commit "mayhem" and aggravated assault. His appellate counsel relied in part "on recent scientific studies that
purport to show that brain development plays a crucial role in a child's ability to
understand the consequences of his actions." Commonwealth v. Ogden 0., 864
N.E.2d 13, 20 n.8 (Mass. 2007); see also id. at 19 n.6, 20 n.8 (rejecting "evidence that
children between the ages of seven and fourteen years are incapable of committing
criminal acts because of insufficient brain development," out of "'respect for the legislative process'" and because the data, which was not part of the record, did not refer
specifically to the defendant (quoting Mass. Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. Of Educ., 767
N.E.2d 549, 558 (Mass. 2002))).
In an additional case, a fifteen-year-old convicted of shooting two students at his
high school appealed the trial court's rejection of his insanity plea. On a post-Roper
appeal he argued that due process requires that teens be judged by not by the
M'Naghten test for insanity but by the "irresistible impulse" test, "because adolescents' brains are less developed than adults' brains in regions related to impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning" and therefore they "may understand their
actions or know that they are wrong, but still be unable to control [their] behavior."
State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original). As the claim was raised for the first time on appeal
the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to reach it. See id. at 713.
194 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (1985) ("A person acts recklessly ... when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . [and that] disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation."); id. § 2.02(2)(d) ("A person acts negligently
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doctrinal barriers to consideration of developmental factors are lower
in this context.19 5 Notwithstanding this relatively open space, however, adolescent brain science generally has failed to persuade.
Courts' first rationale is that the legislature has allowed them less
interpretive room than advocates urge. State v. Heinemann'9 6 makes
this point. Gabriel Heinemann asked that the adult-court jury considering his duress defense be instructed on attributes of the "reasonable
adolescent"; while the argued instruction would not have mentioned
brain science, its content would have reflected insights drawn in part
from that science. 197 Dismissing as irrelevant "literature about the
developing adolescent mind," the trial court determined that whether
a person of "reasonable firmness" in Heinemann's position would
have been unable to resist a threat was "a community objective standard."19 8 On appeal Heinemann and his amici again presented developmental literature, both psychological and neuroscientific. 9 9 The
. . . when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk ... [and that]
failure to perceive it . . . involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.").
195 State and federal law generally allows courts to consider the impact of youth
and immaturity, at least to some degree, in such determinations. Cf Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (noting need for flexibility to consider "special concerns
that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education
and with immature judgment, are involved").
196 920 A.2d 278 (Conn. 2007).
197 Id. at 284-89. Heinemann, sixteen years old, claimed he had been frightened
into submission by two older, larger, and stronger teenagers, one of whom had a gang
connection and both of whom were armed. Id. at 285-87. Under Connecticut law
duress has both a subjective component-the defendant must have been sincerely
afraid that he would be physically harmed-and an objective component-the threat
must be such that "a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 2007). The trial court
refused to instruct the jury to consider age-typical psychological attributes when determining the reasonableness of his response to the purported duress. Heinemann, 920
A.2d at 288-89, 294 (refusing instruction that age is relevant to "reasonable, moral
firmness" and "moral temperament" aspects of legal test for duress, and instructing
jury that Heinemann's age was a "stark tangible factor," like size and weight, that it
should consider only in differentiating him from the other defendants).
198 Heinemann, 920 A.2d at 288, 290 & n.15 (rejecting relevance of "recent legal
debate" over adolescent mind).
199 Id. at 295 (repeating the defense's argument that the court should "recognize
the differences between a juvenile and an adult in maturity, sense of responsibility,
vulnerability, and personality traits, which make it more difficult for adolescents to
resist pressures because of their limited decision-making capacity[,] . .. their susceptibility to outside influences," and their different evaluation of risks); see also id. at 296
n.19 (detailing developmental arguments, including those pertaining to recent
"research on brain development," made by amici).

140

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 85:1

Connecticut Supreme Court "acknowledge [d] that juveniles often
have more immature decision-making capability and recognize [d] the
literature supporting the notion that juveniles are more vulnerable to
all sorts of pressure, including, but not limited to, duress." 20 0 However, it believed itself bound by the legislature's decision to treat sixteen-year-olds as adults, including for purposes of assessing mental
states. Taken to "its logical conclusion," the court held, Heinemann's
argument would "require this Court to rewrite the entire Penal Code,
crimes, and defenses, to necessitate consideration of the age of young
offenders for the ultimate purpose of defining their culpability." 2 0 1
Developmental science was not sufficient to persuade the court to
characterize as "'clearly irrational and unreasonable"' the legislature's
decision to confine its "appreciation of the different mental abilities
and susceptibilities of younger persons" to those under sixteen, and to
express that appreciation not through differential definition of reasonableness but through maintenance of a separate juvenile justice
system with distinct procedural attributes and sentencing outcomes. 20 2
A further rationale, previously noted in the JLWOP cases, is that a
tutorial in brain science adds little or nothing to factfinders' existing
knowledge. A Minnesota appellate court reached this conclusion in
the context of a defense-of-others claim in adult court.203 Relying
(like the Heinemann court) on the legislative scheme for transfer, it
refused to order instruction on the "reasonable adolescent" standard.
It also approved exclusion of defendant's proffered expert testimony
about "the physiological differences between adolescent and adult
brains," which he claimed would explain why his perceptions and
actions were reasonable. 204 Such testimony, the court held, would not
200 Id. at 296.
201 Id. at 297 & n.20 (arguing that the same result would obtain even if court
ignored ramifications of scientific evidence, for unless defendant could show a "'gross
and verifiable'" mental disability he is "confined to the normative function of duress"
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, cmt. 2 (1985))); cf In re A.C.L., No. A06-1489,
2007 WL 447080, at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2007) (refusing to disturb juvenilecourt assessment that "impulsive" and "unplanned" actions, part of defendant's
imperfect self-defense claim, were "typical" of an adolescent, though not mentioning
or relying on brain science).
202 Heinemann, 920 A.2d at 297 (quoting State v. Dupree, 495 A.2d 691, 697
(Conn. 1985)). The court noted a then-pending bill to extend that "appreciation" to
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds; it later became law. 2007 Conn. Acts 96 (Spec.
Sess.).
203 State v. Alford, No. A07-1025, 2008 WL 4006657, at *5-6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
2, 2008) (stating that seventeen-year-old defendant claimed to have acted reasonably
in defending brother against assault by housemate).
204 Id. at *5.
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assist the jury, as "every parent and person who has gone through adolescence is familiar with and can understand the immaturity and
impulsive responses of adolescents." 20 5 Thus, courts that have considered brain-based arguments going to reasonableness have found them
irrelevant, both as a matter of law and a matter of fact.
Felony murder. Courts also have turned aside efforts to invalidate
application to juveniles of the felony murder doctrine. Under that
doctrine, the state generally need not prove intent to kill if it is able to
prove intent to commit the predicate felony and a causal link to the
death. 206 Like reasonableness, the doctrine necessarily relies on
group-level assumptions about what people do and should foresee;
the doctrinal space is similarly somewhat open. Therefore, J.B., an
Ohio thirteen-year-old convicted of the felony murder of his infant
brother, 207 argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that it is unreasonable to assume that minors, particularly very young ones, would or
should foresee a risk of death when committing predicate felonies. 20 8
Garcia similarly claimed that brain science showed that teens generally lack the level of forethought justifying that doctrine. 2 09 One of
his experts testified that anatomical brain immaturity contributes to
205 Id. at *6 (noting further that trial court had allowed psychiatrist to testify about
defendant's background, state of mind, and effects of drugs and alcohol; even if "fully
informed about the physiology of adolescents' brains" jurors would have found
actions unreasonable).
206 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 31.06[B], at 523-26
(5th ed. 2009). Even as applied to adults the doctrine is unpopular among commentators. See State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1201 (N.M. 1991) ("'Few legal doctrines
have been as maligned and yet have shown as great a resiliency as the felony-murder
rule.'" (quoting Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-MurderRub: A Doctrineat
ConstitutionalCrossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 (1985))).
207 In reJ.B., No. CA2004-09-226, 2005 WL 3610482 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2005),
appeal denied, 847 N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio 2006), reconsideration denied, 852 N.E.2d 191
(Ohio 2006), denial of post-conviction reliefaffd, No. CA2005-06-176, 2006 WL 1493276
(Ohio Ct. App. May 30, 2006).
208 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25-29, J.B. v. Ohio, 549 U.S. 1246 (2006) (No.
06-7611) [hereinafter JB. Certiorari Petition] (citing brain science to "highlight[ ]
the unfairness of applying the felony-murder doctrine to cases involving children").
This argument, first raised during state-court proceedings, was not addressed by the
Ohio courts. See Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Amicus Curiae justice
for Children Project at 13-15, In re Matter of J.B., No. 06-0339 (Ohio Feb. 13, 2006).
209 GarciaReply, supra note 164, at 15-19, 25 (arguing that "brain science relied
upon in the Roper decision[ ] clearly demonstrates that proof of mens rea for felony
murder would be highly problematic ... as a matter of law," as "a child cannot understand and appreciate the magnitude, nature, and consequences of risks" and teens
cannot "intend the consequences of their acts"). New Mexico's felony murder provision is unusually stringent; it requires both intent to commit an inherently dangerous
felony and independent "proof that the defendant intended to kill, [or] . . . knew that
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teens' "difficulty in anticipating the consequences of their actions"
and in seeing either "the wors[t] thing that could come from their
actions" or "that there's more than one choice."2 10
Though these assertions, if true, would undermine the felony
murder doctrine, courts have stuck by it, relying (in a now-familiar
pattern) on the legislatures' choices to apply the same responsibility
standards to adults and juveniles. The Garcia court summarily
rejected the facial challenge.2 11 Though the facts in JB. were quite
sympathetic-the boy had been left home alone in charge of four
younger siblings and apparently did not intend his brother's injuries
or death 2 12-and the predicate showing required of the state quite
low-as it had only to prove that J.B. "recklessly abused" his
brother 2 13-the state courts rejected the challenge without mention
of the science, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 2 14
Ability to assert or waive rights. Few courts have been directly
presented with neuroscientific claims going to minors' competence to
waive rights or to face prosecution. In one such case, a sixteen-yearold challenged Colorado's rule dispensing with a parental-presence
requirement for interrogations of out-of-state runaways, arguing
unsuccessfully that the rule ought to be judged by the strict scrutiny
standard because juveniles' undeveloped brains render them a sus-

his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." Ortega, 817
P.2d at 1205 ("An unintentional or accidental killing will not suffice.").
210 GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 170-72 (testimony of Beyer) (claiming
that teens frequently "don't think about the consequences of their actions," showing
"terrible shortsightedness" though they may see their errors in "hindsight").
211 Garcia subsequently pleaded guilty. Docket Entry ofJuly 9, 2007, State v. Garcia, No. CR 2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) (listing change of plea to guilty).
The court accepted Garcia's plea and imposed a sentence of twenty-eight years in
prison and five years of parole. See Docket Entry of Dec. 14, 2007, Garcia, No. CR
2005-422 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007) (reporting sentence, including 27 years and
364 days in prison).
212 JB. Certiorari Petition, supra note 208, at 15-16, 25. J.B. testified that he had
accidentally hurt the baby, J.R.; lost his temper when J.R. would not stop crying; and
then injured him further. JB., 2005 WL 3610482, at *1. He and another sibling
attempted CPR and tried to call for help, but their mother had removed the phone.
Id. They layJ.R. in a blanket and prayed next to him until their mother came home.
Id. J.R. died at the hospital. Id.
213 JB. 2005 WL 3610482, at *13. Ohio-like most U.S. jurisdictions-requires
only proof of the mens rea for the predicate felony, and many predicate felonies
require only a reckless or negligent mens rea as to consequences. SeeJ.B. Certiorari
Petition, supra note 208, at 25-29.
214 J.B. v. Ohio, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007) (No. 06-7611)
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pect class. 2 1 5 In a small handful of other cases, defendants and amici
have raised brain science as one reason why evidence-statements to
police or the fruits of a consent search-should have been suppressed, and courts have simply ignored or rejected the assertion as
insufficiently developed.2 1 6
As in the sentencing context, though, there is a small countertrend. In one case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court (nowhere relying
on neuroscience) used the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test to conclude that a fourteen-year-old's written confession was involuntary.2 1 7
Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote a lone concurrence in which she
215 People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552, 555 (Colo. App. 2005) (rejecting defendant's argument that "juveniles lack the cognitive ability to make a knowing election
under Miranda" and "occupy a special class of persons to whom additional constitutional protection ought to be afforded because '[t]he scientific studies on the cognitive abilities of adolescents do not differentiate between adolescents who are runaways
and those who are not'"); see also Blankenship v. Estep, No. 05-cv-02066, 2008 WL
4964712, at *1, *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 18, 2008) (accepting recommendation of denial of
habeas petition and citing that portion of the state court decision); Gilbert v.
Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 793-95 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting habeas challenge to failure
to suppress statement without parental presence, despite citation to academic article
referencing brain development) (citing Kenneth J. King, Waving Childhood Goodbye:
How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Childrenfrom Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary
Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 431, 432-44).
216 See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (S.C. 2007) ("Appellant has
presented no evidence, other than his age, supporting his claim that his confession
was involuntary. Appellant instead relies exclusively on abstract scientific data and
rhetorical questions for his argument. This evidence is not probative of coercion.");
see also Williams Memorandum, supra note 180, at 11-14 (challenging waiver of
Miranda and guilty plea).
In another case, a coalition of advocates and scholars submitted an amicus brief
relying, in part, on developmental neuroscience to urge the Massachusetts Supreme
Court to suppress evidence and statements obtained from a fourteen-year-old. See
Brief of the juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae at 39-41, Commonwealth v. Guthrie G., 869 N.E.2d 585 (Mass. 2007) (No. SJC-090805). The court did not mention
that research when it ruled the search and interrogation lawful. See Guthrie G., 869
N.E.2d at 586. The juvenile Law Center also has made a modest brain-science argument in the pending military-tribunal case of Omar Khadr; that case involves a number of other issues (like the military commissions' jurisdiction over minors) but also
involves the voluntariness of Khadr's statements to military interrogators. See Amicus
Brief Filed by Marsha Levick on Behalf of the juvenile Law Center at 16 n.8, United
States v. Khadr, No. 07-001 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://wwwjlc.org/files/
briefs/OK%20BRIEF.Jan.18.FINAL.pdf.
217 In rejerrell CJ., 699 N.W.2d 110, 139-40 (Wis. 2005) (applying test derived
from Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), and citingJerrell's age, education, and
low intelligence, the questioning tactics used by the police, and the fact that his parents were excluded). The court used its supervisory power to require that custodial
interrogation of juveniles be electronically recorded. Id. at 122-23.
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asserted eight reasons why she would go further and "adopt a per se
rule, excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of
16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or
interested adult"; reason number three was that "l[e] merging studies
demonstrate that the area of the brain governing decision making and
the weighing of risks and rewards continues to develop into the late
teens and the early twenties."2 18
In addition, at least one competence challenge succeeded in part
because of neuroscience. A California appellate court ordered competency hearings for two young boys, eleven and twelve, holding that
simple "developmental immaturity" (rather than a mental or cognitive
abnormality) might provide a basis for an incompetence finding. 2 19
While the court relied primarily on psychological findings, it-unlike
the trial court-also credited expert testimony about the brain immaturity of very young adolescents. 2 20 In each of these cases the role of
brain science appears to have been small, but that it was mentioned as
one of many reasons to grant a juvenile defendant relief is
noteworthy.

As this Section has shown, the impact of adolescent brain science
on juvenile justice has been strongly cabined by the extrinsic reality of
218 Id. at 135 & n.46 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Amicus parties had brought
the brain science research to the court's attention. See Nonparty Brief of the Children
and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law's Bluhm Legal
Clinic et al. at 1, 4 & n.2, Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110 (No. 02-3423); see also In reJ.T.,
851 N.E.2d 1, 25 (Ill. 2006) (Freeman, J., dissenting) (asserting that juvenile's waiver
of appeal was invalid, citing, inter alia, "[s]cientific and sociological studies" language
of Roper); cf State ex rel. P.M.P., 975 A.2d 441, 447-48 (N.J. 2009) (determining that
filing ofjuvenile petition is "critical stage" of proceedings sufficient to trigger right to
counsel that is nonwaivable unless counsel is present, but explicitly declining to
engage with amicus parties' brain-science arguments because question was answered
by statute).
219 Timothy J. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746, 754 (Ct. App. 2007).
220 Id. at 754, 755 n.12 ("Dr. Edwards testified that minors are different from
adults because their brains are still developing and as myelination occurs during
puberty, the minor develops the ability to think logically and abstractly .... [B]ecause
of his age, Dante's brain has not fully developed and he was unable to think in those
ways. Their conclusions are supported by the literature, which indicates that there is
a relationship between age and competency to stand trial and that an adolescent's
cognitive, psychological, social, and moral development has a significant biological
basis."); id. at 754 n.12 ("[T]he frontal lobes oversee high-level cognitive tasks such as
hypothetical thinking, logical reasoning, long-range planning, and complex decision
making. During puberty, that area of the brain matures as the myelination process
takes place.").
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legal doctrine.22 1 Though that science has been positively received by
a small number of courts and judges, usually in the context of sentencing, in no instance has it been outcome-determinative. Courts generally perceive it either as proving nothing new or as raising a challenge
to the rules themselves, rather than informing an inquiry properly falling within the confines of the rules. 2 2 2 While they sometimes are
"troubled by" the rules and follow them "reluctantly,"223 courts generally do believe themselves to be bound to them.
Doctrine can, of course, change and therefore represents a soft
target. But in this area of law it is not very soft. Because the abovedescribed doctrinal forces are so entrenched and of such broad applicability within criminal law, adolescent brain science is inadequate to
provoke deep change, at least within the courts. 224
B.

Scientific Limitations

The previous Section delineated the many doctrinal hurdles that
have largely hamstrung adolescent brain science in the courts. Some
of those hurdles say far less about the merits of adolescent brain science than they do about contemporary trends generally disfavoring
both juvenile claims and judicial oversight of legislatures' criminal justice policies. However, the challenge for brain science goes deeper
than doctrine. This Section demonstrates limitations that inhere in
the science itself, limitations that show some the courts' general reticence sometimes to be well placed.

221 See Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 98 (manuscript at 32) (noting that
teens' "lack of maturity does nothing to mitigate their culpability under criminal law
doctrine as it exists today").
222 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38 (2007) (No. 06-7949) (question of Souter, J.) (arguing that defendant's assertions
about immaturity, if true, "should be accepted in every case," because "the brain is less
developed in the case of everyone under a certain age" and arguing that "that
amounts, in effect, to a rejection of the policy for a certain swath of individuals, relatively young individuals, for whom the judge is saying age is relevant, the policy says
age is not").
223 People v. Pratcher, No. A117122, 2009 WL 2332183, at *44 (Cal. Ct. App. July
30, 2009); see also State v. Allen, 958 A.2d 1214, 1236 (Conn. 2008) (commenting that
JLWOP raises "deeply troubling questions" but stating that "the wisdom of this sentencing scheme remains with the legislature").
224 These difficulties are not unique to young defendants; mentally retarded persons have to date been similarly unable to leverage Atkins into greater judicial relief.
See Barkow, supra note 132, at 1161-62.
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1. Individual Differences
The most significant current limitation of developmental neuroscience is its inability to inform individual assessment. Imaging studies
that show group trends in structural maturity-such as relative levels
of myelination in prefrontal cortex-do not show that all individuals
in the group perfectly reflect the trend.2 25 Normal brains follow a
unique developmental path bounded roughly by the general trajectory; that is, while all humans will pass through the same basic stages
of structural maturation at more or less the same stages of life, the
precise timing and manner in which they do so will vary.22 6 Moreover,
such variation cannot be detected or interpreted in any legally meaningful way. Neither structural nor functional imaging can determine
whether any given individual has a "mature brain" in any respect,
though imaging might reveal gross pathology. 2 2 7 Researchers therefore consistently agree that developmental neuroscience cannot at
present generate reliable predictions or findings about an individual's
behavioral maturity.22 8 Courts thus have a strong basis for deeming
brain science irrelevant to many highly individualized claims, such as
whether a defendant was able to form specific intent.
Indeed, the cases reflect the difficulties posed by individual variation. Legal decisionmakers display incredulity, even annoyance, when
general lessons about the adolescent brain appear to conflict with evidence about the individual juvenile.2 2 9 One particularly vivid account
225 Casey et al., supra note 28, at 119-21; Morse, supranote 59, at 403-04, 404 n.4.
226 See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 24 ("Within any given individual, the
developmental timetable of different aspects of maturation may vary markedly ....
[D]evelopment rarely follows a straight line during adolescence-periods of progress
often alternate with periods of regression. . . . Variability between individuals is still
more important . . . ."). The problem of individual variation is present in all biologi-

cal research. See, e.g., Steven Pinker, My Genome, My Sel N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11,
2009, at 24, 28-29 (asserting that though "a substantial fraction of the variation
among individuals . .. can be linked to variation in their genes ... no one knows what
the nongenetic causes of individuality are").
227 See Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial, Sci. NEWs, May 28, 2004, at 299, 299
("There's no way to say whether ... an individual 17-year-old possesses a fully mature
brain."); Gur, supra note 119, at 15 (agreeing with that idea).
228 See Hearingon Adolescent BrainDevelopment andjuvenilejustice, supra note 10, at 4
(testimony of Woolard); Baird, supra note 39, at 121; Henderson, supra note 7, at 5
("[S]cience has not progressed to the point where an individual adolescent's brain
scan can be used to back up any one of these propositions in an individual case."); see
also Brown & Murphy, supra note 36 (manuscript at 27) (noting that individual differences are a troubling issue for neuroscience and criminal law generally).
229 See People v. Gonzales, Nos. E036344, E037793, 2005 WL 1799520, at *7 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 29, 2005); State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 154-55 (S.C. 2007); see also
People v. Clark, 869 N.E.2d 1019, 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal denied, 875 N.E.2d

2000]

ADOLESCENT

BRAIN

SCIENCE

IN

JUVENILE JUSTICE

147

of that phenomenon was offered by a Delaware judge who presided
over a juvenile capital case while Roper was pending. 23 0 In a pretrial
hearing, Michael Jones presented the testimony of Ruben Gur "that
juveniles are less criminally culpable than adults because the area of
their brains controlling foresight, goal setting, and ability to plan are
not yet fully developed."2 3 ' Gur later offered such testimony at trial,
alongside the testimony of one Dr. Ragland, a psychologist who had
examined Jones. Recounts the court:
Dr. Ragland discovered that Jones is an exceptionally gifted planner. Dr. Ragland testified that Jones' scores regarding planning
and ability to foresee consequences were "off the charts," and were,
indeed, higher than any he had ever seen. This admission, which
Dr. Ragland repeated ad nauseum, annihilated Jones' only viable
defense: that, as ajuvenile, he was too young to reasonably calculate
the possible outcomes of his murderous rampage, and to plan
accordingly. It also eliminated another proposed mitigating factor:
that a sentence of life imprisonment would ensure thatJones would
never again threaten society. The State used Dr. Ragland's testimony to suggest that Jones would use his exceptional gift for planning to formulate an escape, endangering corrections officers and
the public at large....
When Dr. Gur took the stand as the next defense witness,
explaining the complicated science of brain development and its
nexus to planning ability, the jury appeared disinterested. Their
courtroom demeanor, as well as their sentencing recommendation,
made it clear that the jury viewed the medical evidence as mere
"psychobabble" meant to mislead them into excusing an inexcusable crime. This was despite the fact that Dr. Gur is a superb witness: engaging, charismatic, highly expert, and convincing. There
simply was no way for him to salvage the train wreck . . . of the

defense case. 23 2
Similarly, in Garcia the state was able to rebut the notion that
anatomical immaturity necessarily manifests itself in a lack of meaningful appreciation of death by showing that Garcia himself had such
1116 (Ill. 2007) (overruling, in part, the sentencing court, which had found that testimony as to Clark's "mature and respectful" nature "'really destroy[ed] any far fetched
argument that he had a frontal lobe that wasn't developed"').
230 See State v. Jones, No. 9911016309, 2005 WL 950122 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 10,
2005) (denying motion for new trial). The many opinions in Jones reveal a high level
of acrimony between the trial judge and defense counsel. The context of extreme
antipathy likely colors the judge's description. However, given the jury's vote for
death there is no reason to question its basic accuracy.
231 Jones, 2005 WL 950122, at *1.
232 Id. at *4-6.
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appreciation; he was deeply affected by the recent death of his grandmother and frequently worried that his gravely ill mother would
die.2 33 The Gonzales court, too, remarked that "[r]egardless of
whether the nature of the adolescent brain produces behavior that is
more impulsive than an adult's . . . [Gonzales's] conduct in this case

reveals a high degree of individual culpability." 2 3 4 Neuroscience may
provide marginal support for categorically limiting the sanctions that
may be imposed on juveniles, 235 but it has little to offer in assessing
the mental state, capacity for rehabilitation, or other law-relevant
attributes of any given juvenile.
2.

Structure v. Behavior

A related difficulty stems from the reality that structural and functional differences between individual brains may not correspond with
predictable or discernable differences in behavior. Just as scientists
cannot look at an individual teen's brain and conclude that she has a
particular level of behavioral maturity, observers cannot look at a
teen's behavior and deduce the structural or functional maturity of
her brain.2 36 This is not an issue only for individual determinations,
for even at the group level there are few data demonstrating a clear
233 Garcia I Transcript, supra note 187, at 225 (testimony of Beyer) (answering
"yes" when asked if Garcia "comprehended death really well").
234 Gonzales, 2005 WL 1799520, at *7; see also People v. Diaz, No. F052637, 2008
WL 5273910, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2008) (affirming seventy-five-to-life sentence for seventeen-year-old convicted of attempted murders); Pittman, 647 S.E.2d at
163 ("The specific factual evidence in this case stands in stark contrast to the general
nature of the scientific evidence submitted by Appellant."). The Diaz court affirmed
the sentence despite an amicus briefing with a neurodevelopmental argument. See
Brief of Amicus CuriaeJuvenile Law Center in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Diaz,
No. F052637 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.jlc.org/files/
briefs/California v Diaz.pdf.
235 Cf Emens, supra note 58, at 61, 88-89 (arguing that a categorical prophylactic
rule against juvenile execution is justifiable if case-by-case assessment of maturity and
culpability creates undue risk of irrational, discriminatory decisions).
236 Experts sometimes fall into this trap. For example, in Garcia, Dr. Gur, asked to
explain the Columbine school shooters' extensive planning, replied that the planning
and the crime itself were "a good illustration of failure of myelination." GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 92-93 (testimony of Gur). Such an argument is circular, in
that any bad act by a juvenile can be characterized as evidence of defective brain
processes. Cf Baird, supra note 39, at 118 (asserting that "there are some criminals
who have very functional brains" but offend because of other factors, such as
"deprived backgrounds"). Conversely, a military prosecutor sought (unsuccessfully)
to elicit expert testimony that Omar Khadr's allegedly deliberate actions likely
reflected brain maturity. See Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 8-9).
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link between structural immaturity and immature behavior.2 3 7 The
structure-behavior hypothesis is a strong one, as brain attributes often
correlate with specific behaviors, and a significant developmental
stage is highly likely to manifest in behavior. 23 8 Developmental psychology provides a picture of the attitudes and behaviors that typify
adolescents; neuroscience provides a picture of the brain maturation
processes that typify adolescence; and the latter can be interpreted in
such a way as to provide a plausible, partial explanation for the former.2 39 But though it is highly plausible that "[a]dolescents' behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains,"
science has not determined the nature or extent of that mirroring. 240
Advocates, commentators, and defenders unnecessarily overstate
the case when they claim that imaging studies explain adolescent
behavior, let alone any given adolescent's behavior. Courts also have
a basis for believing neural explanations to be less probative than
behavioral ones.2 4 1 The Supreme Court displayed that defensible per237 See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent
Brain, 1021 ANNALs N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 77, 83 (2004); Spear, supra note 34, at 26 ("What
is clear at this early point . .. is that the brain undergoes considerable sculpting and
remodeling during adolescence. What remains a challenge is to detail the extent of
this restructuring, its functional ramifications, and the opportunities and vulnerabilities provided by this unique transition for the adolescent.").
238 See Casey et al., supra note 28, at 104 (detailing efforts to determine extent to
which brain development "parallel[s] behavioral and cognitive development," but
warning against "common trap" of claiming "causality between coincidental changes
in brain and behavioral development"); Elizabeth A. Phelps & Laura A. Thomas, Race,
Behavior, and the Brain: The Role of Neuroimagingin UnderstandingComplex Social Behaviors, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 747, 755 (2003) (explaining that though complex behavior is

"mapped" onto the brain, there is no "one-to-one correspondence between a behavior
and a brain structure"). But see STRAUCH, supra note 4, at 21 (asserting that it "can't
be just a coincidence" that most dramatic stages of behavioral change coincide with
most dramatic stages of brain remodeling).
239 See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 36, at 111 (positing "biologically plausible
model of the neural mechanisms underlying . .. changes in behavior"); Morse, supra
note 59, at 409 ("At most, the neuroscientific evidence provides a partial causal explanation of why the observed behavioral differences exist and thus some further evidence of the validity of the behavioral differences.").
240 AMA Brief, supra note 76, at 10; see also GarciaTranscript II, supra note 189, at
208-10 (testimony of Raine) (taking issue not with the defense's description of adolescent brain maturation but with the argued behavioral and legal implications); id. at
77-79 (testimony of Edward Siegal) (conceding accuracy of testimony about structural brain development but questioning such development's "functional impact");
Aronson, supra note 2, at 132 (noting AMA's "interpretative leap" in their brief).
241 See Phelps & Thomas, supra note 238, at 748 ("Although brain science can
inform our understanding of complex human behaviors, it cannot help us predict
human behavior with any more certainty than can be derived from examining behav-
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spective in Roper by relying overtly on historical beliefs and legal precedent rooted in direct experience with teenagers' behavior-about
which "any parent knows"-and in the behavior-based findings of
developmental psychology.2 4 2
3.

Relative Deficiency

Even if one credits the strongest hypotheses about the behavioral
impact of brain immaturity, that impact cannot automatically claim
legal significance. Psychological studies show that adolescents are
consistently less able than adults to implement fast, appropriate, and
mature responses to environmental challenges; neuroscience suggests
that these relative deficiencies are partly attributable not to bad character but to biological constraints attending developmental
processes. 2 4 3 But relative deficiency-for example, in impulse control-does not establish that the deficiency is legally meaningful or
that any individual failure of control is excusable. It instead implies
that, compared to a similar failure in an adult, it is less blameworthy to
the extent that its avoidance would have required more effort,
through no fault of the child's own. 24 4 Relative deficiencies do not
necessarily take juveniles below a legal threshold but may instead show
that they exceed it by a lower margin. 245 Where to set that threshold
relative to juvenile deficits is, at its core, a moral and legal determination, not a scientific one.
Unfortunately, defenders and experts often treat the legal significance of the science as a given; indeed, they sometimes bypass the
relative-deficiency point altogether and devolve into hard biological
determinism.2 4 6 They sometimes argue, for example, that because of
ior itself."). Behavioral developmental science suffers from many of the same limitations this Section describes. It does not, however, suffer from all of them, and always
will bear more direct relation to juvenile justice policy than will neuroscience. See
infra note 313.
242 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
243 Beatriz Luna & John A. Sweeney, The Emergence of CollaborativeBrain Function:
fMRI Studies of the Development of Response Inhibition, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 296,
302-04 (2004).
244 See Baird, supra note 39, at 111 (citing, inter alia, B.J. Casey et al., Clinical,
Imaging, Lesion, and Genetic Approaches Toward a Model of Cognitive Control, 40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 237 (2001); Sarah Durston et al., A NeuralBasisfor the Development of Inhibitory Control, 5 DEVELOPMENTAL Sci. F9 (2002)) (noting that "younger
individuals need to recruit greater neural resources to accomplish adult-like
behavior").
245 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 138; Morse, supra note 59, at 409.
246 See Pinker, supra note 226, at 26-27 (describing "increasingly concrete" trend
toward "essentialism," though cautioning that the "scare word 'determinism'" should
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their immature brains, adolescents can't make good decisions under
stress, control their emotions, suppress violent impulses, foresee consequences, or defy antisocial peers. 2 4 7 The cases reveal that legal decisionmakers are, by and large, unprepared to accept flat assertions of
inability. Such assertions conflict with everyday observations (and,
often, record evidence) that most teenagers make good choices most
of the time and that offenders, too, make socially beneficial, self-protective, or strategic choices, sometimes within the context of the
offense behavior itself.2 48 The prosecutor in Garcia, for example,
noted that Garcia had previously threatened his girlfriend with a gun
but had not shot her, something for which his experts had little explanation except that at one moment he was able to exert self-control
and at another he was not.249 Such evidence might be contextualized
by explaining that juveniles' capacity for self-control is less stable than
adults', but that is a relative-deficiency point that may not be legally
meaningful. Courts should not be expected to assume the legal relevance of relative deficiency; that relevance must be directly and adequately defended.

not get in the way "of learning more about the biological contributors to behaviors
and propensities").
247 See, e.g., Hearingon SB 513, supra note 73, at 16-17 (testimony of David Fassler,
M.D.) ("[A]dolescents act on impulse. When they see a stimulus or they are in a
frightening situation, they don't have the physical cognitive capacity, the developed
pre-frontal lobes that say I shouldn't do this because there are X, Y, or Z consequences."); CaseyJones Motion, supra note 166, at 9 (stating that "science tell us that
Casey did not have the logical reasoning and decision-making skills" to comprehend
the import of carrying a gun near school, and "science tells us that the underdeveloped nature of Casey's brain means that when acting he does not process differently
based on the location of where he is or where he plans to be"); id. at 19-20 (asserting
the same claim for juveniles in general); GarciaMotion to Dismiss, supra note 187, at
9 ("U]uveniles under 18 are incapable of possessing the mens rea required for capital
offenses."); id. at 12 (asserting that the "inability of juveniles to modulate their emotional responses and make rational decisions is a biological fact"); RETHINKING THE
JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 10 ("[Dleterrence does not work with juveniles.").
248 See Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 218-19, 246 (testimony of Beyer)
(conceding that adolescents sometimes make good decisions under stress); Bower,
supra note 227, at 301 (quoting Harvard's Jerome Kagan as saying that teens must
usually be able to "restrain their darker urges," or we would "be having Columbine
incidents every week").
249 Garcia Transcript II, supra note 189, at 40-41 (testimony of Thompson)
(responding to the question of how he knew Garcia was, by reason of frontal lobe
disinhibition, unable to inhibit an impulse to shoot the victim when he had inhibited
similar impulses at other emotionally intense moments, by offering as evidence the
fact that he did shoot her).
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Age Limits

Neuroscience also tends to run headlong into a perennial difficulty in juvenile justice: the search for a stable justification for pegging
law's relative solicitude to the eighteenth birthday. Because it is
implausible to posit that any given date constitutes a maturational tipping point, courts and theorists historically have relied on practical
concerns justifying line-drawing. 250 States' choices are not consistent:
while most terminate juvenile court jurisdiction at age eighteen,
others choose seventeen or sixteen; all allow adult treatment of
younger children in some circumstances; and all recognize different
age milestones for benefits and responsibilities such as driving, voting,
and drinking. 25 1 Adolescent brain science has not offered a theory by
which this erratic line-drawing might be harmonized and may have
further muddied the waters.
Developmental neuroscience consistently indicates that structural
brain maturation is incomplete at age eighteen. Though estimates
vary, many scientists have opined that structural maturation is not
complete until the mid-twenties.2 52 Some also have opined-including in court testimony-that just as brain maturation is completed by
the mid-twenties, it starts to decline in middle age, perhaps as early as
age forty-five. 253 Taking neuroscience as the proper benchmark
therefore would suggest that the criminal justice system systematically
should recognize the brain deficiencies of both young adults and the
250 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status
Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIs J. JUv. L. & POL'Y 275, 277-78 (2006).
251 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 579-88 & apps. A-D.
252 See Gur PattersonDeclaration, supra note 68, at 3 (citing a "congruence of evidence" that maturation is complete "about age 21"); Bower, supra note 227, at 300
(relating Baird's belief that maturity is achieved at "25 or 26"); Sabbagh, supra note 2,
at 24 (stating that Giedd was "surprised" at "how long [the brain] changes into young
adulthood"). But see State v. Daniel, No. M2005-01211-CCA-R3, 2006 WL 3071329, at
*10 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 30, 2006) (involving an expert opining that "age 20 is
when the full maturation process in 99 percent of individuals growing is-is peaked
out").
253 Gur Patterson Declaration, supra note 68, at 12-13 (stating that men experience "age-associated decline" earlier than women); Garcia Transcript I, supra note
187, at 109 (testimony of Gur) (noting that the "brain begins to deteriorate at roughly
after age 45"); see also Luna & Sweeney, supra note 243, at 299 (observing that
"response inhibition" improves as children develop, but "diminish [es] in the aged");

Bower, supra note 227, at 301 (reporting the results of a study, Elizabeth R. Sowell et
al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the Human Life Span, 6 NATuRE NEUROSCIENCE 309,
312 (2003), showing that myelination peaks around age 45).
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elderly. 2 5 4 Not only would such a position be politically untenable,
particularly because young men between eighteen and twenty-four
have a high criminal offense rate, 25 5 it would dilute any argument that
there is something so developmentally special about age eighteen as
to justify juvenile treatment for all below that age. Scholars and advocates understandably have conceded the date's artificiality but point
to a societal consensus as to its significance.2 5 6 Some articulate a
deeper rationale: that eighteen is a reasonable guess as to when most
people will have crossed an important developmental threshold even
though they will continue to mature significantly. 25 7 However, as with
relative deficiency, science cannot define that threshold, nor can it
tell us precisely when it is likely to have been crossed. 2 5 8 Further,
other evidence suggests that most adolescents achieve intellectual and
cognitive maturity, though not psychosocial maturity, by the mid-teenage years. 259 There is, therefore, some law-relevant decisional maturation before eighteen, and it is not yet clear how to harmonize those
254 Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 108 (testimony of Gur) (answering
"unfortunately, . . . yes" when asked if "older people become less culpable because
they're losing gray matter or parts of their mind"). One obvious distinction is that the
elderly, unlike youth, have significant life experience on which to draw, and which
may well compensate for much neural decline when making important decisions.
This is a behavioral and environmental argument, not a neuroscientific one.
255 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.39 (2007), http://www.
fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_39.html (showing that males eighteen to twentyfour account for nearly one-third of all violent crime, with offense rates highest at
ages eighteen and nineteen).
256 See, e.g., Sco-rr & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 70-81.
257 Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 12-14 (testimony of Fassler) (stating that
certainly the vast majority of eighteen-year-olds will, at least from a biological, cognitive development standpoint," have capacity to be legally responsible for their
actions).
258 See Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 ("Few people doubt that the brains of 13-yearold teens differ from the brains of 25-year-old adults. But the research doesn't make
the types of age-graded distinctions that the new waiver laws make, especially in the
critical age span of 14 through 19.... The legislatures and the courts are much more
concerned with the fine distinctions of 15 versus 16 versus 17 years of age."). But see
CaseyJones Motion, supra note 166, at 21 ("The brain of the 15, 16, and 17 year old is
underdeveloped, just as is the brain of the 12, 13, and 14 year old.").
259 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 119; Baird, supra note 39, at 97-99; Laurence
Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and Why?, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
Sa. 51, 54 (2004). Competence studies reliably show, for example, that sixteen-year-

olds have greater capacity than younger teens for understanding Miranda warnings.
Thomas Grisso, What We Know about Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON
TIUAL, supra note 1, at 139, 149-50. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER

OF RIGHTS (1981) (finding that younger adolescents are far less likely to assert their
rights when in custody than older adolescents).
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findings with brain maturation. Just as neuroscience is not responsible for the difficulties of line-drawing, it does not resolve them.
Courts therefore rightly tend not to see in brain science significant support for a sharp dividing line at age eighteen. Generally this
inures to youths' disadvantage, as when courts refuse to second-guess
the legislatures' choice of the age at which children face transfer. 260
Sometimes, though, this inures to a defendant's advantage. An unexpected finding of the case analysis is that a good number of the cases
reflecting successful brain-based defense arguments involve young
adults. 2 6 1 An Illinois appellate court, for example, reduced an eighteen-year-old's forty-four-year sentence to thirty-six years, pointing to
his great "rehabilitative potential," and in so doing appeared to
endorse expert testimony on brain development.2 6 2 Similarly, in
United States v. Galt2 63 a federal district court noted that "human brain
development may not become complete until the age of twenty-five"
before granting a downward departure to a man whose offense behavior occurred before he turned twenty-one and who had demonstrated
rehabilitative potential. 2 64 That language was approvingly cited by the
260 The state's experts in Garcia,for example, questioned whether brain science
proves so few developmental differences between older teens and those fourteen and
under as to delegitimize the legislature's choice to expose only the former to
mandatory transfer, a position with which the court appeared to agree. See Garcia
Transcript II, supra note 189, at 208-10, 238-43 (testimony of Raine).
261 See supra note 119 (addressing four of eleven arguably "successful" arguments
made by young adults). Qualitatively, it is striking that these cases are among those
reflecting the most full-throated embrace of developmental neuroscience. But see
Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 246 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (denying habeas petition for defendant convicted of capital murder committed when nineteen, and concluding that proffered 2004 brain-development study was not "newly discovered
evidence"); Hodges v. State, 912 So. 2d 730, 764 (Miss. 2005) (holding that counsel
was not ineffective in a capital sentencing proceeding for failing to call an expert on
adolescent brain science, particularly given that the nineteen-year-old defendant was
"legally an adult").
262 People v. Clark, 869 N.E.2d 1019, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), app. denied, 875
N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. 2007). Clark, granted a new sentencing hearing on other grounds,
called Gur to testify about adolescent brain development. Id. at 1026. The sentencing court found Gur's testimony "very fascinating" but declined to give it any weight,
as Gur had not examined Clark's brain. Id. at 1040. The appellate court appeared to
criticize the lower court on this ground. Id. at 1042 (appearing to disagree with the
lower court's assessment that testimony "about generally accepted studies involving
the brain development in adolescents . . . did not offer anything helpful").
263 374 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Iowa 2005), rev'd and remanded, 446 F.3d 884 (8th
Cir. 2006), rev'd, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
264 Id. at 762 n.2; see also id. ("Recent studies on the development of the human
brain [are] of critical importance in the area of criminal law... . The Supreme Court
based its most recent death penalty decision, Roper v. Simmons, on studies indicating
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Supreme Court in upholding the departure. 265 Other courts have
cited developmental neuroscience when granting sentencing concessions to young adults, including one case in which the judge notedin dicta, as the defendant was twenty-two-that he had "conducted a
review of the scientific literature in this area and believes there is compelling evidence that the judicial system's longstanding principle of
treating youth offenders differently than adult offenders is justified in
part based on the unformed nature of the adolescent brain." 266
The fact that such evidence is having at least as much, if not
more, influence in young-adult than juvenile cases is striking. Several
explanations suggest themselves. First, many of the juvenile challenges were broader, taking on (for example) entire sentencing
schemes, while the adult cases were narrow appeals to an allowable
exercise of mercy at sentencing. 2 67 This cannot be the entire story, as
some unsuccessful juvenile claims shared that characteristic; 2 68 howadolescents are less culpable for their actions than adults. . . . [T]he recent NIH
report confirms that there is no bold line demarcating at what age a person reaches
full maturity. While age does not excuse behavior, a sentencing court should account
for age when inquiring into the conduct of a defendant."). The sentencing court also
cited many other factors justifying departure, including Gall's voluntary withdrawal
from the conspiracy. See id. at 762-63.
265 The departure initially was overturned by the Eighth Circuit, but the Supreme
Court reversed. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 601 (2007) ("Given the dramatic
contrast between Gall's behavior before he joined the conspiracy and his conduct
after withdrawing, it was not unreasonable for the DistrictJudge to view Gall's immaturity at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor, and his later behavior as a sign
that he had matured and would not engage in such impetuous and ill-considered
conduct in the future.").
266 United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Gall,
Roper, and NIMH, TEENAGE BRAIN, supra note 153, and imposing relatively lenient
sentence on twenty-two-year-old convicted of possession of child pornography, observing that defendant had begun viewing such materials when just fourteen). Like Gall,
Stern had demonstrated rehabilitative potential. Id. at 955.
Additionally, an Idaho appellate court overturned a lower-court decision denying
a twenty-year-old defendant's request for a neuropsychological evaluation to aid in
sentencing. See State v. Izaguirre, 186 P.3d 676, 678-80 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008). The
defendant had raised a sufficient issue as to his "neurocognitive abnormalities," and
the appellate court believed defendant's proffered evidence about normal brain development to be relevant to that showing. Id. at 679-80 (presenting neuropsychiatrist's
summarized research on brain maturation processes that continue "well into [the]
late 20s" and chiding lower court for not considering such research). Numerous
other factors also supported the appellate court's order of resentencing. See id. at
680-81 (citing, inter alia, sentencing judge's apparent disapproval of legislative
scheme for murder sentencing).
267 See Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
268 See Clark, 869 N.E.2d at 1042.
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ever, it is buttressed by the fact that most of the marginal juvenile
successes also fit that model. 2 6 9 Second, perhaps these judges would
have taken the same position had the defendants been juveniles, but
also believed that evidence of continuing neural development counsels that the relative solicitude historically limited to those under eighteen ought also extend to young adults. 2 70 Third, and on a deeper
level, perhaps juveniles asserting such claims appear to courts to be
unusual juveniles, that is, more calculating, callous, and dangerous,
while these young adults appear to be unusual adult offenders, that is,
less calculating, callous, and dangerous. 27 1 The developmental attributes thought to stem from brain maturation may seem to conflict with
perceptions of the former and to cohere with perceptions of the latter; that is, the perceived relevance of brain science may stem not
from its inherent persuasive power but from the degree to which it
challenges or confirms perceptions based on other factors. 272
Whatever the explanation, the lack of clear age-limit implications
for developmental neuroscience poses a challenge to those who seek
thus to justify sharp dividing lines.
5.

Equality and Autonomy Commitments

Finally, direct reliance on developmental neuroscience implicates
commitments to equality and teen autonomy. While the latter danger
269 Cotting v. State, No. A-9909, 2008 WL 4059580, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 3,
2008); Ling v. State, No. A-9228, 2008 WL 2152028, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. May 21,
2008); State v. Carrasquillo, 962 A.2d 772, 775-76 (Conn. 2009).
270 See Melissa S. Caulum, Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect
Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 729,
755-58 (arguing that the jurisdictional age forjuvenile court should be raised to benefit "emerging adults").
271 See, e.g., State v. Ninham, 767 N.W.2d 326, 329-30 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)
("Ninham's crime was unusual for its senseless and extreme brutality. When combined with his lack of remorse, his prior record and other crimes he committed while
awaiting trial, his case is distinguished from other juveniles arrested for murder or
manslaughter."); cf Emens, supra note 58, at 77 (noting that jurors might perceive
juveniles facing death penalty as so unlike normal children as to seem "monstrous,
evil, or genetically defective").
272 This, too, is unlikely to be a full explanation, as some juveniles appeared to
present sympathetically. See, e.g., In reJ.B., No. CA2004-09-226, 2005 WL 3610482, at
*18-20 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2005) (noting that the court took "no pleasure" in
sentencing the juvenile defendant); cf MICHELE DEITCH ET AL., FROM TIME OUT To
available at http://utexas.edu/lbj/news/images/file/
HARD TIME 2-5 (2009),
From%20Time%200ut%20to%2OHard%2OTime-revised%20final.pdf (offering far
more sympathetic narrative of Christopher Pittman than appears in courts' opinions).

The role of belief confirmation is discussed further infra Part III.
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has been partially addressed by commentators, both remain
worrisome.
Just as developmental neuroscience might, if taken literally, counsel special treatment of the elderly, it might counsel differential treatment of girls and boys. Brain maturation is importantly linked to
puberty, and girls tend to reach puberty significantly earlier than
boys.2 73 Though physical and sexual maturity are poor proxies for
either brain maturity or cognitive development,2 7 4 there is a clear gender differential, likely linked to pubertal onset. Girls, on average,
experience early-adolescence neural exuberance-particularly in the
frontal lobes-at least a year before boys, and possibly more. 275 If
structural brain maturity were the correct legal metric, it would counsel that boys and girls become subject to juvenile-court jurisdiction,
and age out of it, at different times; indeed, one testifying expert has
conceded as much. 276
The behavioral implications of brain-level gender differences are
largely unknown. 27 7 Whatever they may be, law should not track
273 Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent BrainDevelopment: A Periodof Vulnerabilitiesand Opportunities, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. ScI. 1, 12-16 (2004) (calling for more research on
puberty and brain maturation); Judy L. Cameron, InterrelationshipsBetween Hormones,
Behavior, and Affect DuringAdolescence, 1021 ANNALs N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 134, 139 (2004)
(same); Gur PattersonDeclaration, supranote 68, at 11 (referencing 1996 study showing sex differences).
274 Dahl, supra note 273, at 15-18 (stating that capacity for "planning, logic, reasoning ability, inhibitory control, problem solving, and understanding consequences,"
seem to depend on age and experience rather than timing of puberty; however, studies have shown "a significant positive correlation between pubertal maturation and
sensation seeking" in both boys and girls, which is associated with greater risk-taking
behaviors).
275 BRIZENDINE, supra note 4, at 44 (claiming that the female brain "matures two or
three years earlier the male brain"); STRAUCH, supra note 4, at 54 (citing study showing girls' faster myelination, which "may be one reason why young girls often seem to
attain emotional maturity before boys"); Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 862-63 (noting
that the earlier gray-matter peak in girls corresponds with "earlier age of onset of
puberty" and "suggests a possible influence of gonadal hormones"); Giedd, supra note
237, at 79, 82 (noting other gender differentials, such as overall cerebral volume).
But see Hearing on SB 513, supra note 73, at 13 (testimony of Fassler) ("We have not
found differences in boys and girls in the research that has been done to date ....
The research we have so far does not show differences in that level of brain
development.").
276 Garcia Transcript I, supra note 187, at 65 (testimony of Gur) (stating that,
because girls' brains mature faster, "biology would say" that they should be held to a
different standard for accountability than boys); see also Buss, supra note 13, at 513
(raising similar concern about gender implications).
277 Giedd, supra note 237, at 83 ("The connection between these structural
changes and behavioral changes is only beginning to be elucidated."); Charles A. Nel-
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them. Indeed, behavioral research already shows that boys and girls
have markedly different propensities for violence and lawbreaking, 278
and law rightly does not officially impose more severe punishment for
girls' violent acts because they are less normative. 2 7 9 While the equality concern is most evident for gender, it is not confined to it. It
would apply to any group for whom a statistically significant developmental trend could be identified, including racial or socioeconomic
groups. As race is strongly linked to age of pubertal onset-it is well
documented, for example, that African American girls tend to begin
puberty much earlier than white American girls-boys and girls of different races might be subject to different rules. 280 Any argument that
law's treatment of children should track developmental neuroscience
must demonstrate why such inequality is not its logical outcome, and
the only way to do so is to concede that neuroscience (and, for that

son, Brain Development DuringPuberty and Adolescence, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 105,
108 (2004) ("[W]hat are the functional correlates of changes in gray and white matter
before and after puberty, and how do these morphological changes account for sex
differences?"); Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd & William D.S. Killgore, Fear-RelatedActivity in the PrefrontalCortex Increases with Age DuringAdolescence: A PreliminaryfMRI Study,
406 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 194, 198 (2006) (stating that sex differences in frontal
activation contribute to "rapidly growing evidence supporting sex-related differences
in neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, and neurocognitive functioning"). Caution is particularly warranted here, as claims about the relatively small size of female brains long
were invoked to support female subordination. BRIZENDINE, supra note 4, at 1.
278 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 55, at 132 (showing teen boys' violent-crime
arrest rate to be at least four times that of girls). Indeed, all gendered behavioral
differences (like all behaviors) are somehow operationalized in the brain. See
STRAUCH, supra note 4, at 116, 134-36 (noting that psychological studies show earlier
mature thinking in girls); Marisa M. Silveri et al., TrajectoriesofAdolescent Emotionaland
Cognitive Development, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 363, 364 (2004) (citing gender
differences in "emotional intelligence, academic achievement, and cognitive functioning," as well as differential impact of familial drug abuse); Laura R. Stroud et al.,
Sex Differences in the Effects of PubertalDevelopment on Responses to a Corticotropin-Releasing
Hormone Challenge, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 348, 350 (2004) (noting that gender
differential in depressive disorders likely linked to brain-level differences).
279 Evidence that the juvenile justice system sometimes does, as a de facto matter,
punish girls more harshly is rightly seen as disparate treatment. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES
FOR PROMISING FEMALE PROGRAMMING, at ch.1 (1998), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
pubs/principles ("[G]irls who break the law are sometimes treated more harshly than
boys who offend.").
280 See Dahl, supra note 273, at 12-13 & fig.3. Moreover, girls who experience
greater family stress might reach puberty significantly earlier, and family stress tends
to correlate with socioeconomic disadvantage. See Cameron, supra note 273, at 134,
137.
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matter, developmental science generally) must sometimes give way to
other values.
Undue emphasis on the immature brain also might alter our societal commitment to allow teens incrementally greater control over
important aspects of their lives-whether to access health services,
leave school, marry, exercise their right to free speech, and the like.
This issue has been transparent since Roper, in which Justice Scalia, in
dissent, excoriated the American Psychological Association for taking
what he saw as inconsistent stances on teen maturity in death penalty
and abortion cases. 28 1 As other commentators-in analyses whose full
repetition is unnecessary here-correctly have argued, the state can,
does, and should distinguish between the competence necessary to
make certain critical choices about one's fate-such as whether to
have an abortion-and the relative moral blameworthiness and capacity for change that justifies differential treatment when accused of a
crime.2 8 2 But a strong and simple message about brain immaturity
poses a challenge to making complicated and contingent claims about
autonomy, and the former easily is interpreted to be in irreconcilable
tension with the latter.2 8 3 Indeed, even some defense experts have
endorsed incursions into teen autonomy for this reason.2 8 4 There are
no simple answers to when teens deserve and can handle the right to
281 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-18 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282 See Donald L. Beschle, Cognitive DissonanceRevisited: Roper v. Simmons and the
Issue of Adolescent Decision-MakingCompetence, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2006); Casey
et al., supra note 28, at 122 (stating that legal decisionmakers should differentiate
between culpability and teens' ability to make "informed choices about their
futures"); Chernoff & Levick, supra note 98, at 217-18; Kimberly M. Mutcherson,
Minor Discrepancies:Forginga Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 948-53 (2006); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors'Access to Abortion,
the juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA 'Thp-Flop, " 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583,
592-93 (2009), availableat http://www.temple.edu/psychology/lds/documents/JDP.
pdf.
283 See, e.g., In re D.L., No. B205263, 2009 WL 43513, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App.Jan. 8,
2009). In D.L., a child-dependency judge partially justified his decision to remove an
infant from the custody of the twenty-two-year-old father, by referencing judicial education programs in which the judge learned that brain development is not complete
in early adulthood. The judge opined that the father (who had begun a sexual relationship with the fifteen-year-old mother when she was thirteen) would not have adequate "judgment" to know what is "age appropriate" for his child until he was twentysix years old, at which time he would have a fully mature brain. Id. at *5.
284 GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187, at 86 (testimony of Gur) (testifying that he
would be hesitant to let a sixteen-year-old decide to forego cancer treatment because
of brain immaturity). It could instead be argued that teens need experience making
hard choices in order for their brains to mature, a theory that is consistent with the
idea that teens nonetheless should be shielded from the harshest consequences of
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direct the many aspects of their lives, and the answers will vary according to the multiplicity of interests at stake (for example, teens' right to
free speech deserves far greater protection than their ability to drive
cars). Adolescent brain science appears (wrongly) to offer far too simple an answer, one that points in most instances away from autonomy.
C.

Advocacy Pressures

The previous Section delineated the intrinsic limitations of developmental neuroscience for juvenile justice. It also raised reasons to
be concerned were neuroscience to be given the influence some have
urged. One additional concern is intrinsic to all efforts to link law to
science. The realities of advocacy, in which nuance and complexity
are difficult to convey without compromising effectiveness, incentivize
advocates to oversimplify. All scientific data must be simplified for
legal or policy arguments, if for no other reason than to render them
comprehensible. But simplification easily can creep into oversimplification, creating a risk that legal decisions will be based on incorrect
premises. This danger is not unique to juvenile justice 2 8 5 but it has
manifested in this context, and its presence counsels great caution.
Consider, for example, how advocates, experts, and commentators tend to characterize teenagers' recruitment of the amygdala, an
evolutionarily old brain structure often described as the seat of primitive, aggressive impulses.28 6 They consistently assert that teenagers act
more "emotionally" than adults, who are more "rational," and that
such emotionalism explains teens' criminal behaviors. 287 They
bad choices. Cf ZIMRING, supra note 29, at 17-22 (conceptualizing adolescence as a
"learner's permit period of life").
285 See Buss, supra note 13, at 507 ("Common to the law's use of all social science is
the risk of bad data or misused data, and the danger that lawmakers will not have the
sophistication or the inclination to assess the data closely and limit its use
accordingly.").
286 See GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra note 43, at 537, 553-72 (explaining the complex
roles of the amygdala); Phelps & Thomas, supra note 238, at 750, 753, 755 (explaining
that the amygdala is important to emotional learning, implicit evaluation, and memory, but asserting that "it is a mistake to assume any given brain region 'does' a given
behavior, just as it is a mistake to assume that activity in a given brain region predicts a
single behavior").
287 See, e.g., Casey Jones Motion, supra note 166, at 6; Garcia Transcript I, supra
note 187, at 156 (testimony of Beyer) ("The immature behavior we see in teenagers
comes in large part because they are so driven by a primitive emotional process rather
than the deliberative thought process that we see in adults."); RETHINKING THE JUVENILE, supra note 7, at 11-13; cf Brief of the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19, 48, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-5666, 87-6026), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 56 (adoles-
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explain this tendency toward unchecked emotionalism as the consequence of an overactive amygdala that has not yet been tamed by
mature, rational frontal lobes.2 88 In addition to oversimplifying the
complex role of the amygdala, this narrative overstates the behavioral
implications of relevant studies. 28 9
In support of this narrative advocates, experts, and commentators
most frequently cite to a small number of functional-imaging studies
that show teens to display more amygdala, and less frontal-lobe, activation than adults when engaged in an emotion-recognition task.290
cence is "characterized by emotionality rather than rationality," and "[e]motionality
... leads adolescents to commit capital offenses").
288 Hearingon SB 513, supra note 73, at 6-7 (testimony of Fassler) ("[T]he primitive, or instinctual part of the brain develops first . .. we're talking about the amygdala, which is . . . responsible for gut reactions, including fear and aggressive
behaviors, versus areas like the frontal cortex, which develops later and helps us control our emotions and modify our actions and responses."); GarciaTranscript I, supra
note 187, at 95 (testimony of Gur) (stressing role of teens' "vibrant" amygdalae in
violent behavior); Garcia Transcript II, supra note 189, at 43 (testimony of Thompson) ("[H]e has a very weak frontal system, and the system which is driving it, the
limbic system, is running at high gear."); GarciaMotion to Dismiss, supra note 187, at
1; Lucy C. Ferguson, Comment, The Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on
"EvolvingStandards of Decency" and the Imposition of the Death Penalty onjuveniles, 54 AM.
U. L. REv. 441, 455 (2004) ("Instead of using the pre-frontal cortex to make decisions,
research indicates that adolescents rely more heavily on the amygdala, the emotional
center of the brain. Consequently, adolescents typically exhibit poorer risk assessment than adults and behave in a more impulsive manner." (footnotes omitted));
Krueger, supra note 2 (contrasting how the teen amygdala "is in full swing" while
frontal lobe "is barely firing at all"); Barbara Cooke, The Teenage Brain, http://
(Aug. 2005)
life.familyeducation.com/teen/growth-and-development/36499.html
("[T]eens whiz through life manipulated by the wild whims of the amygdala, home to
primal feelings, such as fear, rage, and impulse.").
289 The narrative also overstates the irrationality of emotion and understates the
extcnt to which emotion influences adult decisionmaking. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney,
Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an EmergingField, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 119,
121-23 (2006) (discrediting the opposition of emotion and reason); Maroney, supra
note 51, at 1387-88, 1404-08 (advocating that emotional and cognitive capacity both
form necessary part of "reason").
290 See, e.g., State v. Ninham, 767 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (citing
defendant's contention that recent research "shows adolescents' amygdalas are more
active than adults'. The amygdala is closely related to emotionally-laden responses.").
There are several such studies with a variety of findings, though advocates and commentators tend primarily to discuss the unpublished data described in a study by
Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd and William D.S. Killgore. See Yurgelun-Todd & Killgore,
supra note 277, at 195-98; see also Baird et al., supra note 44, at 196 (providing similar
data); Frontline, Interview: Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, PBS, Jan. 2002, http://www.pbs.
[hereinafter
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html
Yurgelun-Todd Frontline Interview]. For reliance on such studies, see, for example,
Hearingon SB 513, supranote 73, at 7 (testimony of Fassler) (noting that "[f] unctional

162

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:1

These studies provide little support for the assertion. In a typical
study, subjects' brains are scanned while they view photographs of
unfamiliar persons displaying stylized "fearful" facial expressions; they
then are asked to identify the emotion being displayed. This task
bears little relation to juvenile offending. 29 1 The only reported behavioral outcome is teens' higher rate of misidentification of the emotion, 292 and that differential may be erased by using color
photographs and including images of people the teens know.2 93 It is
tempting to conclude (as at least one researcher has) that a teenager,
if confronted with a person displaying a fearful expression, is likely to
misinterpret that expression and harm the person out of a misguided
instinct toward self-defense. 294 That conclusion may be true, but it
cannot be reached on the basis of the studies. 295 Indeed, other studstudies" show that teens "tend to rely more on these instinctual areas, like the amygdala, and less on the more advanced areas, like the frontal lobes, which are associated
with more goal-oriented and rational thinking"); GarciaTranscript I, supra note 187,
at 182 (testimony of Beyer) ("It's likely that [David Garcia's] brain, like those of the
teenagers that are being studied in the MRI studies would show an over reliance on
the primitive emotion center of the brain . . . ."); Bower, supra note 227, at 300
(describing facial recognition studies); Spear, supra note 41, at 440 (describing
unpublished study); Ortiz, supra note 70, at 2 (summarizing Yurgelun-Todd's study);
Wallis, supra note 2, at 56-59 (same).
291 This is a problem for behavioral research generally. See Steinberg, supra note
259, at 52-53, 55-56 (describing efforts to design studies that better mimic teens'
real-world decisionmaking); Fagan, supra note 85, at A7 ("[W]e know next to nothing
about how brains react under real-world conditions of threat, arousal, or peer provocation."). However, it is particularly pronounced in brain imaging research given the
technological restraints (for example, needing to immobilize the subject).
292 See Yurgelun-Todd Frontline Interview, supra note 290 (describing small
unpublished study showing adults correctly identified emotion one hundred percent
of time while teen rate was fifty percent); see alsoAronson, supra note 2, at 122 (same);
cf Baird et al., supra note 44, at 198 (describing how, though without an adult comparison group, teens correctly identified fearful emotional expression seventy-four
percent of time).
293 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 123 (stating that researcher questioned extent to
which studies revealed "anything relevant about impulse control"); Beckman, supra
note 63, at 599; Bower, supra note 227, at 300.
294 See Hearingon SB 513, supra note 73, at 13 (testimony of Fassler) ("When you
show a stimulant, a picture of someone who is frightened to a sixteen or seventeen
year old, they respond in fear. They don't recognize it as someone who is frightened.
They are much more likely, if they are standing in a gas station with a gun, they are
much more likely to impulsively pull that trigger.").
295 One study claims to have generated the first preliminary data suggesting a general developmental shift toward frontal rather than amygdala activation. See K Rubia
et al., Functional Frontalisationwith Age: Mapping Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with
]MI, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHA-vIORAL REVs. 13, 18 (2000). But seeYurgelun-Todd
& Killgore, supra note 277, at 198 (finding "no evidence of systematic age-related

2009]

ADOLESCENT

BRAIN

SCIENCE

IN

JUVENILE JUSTICE

163

ies show that when presented with different tasks teenagers tend to
display greaterfrontal-lobe activity than adults. 296 This does not suggest that they are somehow more "rational," but instead may indicate
that processes that have by adulthood become automatic require
more effortful thought for adolescents.2 9 7 Some studies indicate that
aggression and violence sometimes correlate with low levels of amygdala activation; 298 yet others suggest that teens have great variation in
amygdala response.299

In short, the brain's emotional circuitry is highly complex. Teens
unquestionably have distinctive emotional experiences.3 0 0 They may
well have distinctive neural patterns of emotional activation and of
emotion-cognition interaction, and those patterns may well be linked
to maturation processes, but to date we know little about these phenomena or their behavioral implications.3 0 1 Teens' emotional lives,
change in functional activity of the amygdala" in adolescence, though data suggest
possible greater involvement of frontal areas). For a review of the state of this aspect
of the science, see Casey et al., supra note 28, at 111-12.
296 See Luna & Sweeney, supra note 243, at 302; see also Beckman, supranote 63, at
597-99 (describing, inter alia, a study that showed that "adolescents' prefrontal cortices were considerably more active than adults"' in an impulse-suppression task).
297 David J. Kupfer & Hermi R. Woodward, Adolescent Development and the Regulation
of Behavior and Emotion, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 320, 320 (2004). It is worth
considering that groups' differential recruitment of brain pathways ultimately may
bear no relation to measurable differences in behavior. See, e.g., BRIZENDINE, supra
note 4, at 5 (claiming that studies show "no performance differences between ... men
and women" in certain tasks despite "significant, sex-specific differences in the brain
circuits they activated").
298 See Baird, supra note 39, at 115-16 (citing, inter alia, Adrian Raine, Biosocial
Studies ofAntisocial and Violent Behavior in Children and Adults: A Review, 30 J. ABNORMAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 311 (2002)).
299 See Tara Parker-Pope, The Brain of a Bully, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOC, Nov. 12, 2008
(reporting on an
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/the-brain-of-a-bully
fMRI study by Jean Decety and explaining how only those identified behaviorally as
"bullies" show greater amygdala response to certain images).
300 See Dahl, supranote 273, at 2, 7-9 (noting there is a "natural biologic proclivity
toward high-intensity feelings that emerges at puberty" and that "emotional changes
in adolescence have been generally recognized for many centuries"); Carolyn Saarni
et al., Principlesof Emotion and Emotional Competence, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 361, 374-75.
301 A very plausible hypothesis is that neural exuberance, myelination, and pruning converge to "support[ ] the development of a coordinated relationship between
emotional and cognitive processes, a relationship whose integrity is critical to the production of behavior in accordance with personally or socially mandated standards."
Baird, supra note 39, at 83; see also Dahl, supra note 273, at 18 ("The ability to integrate these multiple components of behavior-cognitive and affective-in the service
of long-term goals involves neurobehavioral systems that are among the last regions of
the brain to fully mature.").
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and their patterns of criminal behavior, cannot be reduced to the relative strength of amygdala response; they are shaped by a rich set of
factors including social goals and expectations, as well as relative lack
of life experience.3 0 2
It may be tempting to regard the frequently flattened or even distorted portrayal of neuroscience as harmless if it appears to come
"close enough" to the truth for legal, not laboratory, purposes. The
temptation is strong for all biological explanations, as if a trait or
behavior is partially determined, then society is less inclined to regard
it as morally blameworthy.3 0 3 It is even stronger at present, as people
seem now to find neuroscientific explanations particularly persuasive.30 4 This temptation must be resisted. Inaccuracy has costs. Some
are immediate: it may, for example, prompt one's opponent either to
offer an equally inaccurate counterclaim (which a court might
accept), or successfully to impeach evidence that might have been
persuasive were it not being oversold. Some costs, though, cannot
presently be anticipated and have wider reach. If, for example, courts
were routinely to endorse the "unchecked-amygdala" explanation for
teen behavior, that endorsement would lend undeserved support to
302 Kupfer & Woodward, supra note 297, at 321. A second sort of oversimplification visible in both the cases and commentary is relative inattention to other biological processes shaping adolescents' brains and behaviors. Genetics, neurochemistry,
and hormones-to name just a few-all play significant roles, but have received far
less attention in juvenile justice. See, e.g., BRIZENDINE, supranote 4, at 32-56 (presenting theory of female brain development centered on hormonal influences in adolescence); Cameron, supra note 273, at 110; Rudolf N. Cardinal et al., Limbic
CorticostiatalSystems and Delayed Reinforcement, 1021 ANNALs N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 33, 43-44
(2004); Casey et al., supra note 28, at 113, 118-119 (identifying the role of dopamine
and hormones). A dominant focus on structural brain maturity creates an inaccurate
impression as to its relative importance.
303 See generally Nita A. Farahany, Law and Behavioral Morality, in NOMOS LII:
EVOLUnION AND MORALITY (Sandy Levinson ed., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2)

(defining "behavioral morality" as "a form of moral philosophy that claims that deviant behavior attributable to a physical cause is either less or is not at all morally
blameworthy"), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336268. For instance, some
credit recent advances in gay and lesbian civil rights to increased public belief in a
biological basis for sexual orientation. Barbara Fedders, Coming Outfor Kids: Recognizing Respecting, and Representing LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEV. L.J. 774, 782 (2006); Posting of
Jeff Walsh to Oasis Magazine, http://www.oasisjournals.com/issues/9705/cover.html
(May 1, 1997, 6:00 AM EST) (quoting Simon LeVay, a researcher for the Salk Institute: "There is no question that people who think sexuality is imborne [sic] are, in
general, much better disposed towards gay people and gay rights than people who
think it's some kind of lifestyle choice.... I've run into many people whose minds
have been changed due to the science.").
304 See Aronson, supra note 2, at 119 ("[This] culture finds ... biological explanations of behavior and personality captivating.").
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an underlying theory about the low value of "emotion" relative to "reason." That pernicious distinction already infects legal analysis, and it
should receive no further encouragement.3 0 5
Some of these dangers can be mitigated by high-quality advocacy
that seeks to portray science in as nuanced and grounded manner as
possible. A number of contemporary efforts satisfy that criterion.3 0 6
However, the need to be consistent with the advocacy goal provides a
built-in incentive to oversimplify, one that cannot be eliminated.

This Part has shown that, contrary to many predictions, adolescent brain science has had no deep impact on juvenile justice in the
courts. It has proved generally insufficient to uproot doctrine that
tends to disfavor juveniles' claims, particularly when they are accused
of serious crimes. While most courts have ignored neuroscientific
arguments, some have soundly rejected them, particularly where the
individual juvenile appears to be an exception to the argued rule.
One of the main beneficiaries of brain-based advocacy is a group not
specifically targeted by most scholars and advocates: young adults.
Those courts that have reacted favorably to arguments about the adolescent brain, whether for young adults or juveniles, have done so to
buttress conclusions reached on other grounds.
More, this Part has shown that these trends are far from irrational. Developmental neuroscience does not shed direct light on the
highly individualized determinations that are so commonly at issue in
specific criminal cases. Its implications cannot be fully grasped until
its link to behavior is better understood. To tether law to that science
creates dangers-inequality, diminished autonomy, and inaccuracywith no intrinsic hedge. Therefore, adolescent brain science should
not on its own meaningfully shift doctrine, even if that shift is normatively desirable. Its inherent limitations do, and should, limit its influence. These conclusions closely parallel those other scholars have
reached in theorizing the role of neuroscience in adult criminal
305 See Maroney, supra note 289, at 121-23, 135; Maroney, supra note 51, at 1434.
306 The APA's brief in the Sullivan v. Floridaand Graham v. Floridacases provides
one example. That brief accurately relates the basics of structural brain maturation
and uses appropriately cautious language in describing the ways in which such maturation is "thought" to be "consistent with the demonstrated behavioral and
psychosocial immaturity of juveniles." APA Sullivan & Graham Brief, supra note 128,
at 27; see also id. (acknowledging that "the precise underlying mechanisms of brain
development continue to be studied").
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law.3 07 Insights from that literature have not before now significantly
penetrated debates within juvenile justice.3 08 As this Article demonstrates, they should.
This is a sobering picture. The following Part, though, presents a
vision of the real-albeit limited-role that adolescent brain science
nonetheless can play in moving juvenile justice away from the destructive trends of the last two decades.
III. A

LIMITED ROLE FOR ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE
WITHIN JUVENILE JUSTICE

The findings of the previous Part confirm the skepticism that
many developmental neuroscientists have themselves expressed about
the legal relevance of their research.3 0 9 That research is not, however,
utterly irrelevant.3 1 0 It contributes marginally to our understanding
of general principles about the distinctiveness of adolescence as a
developmental stage. General principles matter. The general principles that, as a group, normal young people differ from normal adults
in systematic ways directly relevant to their relative culpability, ability
to be deterred, and potential for rehabilitation, were for most of the
last century invoked to justify differential treatment ofjuvenile offenders in virtually all instances, with only narrow exceptions. Always supported (if erratically) by everyday observation, these beliefs are now
well supported by behavioral and criminological research. In the last
two decades the juvenile justice landscape has shifted dramatically as
our collective commitment to those principles has eroded, though (as
Roper showed) that commitment is far from extinguished. The ero307 See, e.g., Brown & Murphy, supra note 36 (manuscript at 77-79); Robert M.
Sapolsky, The FrontalCortex and the CriminalJusticeSystem, in LAW AND THE BRAIN, Supra
note 47, at 227-228, 238-40 (outlining differences between the questions asked by
neuroscience and those asked by law, and theorizing how the former might nonetheless inform the latter); Snead, supra note 119, at 1280-99, 1338-39.
308 One exception is Morse, supra note 59 (applying certain insights from the lawand-neuroscience field to the juvenile justice context).
309 Several prominent developmental neuroscientists have taken "a dim view of
the movement to apply neuroscience to the law," and even those who believe that
"'[b]rain data are eventually going to support reduced legal culpability for adolescents"' believed as recently as 2004 that "'we're not quite there yet.'" Bower, supra
note 227, at 301 (quoting Ronald Dahl); see also Aronson, supra note 2, at 134 (detailing debate).
310 See Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4) (discussing that "[w]hile it is
undoubtedly true that the neuroscience evidence has sometimes been embraced too
uncritically, explained too glibly, or extended too broadly," it should not be "dismissed too readily, described as less conclusive than it actually is, and banished from
the discussion prematurely").
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sion can and should be reversed, and to the limited degree to which

brain science helps remind us of these first principles, it is useful.3 11
Adolescent brain science therefore is appropriately considered by
legal decisionmakers performing a policymaking function.
"[A] ggregate data" about youth should be considered when formulating "policy that will optimize the costs and benefits of treating a large
similar group in a particular way."3 12 Because neuroscience generally
corroborates the beliefs traditionally undergirding a strong and separate juvenile justice system, it somewhat strengthens the confidence
policymakers can have in those beliefs. If this minor buttressing role
is less spectacular than some would hope, it is a real one. More, this
role could expand if the science eventually were to show stronger connections between neural structure, neural functioning, and externalized behaviors. Neuroscience is simply one new input into the wellestablished interface between juvenile justice policy and developmental science.3 13
311 A full defense of the wisdom of maintaining a strong, separate, and substantively distinct juvenile justice system for virtually all persons under eighteen is beyond
the scope of this Article, and has been made more than adequately by numerous
other scholars. Suffice it to say that this author concurs.
312 Pinker, supra note 226, at 50 (making this point with regard to policy uses of
genetic data, but stating that using such data to reach conclusions about the attributes
of any given person "is just plain weird").
313 At this juncture it is worth addressing directly the reality that behavioral studies
suffer from at least some of the same scientific limitations described in the previous
Part. For example, individual variation is just as true of behavioral maturity as it is of
neural maturity. Behavioral studies also carry some of the same potentially undesirable implications. For example, they show even more relevant differences between
girls and boys. Further, as Part I made clear, rigorous behavioral study of adolescence
is only a few decades older than neuroscientific research.
There are, however, several features of behavioral work that commend it as a
more relevant and stable source on which to draw in making juvenile justice policy.
First, as the law cares primarily about behavior, direct measures of behavioral traits
and tendencies always will be one giant step closer to law's core than will studies of
underlying correlates (or even causes) of behavior. See Greene & Cohen, supra note
49, at 1779 (critiquing Scott and Steinberg's view of the importance of adolescent
brain science, in part because such evidence is indirectly relevant while evidence of
behavior is directly relevant); Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 22) ("[I]n the
formulation of policy, the scientific evidence in which we should place the most faith
is the evidence that is most similar to the actual behavior the policy is intended to
regulate."). Second, psychology provides tools for directly measuring law-relevant
traits, so the match between group behavioral tendencies and individual behavioral
characteristics can be tested to a non-negligible degree. See, e.g., Richard Dembo &
Amanda Anderson, Problem-Oriented Screening Instrument for Teenagers, in MENTAL
HEALTH SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 112, 112 (Thomas Grisso et
al. eds., 2005) (describing POSIT, a psychological screening test for adolescents);

168

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

85:1

It is for this reason, too, that neuroscience has more natural traction within juvenile justice than it does in adult criminal justice. Any
system of criminal law that incorporates determination of responsibility necessarily rests on the fundamental assumption that persons possess-and can exercise-free will, unless some gross pathology exists.
At a minimum, the philosophical orientation of such a criminal law
must be compatibilist in order to function. 3 14 Neuroscientific arguments that purport to challenge free-will or compatibilist theories may
be of theoretical interest but are unlikely to influence practice;
neuroscience rightly will have greater influence if it can prove or finetune determinations already within the purview of criminal law, such
as showing that some identifiable pathology contributed to insanity or
incompetence.3 15 A modest invocation of adolescent brain science
has far more in common with the latter than the former. At least
where advocates avoid biological determinism, developmental neuroscience steers clear of fundamental questions about free will and
instead describes one aspect of a type of relative disability-youththe law historically has recognized. Its insights-correctly contextualized-therefore may be made available to policymakers to take for
what they are worth.3 1 6
Edward P. Mulvey & Anne-Marie R. Iselin, Improving ProfessionalJudgments of Risk and
Amenability in juvenile justice, FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2009, at 35, 40-44 (2008)
(explaining the interplay between clinical and actuarial assessment).
Despite these distinctions, the shared limitations and implications of these two
types of developmental science counsel that juvenile justice policy ought not directly
and literally rely on such science, even if it should be significantly enriched by its
findings. See Buss, supra note 13, at 507-08. One distinct benefit of criminological
studies-for example, deterrence and desistance studies of actual juvenile populations-is that they measure offense behavior in the real world and can directly measure the impact of different legal schemes, social environments, and interventions.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 331-38 (discussing advocates' task of educating policymakers and the public about the real-word effects of juvenile policy).
314 But see Greene & Cohen, supra note 49, at 208 (arguing instead that current
legal doctrine is only "officially compatibilist" and is actually "grounded in intuitions
that are incompatibilist" and "libertarian"). Without taking a stance on whether our
criminal law always should incorporate consideration of responsibility, it suffices to
say that our criminal and juvenile law does consider both responsibility and consequentialist concerns, long has done so, and is unlikely to stop doing so. For an argument that law's treatment of children should instead be concerned only with
prevention, a consequentialist concern, see Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 98
(manuscript at 36-43).
315 See Maroney, supra note 51, at 1392-99; Morse, supra note 59, at 400-03; Sapolsky, supra note 307, at 1793-94.
316 Legislatures also may be more open to adolescent brain science because they
need not observe evidentiary standards for admissibility. See, e.g., Brown & Murphy,
supra note 36 (manuscript at 34-76) (discussing the wide variety of evidence law
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Because legislatures unquestionably are in the best position to
reverse the sweeping policy changes of the last two decades, they
should be acknowledged as the primary audience. If developmental
neuroscience is perceived as challenging the rules rather than their
application, then it is best addressed directly to the primary
rulemakers.3 17
To be sure, legislatures are a tough audience for this message. It
is an unfortunate political reality that modem crime policy tends to be
a one-way ratchet consistently trending in the direction of more punishment, less judicial discretion, and fewer chances for serious offenders, including young ones. But though such political forces remain
strong, very recent developments at the state level show that directing
juveniles to the legislatures is far from a fool's errand. Even before
Roper some states apparently had relied in part on developmental
neuroscience to eliminate the juvenile death penalty.3 1 8 Since Roper,
states have taken additional steps to roll back certain other punitive
policies; and in so doing, some have looked to brain science. Washington State, for instance, in 2005 abolished mandatory sentencing of
juveniles convicted as adults, relying in part on a legislative finding
"'that emerging research on brain development indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabiliissues implicated by the possible introduction of fMRI images into a criminal trial).
This greater openness increases the danger of the inaccuracy against which this Article warns. As shown in the previous Part, such arguments logically also would marginally inform legislatures' choices as to other adolescent rights and responsibilities.
Advocates can determine for themselves whether such consideration poses undue risk
of outcomes they consider normatively undesirable.
317 Even before Roper some commentators had thought the science more relevant
to legislatures than to courts. See Boyle, supra note 62, at 38 (quoting Victor Streib as
saying, "I don't think the brain research has any impact at all on the constitutional
issue."). Some advocates have explicitly directed their efforts toward the legislatures.
See Eileen Hirsch et al., Raise the Age: Return 17-Year-Olds to juvenile Court, Wis. LAw.,
June 2007, at 15 (arguing in favor of a legislative proposal to raise the age of adult
court jurisdiction in Wisconsin to eighteen); Puttingthe Juvenile Back in juvenile justice,
supra note 7, at 7-9 (seeking to persuade North Carolina's legislature to reform its
juvenile justice system); see also Fagan, supra note 70, at A7 ("As legislatures move
toward placing increasingly younger teens in adult criminal court, social and biological evidence suggests moving in the other direction. It's time for the law to change
course and follow the science.").
318 See Bower, supranote 227, at 299; Boyle, supra note 62, at 37 (citing victories in
Indiana, South Dakota, and Wyoming); Moran, supra note 63, at 8. Not all such
efforts were effective.
See Pro-DeathPenalty.com, Legislation, http://
prodeathpenalty.com/legislation.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2009) (reporting comments
of Linda Aguirre, a state senator in Arizona and sponsor of a 2004 bill to ban juvenile
death penalty, who "hope[d] testimony about teenagers' brain development [would]
change[ ] minds of colleagues," but acknowledged "that her bill ... is dead").
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ties, differ significantly from those of mature adults.'" 3 1 9 The
Wisconsin Governor's Juvenile Justice Commission in early 2009
accorded "great weight" to brain science in recommending that the
legislature raise the criminal-court jurisdictional age to eighteen. 3 20
Most recently, Texas abolished juvenile life without parole after legislative hearings that included testimony about juvenile brain
development.3 2 1
Legislatures, though, are not the only relevant audience.
Though it is unfashionable to say so, the courts also are entrusted with
a policymaking role. 3 2 2 Not all of the extreme deference to legislatures reflected in the findings of the previous Part, therefore, is warranted. Courts must make judgments about youth as a class when they
determine, for example, what mental states are "reasonable" for adolescents; whether the factual assumptions about foresight undergirding the felony-murder doctrine and accomplice liability are
irrational when applied to youth; and whether youth are so different
from adults as to warrant categorical protection under the Eighth
Amendment from extreme, lifelong, irrevocable punishments. As
such legal determinations inevitably include policy judgments, courts
should feel free to take from developmental neuroscience the same
modest messages as would a legislature.
Whether directed at courts or legislatures, though, adolescent
brain science never should be the primary argument for juvenile justice reform. The real struggle lies elsewhere, and always will.
First, the persuasive power of developmental neuroscience always
will be limited by confirmation biases. This may not seem obviously
In re Hegney, 158 P.3d 1193, 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting WASH. REV.
§ 9.94A.540 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (historical and statutory notes). In
North Carolina, advocates are engaged in an ongoing campaign-flavored with lessons from neuroscience-to raise the state's jurisdictional age to 18. See Birckhead,
supra note 88, at 1463-64.
320 Statement Related to Wisconsin's Age of Adult Criminal Responsibility. Governor's Juvenile Justice Commission (Feb. 2009), available at http://njn.org/media/
resources/public/resource_961.pdf (listing eight relevant factors, of which "recent
and evolving brain development research" was one).
321 See Hearingon S.B. 839 Before the Comm. On CriminalJustice,2009 Leg., 81st Sess.
(Tex. 2009) (testimony of Isela Gutidrrez, Juvenile Justice Initiative Director, Texas
Criminal Justice Coalition), available at http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/
files/userfiles/publicpolicy/SB_839_Testimony.pdf; Texas Legislature Online, 81(R)
History for SB839, http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=81
R&Bill=SB839.
322 See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGEs THINK 81-88 (2008) (stating that all
judges, but particularly appellate judges are "occasional legislators" whose policymaking
powers are greatest in "legalistically indeterminate" cases presenting a "zone of reasonableness" of interpretation).
319
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so, as a number of recent studies show that people unduly credit
neuroscientific explanations, even bad ones. Those studies suggest
that adolescent brain science is uniquely persuasive.3 23 This Article,
though, suggests instead that such persuasiveness is in fact quite limited. As this author and other scholars elsewhere have demonstrated,
legal decisionmakers (like all people) filter factual assertions, including scientific ones, through their prior beliefs, values, and commitments. 32 4 They tend to accept evidence as relevant and plausible
where it aligns with implicit views and judgments and to reject it when
it does not.3 25 This Article strongly suggests that such bias is operational here. In many cases, this factual filtering is shaped by views
based on record evidence. For instance, in the Delaware capital case,
evidence of the defendant's high level of planning capacity reduced
subsequent testimony about adolescent brains to "psychobabble" in
the jurors' eyes. 3 26 In contrast, where sentencing courts were
presented with credible evidence that particular defendants had
matured, they saw in brain science a plausible explanation.3 2 7 More
abstract background beliefs, too, play a filtering role. Legal actors
evaluate brain science through implicit political, cultural, or rolebased perspectives that predispose them to favor or disfavor juveniles'
claims. 328 That phenomenon may explain why juvenile advocates and
defenders have tended wholeheartedly to embrace neuroscience and
to take a broad view of its implications, while prosecutors have tended
323 See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain
Images on judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 344 (2008); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of NeuroscienceExplanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470 (2008) ("Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to
generate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific information," and
"irrelevant neuroscience information ... may interfere with people's abilities to critically consider the underlying logic.").
324 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REV. 837, 842 (2009) ("[P]erceptions of
fact are pervasively shaped by our commitments to shared but contested views of individual virtue and social justice."); Maroney, supra note 16, at 885-86.
325 Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 112-14 (1998) (noting that lawyers
and judges frequently reject as invalid empirical psychological evidence where it conflicts with their "common sense" views).
326 State v.Jones, No. 9911016309, 2005 WL 950122, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 10,
2005).
327 See supra note 157 (discussing case in which a Delaware family court credited
demonstrated rehabilitation of youthful sex offender).
328 See, e.g., The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://culturalcognition.net (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (collecting research on cultural cognition biases).
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to take just the opposite tack, acknowledging the basic empirical
points about structural maturation but displaying extreme skepticism
as to its relevant behavioral implications.3 2 9 Judges and juries, too,
necessarily come to juvenile cases with implicit views. It is noteworthy
that in every instance in which a court positively cited developmental
neuroscience, it did so as part of a roster of reasons why it would reach
a particular result. Not only were the other items on the roster sufficient to justify the result, the fact that the court credited them is one
reason why it also found the science relevant. Steinberg recently has
argued that the same phenomenon is true for legislatures, who "often
look to science for evidence that supports a position they have take for
other reasons."3 3 0 Developmental neuroscience is not materially shifting beliefs and values; it is instead being read through the lens of
those beliefs and values.
To make this point is not to cast aspersions on legal advocates
and decisionmakers for coming to their tasks with views about juvenile
offenders and their proper treatment, whether in the abstract or as to
a specific person. Human beings necessarily have such views, and
these views necessarily influence how facts are regarded. The point,
rather, is that a clear-eyed recognition of the phenomenon should
temper expectations. The value-confirmation bias confines the persuasive potential of adolescent brain science to cases of ambivalence
or equipoise. In all other instances, it is likely to be understood in a
manner conforming to conclusions to which the decisionmaker
already is inclined.
The real task, then, for those seeking juvenile justice reform is to
influence such beliefs, values, and inclinations directly rather than
expect such influence to flow naturally from explanation of neuroscience. While there is no simple formula for that task, it has long
been the bread and butter of juvenile justice scholarship and advocacy. It includes demonstrating the ways in which teens are developmentally distinct, but also educating the public and legal
decisionmakers about the real-world effects of juvenile policy and
329 See, e.g., supra note 8 (citing prosecutors' guides to rebutting juvenile brain
science); see also Greene & Cohen, supra note 49, at 215 (arguing that Scott and Steinberg's enthusiasm for adolescent brain science is based on a "moral intuition,"
grounded in an unstated dualist mind-brain dichotomy, and is appealing to them
because it "allows us to blame adolescents' brains instead of the adolescents
themselves").
330 Steinberg, supra note 8 (manuscript at 20) ("[I]t is highly unlikely that
lawmakers are going to rewrite statutes because of a new study of synaptic pruning,
myelination, brain activity, or neurotransmission. If only scientists held such sway in
our legislatures.").
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what "works" from a utilitarian perspective. Such messages suffer
from few of the vulnerabilities attending brain science. The strongest
challenge to transfer schemes, for example, has nothing to do with
the juvenile brain and everything to do with robust data consistently
showing that transfer to adult court increases recidivism 3 3 ' and that
many youth transferred to adult court are accused not of serious interpersonal violence but of property crimes.33 2 The public might be
even more moved if they fully understood how frequently incarceration with adults leads to physical and sexual abuse.33 3 Strict "zero tolerance" policies in schools are becoming increasingly unpopular
because they lead to patently absurd results.3 3 4 Attitudes about
JLWOP might be swayed by stories of youth who have grown into different people, and yet necessarily will die in prison;3 35 juvenile sex
offender registration may seem less palatable if the public were to
learn about the range of youth on such lists (including, for example,
preadolescents who engaged in inappropriate "play" and have
responded well to treatment) and what registration does to their
futures.3 3 6
Developmental principles, in short, tend to draw our attention
inward. We need, too, to maintain a clear view of the world within
which youth develop. Societal factors such as stable families, safe
331 Jeffrey Fagan, The ComparativeAdvantage ofJuvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAw & POL'v 77, 100 (1996);
Angela McGowan et al., Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Effects on Violence of
Laws and Policies Facilitatingthe Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile to the Adult justice
System, 32 Am. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S7 (2007); Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer
Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?,Juv. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2008,
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfflilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
332 See Deitch et al., supra note 272, at 30-31.
333 See id. at 55 (reporting studies showing much higher levels of physical and
sexual abuse of youth held in adult, not juvenile, facilities); CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH
JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES 13 (2007), available at http://www.campaign4youthjustice.
org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFJ-Jailing juvenilesReport_2007-11-15.

pdf.
334 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009)
(invalidating strip search of middle-school girl on suspicion of possessing ibuprofen);
Bob Herbert, Editorial, 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A17
(reporting on a six-year-old girl who was arrested for throwing a tantrum during

class); Ian Urbina, Suspended Boy Back in School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at A22
(reporting on six-year-old boy whose suspension for bringing a Cub Scout tool to
school prompted parental protest and changes to policy).
335 See, e.g., EQUALJUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 25-33 (2007), available

at http://eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.
336 See, e.g., Maggie Jones, How Can You Distinguish a Budding Pedophilefrom a Kid
with Real Boundary Problems?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22, 2007, at 32, 39, 56.
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housing, medical and mental health care, good schools, and economic opportunities-all subject to relatively direct societal controlwill continue to be the most important contributors to juvenile
offending, and they should continue to receive the lion's share of
attention. This is particularly so because a disproportionate focus on
the teen brain tends to support a false notion that teens' propensity to
offend is "hard-wired," a view that not only makes societal reform
seem pointless but, by implying the impossibility of deterrence, could
support needless incapacitation of many youth until their brains
"grow up."3 37
Educating the public and policymakers about teen brain development need not devolve into such counterproductive reductionism;
instead, understanding the brain's "biological processes can actually
enhance the importance of behavioral or social policy interventions"
by highlighting the extraordinary impact of environment during a
critical period of development.3 3 8 Conceptualizing neuroscience as
background rather than foreground keeps us collectively focused on
creating the conditions necessary for youth to become healthy, productive adults-including those youth who have committed serious
offenses.

337

Shepherd, supra note 88, at 52 (stating that a juvenile's behavioral traits are
THE NEW
YORKER, Apr. 24, 2006, at 129 (showing parent disciplining teenage son by saying,
'Young man, go to your room and stay there until your cerebral cortex matures"); see
also Buss, supra note 13, at 509-10 (noting the danger that by deferring too heavily to
developmental principles, including brain science, law "will lock in a developmental
status quo," and asserting that "law can shape development instead of the other way
around").
338 Dahl, supra note 273, at 4 ("Evidence of brain plasticity in the early years of life
has not led to the conclusion that parenting and social experience are unimportant

"literally hard-wired into the adolescent brain"); B. Smaller, Cartoon,

.

. ..

[We] are more likely to emphasize the value of social policies that protect and

support infants and toddlers during this important period of brain development.
There are . . . parallel opportunities [with] adolescent brain development."); see Aber
Brief, supra note 128, at 25-29 (discussing young brain's extreme plasticity in
response to environmental pressures, both positive and negative); see also Elizabeth
Cauffman, The Adolescent Brain:Excuse Versus Explanation, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci.
160, 161 (2004) ("[W]e should view our findings as providing an explanation that may
enable more effective means of encouraging healthy development."). Advocates,
commentators, researchers, and experts frequently acknowledge the role of environment. See, e.g., Ann S. Masten, Regulatory Processes, Risk, and Resilience in Adolescent
Development, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 310, 312 (2004); RETHINKING THE JUVENILE,

supra note 7, at 13-14. Nevertheless, that point is at risk of being overshadowed.
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CONCLUSION

This Article tells a cautionary tale.3 39 Relying aggressively on
developmental neuroscience in legal theory and practice might wear
out its welcome early, even though it now offers some law-relevant
insights and in the future might offer more.3 40 The courts' early cold
shoulder shows this to be a real danger. Nor is such reliance necessary, as we already have all the information we need to construct a
rational juvenile justice policy. Adolescent brain science does not provide an independent basis to recommit to traditional juvenile justice
values; it merely reinforces the wisdom of doing so. The bulk of that
wisdom comes not from understanding what is going on inside the
teen brain but from understanding the impact of the legal and social
environments we create for young people.
We need that wisdom now, as we are at a potentially momentous
crossroad for juvenile justice. By removing the most extreme possible
punishment for youth, Roper unquestionably has shifted the terms of
debate. Recent legislative developments suggest that the states are,
wisely, starting to roll back some of the policy changes of the 1990s. 3 4 1
Most Americans report being committed to second chances for
youth. 3 4 2 Even recent fiscal challenges have wrought change, as states
seek to avoid costly incapacitation if cheaper alternatives, like supervised release and family therapy, can be shown equally effective.3 43
339 See Munakata et al., supra note 1, at 125 box 3 (stating that "the excitement
surrounding" developmental cognitive neuroscience, "and the potential applications
of this research, increase the need for caution in interpreting study results and their
implications").
340 STRAUCH, supra note 4, at 215 (quoting scholars worried that brain science will
be reduced to a "fad" or allowed to narrow rather than broaden understanding of
teen behavior).
341 See, e.g., 2007 Conn. Acts 07-4 §§ 87-88 (Spec. Sess.) (raising jurisdictional
limit of juvenile court to age eighteen).
342 See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., PublicAttitudes About the Culpability and Punishment of
Youth Offenders, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 815, 827 (2006); CTR. FOR CHILDREN'S LAW &
POLICY, POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE 3 (2007), available at http://www.macfound.org/atf/
cf/%7Bb0386ce3-8b29-4162-8098-e466fb856794%7D/cclppollingfinal.pdf; Barry Krisberg & Susan Marchionna, Attitudes of US Voters Toward Youth Crime and the Justice System, FOCUS (Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency, Oakland, Cal.), Feb. 2007, at 3,
available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/zogby-feb07.pdf.
343 See Editorial, Money Saved, Safer Streets, CHI. TRuB., Apr. 25, 2009, at 14 (noting
that the "Redeploy Illinois" program "saves money and steers kids in the right direction" by keeping them out of more costly detention while simultaneously reducing
recidivism); Jackie Nash, Legislation Would Transform Ohio's CriminalProsecution ofDelinquent Children, DAILY REP. (Atlanta, Ga.),July 7, 2009, at 1 (discussing H.B. 235, which
would prioritize cheaper community-based treatment over incarceration). Fiscal challenges also have created opposing pressures, highlighting the need to focus policy-
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These shifts may well portend a welcome new era in juvenile justice,
one in which recommitment to the protection and rehabilitation of
youth is the driving first principle. But if we move into that new era, it
will not be because of adolescent brain science. To the extent that the
science appears to promise transformation, it is a false promise.

makers on first principles even in hard economic times. See Kate Howard, Budget
Cuts Could Hurt Nashville's Juvenile Court, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 23, 2009, at BI (reporting that victims' rights group and a judge both warn of negative fallout from cuts to
programming and probation services).

